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VOL, XXXV_— VSsYCHOLOGICAL REVIEW PUBLICATIONS 


WHOLE NO. 16 
1926 


Psychological Monographs 


EDITED BY 


SHEPHERD I. FRANZ, Univ. or Catir., So. Br. 
HOWARD C. WARREN, Princeton University (Review) 
JOHN B. WATSON, New York City (Review) 
MADISON BENTLEY, Unversity or Inurnots (J. of Exp. Psych.) 
S. W. FERNBERGER, Unrversity or PENNSYLVANIA (Bulletin) 
WALTER S. HUNTER, Crarx University (Inder) 


Studies in Psychology 


From the University of Illinois 


EDITED BY 
MADISON ‘BENTLEY 


PSYCHOLOGICAL REVIEW COMPANY 


PRINCETON, N. J. 
AND ALBANY, N. Y. 


Acents: G. E. STECHERT & CO., Lonpon (2 Star Yard, Carey St., W. C.) 
Paris (16 rue de Condé) 





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NY ie i i] 
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NER 


IV. 


TABLE OF CONTENTS 


The relation of instruction to the psychosomatic 
functions. By Oscar F. Weber and Madison 
Detter terre ey Tt hg i cae alle ue Lor we ae Late 

Search; a function intermediate between perception 
and thinking. By Howard L. Kingsley........ 

Studies in psychometric theory. By Elmer Culler. . 

l, The Pechnerian time-space errors... ...).....*. 
2. Absolute impression and the “tendencies of 
JUGS Tet sy aie. se aneue ders, 4 Ueno iety acct twee) 

3. The methodological importance of Xi...... 
4. On the use of a variable standard.......... 
5. On the Urban weights and their reliability. . 
6. The probable error of the limen and its 
PMCTI VATION Latuaabonnioe NW Ltt Ca oa ah is 

7, On the perception) of: changey oss.) 0.4.4 
8. On the use of an intermediate category of 
judgment (“ equal” or “ doubtful”’)..... 

9. On adopting the probable error of the psycho- 
metric function (Urban) as the “limen”’.. 

AU eRe Herstiritiiiseehroinds iia arminy sv yke ts we thei ik 

Allport’s experiments in social facilitation. By 
ee COV ALEATNISOM ie tunisia enn rene al dunn Somalia Ol 

Qualitative resemblance among odors. By Madison 
ESAT Gy epee RIAN A teal Aue UNG Nee tach ali a ZAld 


PAGE 


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In 2022 with funding from 
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_httos://archive.org/details/studiesinpsychol0Obent 


THE RELATION OF “INSTRUCTION ” TO THE 
PSYCHOSOMATIC FUNCTIONS 


By Oscar F. WEBER AND MapIson BENTLEY | 


THE PROBLEM 


In sustaining its intercourse with nature, as well as for its own 
internal regulation, the human organism has recourse to a con- 
siderable number of psychosomatic or “ mind-body” functions 
or modes of operation. These functions may be indicated by 
the terms perception, memory, imagination, action, emotion, com- 
prehension and elaboration or thinking. Like all organic opera- 
tions these functions proceed from definable conditions; that is 
to say, they are induced by specific antecedents, which serve to 
throw the organism into commission for a given operation. On 
the bodily side, are neural trends or sets, glandular reserves, dis- 
posable energy and other available means. On the mental side, 
or (to be more exact) within phenomenal experience, are to be 
found intents, anticipations, forward-looking hints, premonitions 
and commands. Under our common conditions in the laboratory 
the anticipation of function usually appears in the formal instruc- 
tion, ““ Move quickly when the stimulus light appears,’’ “ Attend 
to the fixation mark,’ “ Read the syllables,’ and so on. The 
same form of preparation is likewise given in common life by 
such phrases as “ Look at the valley when we approach the next 
turn,’ “ Hold your hat on” and ‘“ Lend me a match.” But 
just as much, whether we are in the street or in the laboratory, 
does the occasion itself (e.g., the wayside fountain, the approach 
of the street car, the half-familiar face, the fire-siren) or the 
orgamsm itself (“ I must get to work,” “ What was that name? ”’ 
“T can if I try’’) “instruct” the individual toward some func- 
tional performance. Thus is the psychological organism. con- 
stantly set, tuned, bullied, encouraged or charged for seeing and 
for hearing, for remembering, for acting and suffering emotion, 


2 OSCAR F. WEBER AND MADISON BENTLEY 


for understanding and for thinking. Always is the body pre- 
pared; and phenomenal experience also contains premonitions, 
prophecies, announcements and intimations of imminent and 
forthcoming tasks and operations. 

And not only do these functional antecedents throw the 
organism into commission for its performances. Since they 
stand as compact surrogates for the animal’s history, they also 
—if they fit the occasion—facilitate an approaching function, 
give it precision, inform it with significance, and render it both 
apt and effective. 

Now the psychological experiment, with its trained observers 
and its nice control of conditions, as well as the less analytic test, 
have made it plain that such performances of the organism as 
we have indicated are carried through with high variability. 
Individuals vary in the accomplishment of one and the same task 
and the single individual himself varies from time to time and 
from occasion to occasion. These wide variations are generally 
laid to differences of a vaguely conceived “ capacity,” though at 
times the operation of diverse and multitudinous “ mental func- 
tions’ is also invoked. It is our intent to suggest in this study 
that the main factor to be taken into account, both in under- 
standing the functional operations themselves and in supplying 
a key to the wide variability of their output or accomplishment, 
lies elsewhere; that it lies in the antecedents of function and in 
the precise resources of the organism which they throw into 
commission for the task in hand. 

In order to make our study as empirical as we can, we have, 
in what follows, left aside the bodily factors of functional 
preparation, where our knowledge is, for the greater part, both 
hypothetical and vague; and we have confined ourselves to the 
experiential factors, to those antecedent factors which are at 
hand for the report of the observer and which depict the actual 
way in which the organism devotes itself to the discharge of an 
impending function. Taken all together we shall use the common 
term “instruction” to include all the experiential or phenomenal 
facts which lead up to and usher in the functional performance. 


STODIES IN ‘PSYCHOLOGY 3 


Among these factors we shall distinguish three types of instruc- 
tion, ‘‘ formal,” “ occasional’ and “ self-imposed,” and we shall 
discuss the relation of instruction to attitude, posture, predisposi- 
tion, task and Aufgabe. 


Historical summary. Kulpe’s early insistence upon the determination of 
action by instruction (in the form of expectant attention) and the primary use 
by Ach, Watt, Messer and other representatives of the Wurzburg School of 
the concept of Aufgabe in the initiation and progress of thinking are every- 
where known in psychology. Meumann’ noted that the associative reaction 
depends upon the form of the instruction (‘‘respond as quickly as possible,” 
“as effectively as possible,” etc.) ; Whipple® that the stimulus threshold for 
pain varies with the verbal instruction (“report when the pressure is mildly 
disagreeable,” “is uncomfortable,” “begins to hurt,” etc.) ; Fernberger* that 
the hint to look for a “difference” affected the magnitude of the differential 
limen; George’ made it clear that the “doubtful” judgment may rest upon an 
ambiguous or shifting instruction and has therefore to be carefully controlled 
in the psychophysical metric methods, and Godfrey Thomson*® approached the 
concept of instruction and its influence upon function in his naive comment 
that the mode of psychophysical report depends upon “a conscious act of the 
subject, and can be varied, if he is so disposed, at his whim.” Many experi- 
mental researches have made explicit study of the effect in various fields of 
the form of instruction upon report. We may mention Friedlander, Fernberger 
and Reid with lifted weights,’ Pratt ® with tonal complexes, and Hoisington 
and others® with limens for film color. Occasionally some attention has been 
paid to the control of the instruction in the administering of the test; albeit 
the setting of a gross task usually takes for granted there the actual instruction 
under which the subject labors. We have abundant evidence, however, that 
high training and careful regard of observational errors are necessary to insure 
functional performance under a fixed and unequivocal instruction. Mere 
docility and faithful intent to do as the administrator of a test generally directs 
offer no guarantee whatsoever either that the psychosomatic operations are 
called forth as the verbal instructions imply or that the same or even similar 
functional resources are appealed to by different observers. 


See, for literature and discussion, BENTLEY, M., The Field of Psychology, 
1924, 360ff, 384ff, 452, 505, 533ff. 

*MeEuMANN, E. Vorlesungen zur FEinfiihrung in die experimentelle 
Pddagogik, 1913, Vol. II, 420. 

* WHIPPLE, G. M. Manual of Mental and Physical Tests, 1914, Pt. I, 236. 

+ FERNBERGER, S. W. Amer. J. of Psychol., 1914, Vol. Oath 538-543. 

°Grorce, S. Ibid., 1917, Vol. XXVIII, 1-37: 

*Tuomson, G. Psychol. Rev., 1920, Vol. XXVII, 300-307. Cf. Boring, 
E. G., Ibid., 440-452. 

*FRIEDLANDER, H. Zsch. f. Psychol., 1920, Vol. LXXXIITI, Meee 
FERNBERGER, S. W., J. of Exper. Psychol., 1921, Vol. IV, 63-76 ; REID, = 
Amer. J. of Psychol., 1924, Vol. XXXV, 53-74. 

a RATT. Gao Ibid., 1921, Vol. XXXII, 490-515. 

~Exiio7, M., WEst, J., and HoIsincTon, L. B. Ibid., 1924, Vol. XXXV, 
125-131. 

1 Jupp, C. H., and Busweti, G. T. Silent Reading; a Study of various 
Types. Univ. of Chicago (Educ. Monog. Suppl., No. 23), 1922 


4 OSCAR F. WEBER AND MADISON BENTLEY 


THe EXPERIMENTS 


The general procedure: Observers™’ were given, under verbal 
instruction, such simple tasks as the reading of plain sentences, of 
unspaced sentences, or of sentences with colons placed between 
succeeding letters. The Os were informed of the general nature 
of the study (the exact reporting of all forms and kinds of 
instruction appearing before and during the task) and they were 
warned that. they could never safely assume that the verbal 
formula of the experimenter was the actual instruction under 
which they proceeded. The following description was supplied 
upon a sheet of paper to each observer before he began his 
observations, and it was subsequently kept near him for reference. 


Tue Nature oF “ INSTRUCTION ” 


Any preparation of the organism for the performance of a mind-body func- 
tion might be looked upon as an “ instruction.” Thus the organism might be 
said to be prepared or “instructed” to do so-and-so, 1.e., to observe, to under- 
stand, to remember, and the like. This use of the term “ instruction” would, 
however, include such purely hypothetical factors as neural “trends,” “sets” 
and “predispositions,” as well as directly observable and reportable anticipa- 
tions, commands, and forecasts. Since we are here concerned with matters of 
observation only, we shall neglect these hypothetical factors and consider under 
“instruction” only those forms of preparation which fall within the com- 
mentary of the observer or subject. 

These forms are three, namely, (1) the formally imposed instruction, (2) the 
self-imposed instruction, and (3) the occasional instruction. 

The formally imposed instruction is verbal. It is given by another indi- 
vidual, as in the instruction accompanying a test; e.g., “In order to add the 
following numbers you may rearrange them,” or “Can you find suitable verb- 
forms to fill in the blanks in the following sentences?” or “ Study the chart 
on the next page.” The formal instruction is, then, a verbal statement, query 
or command, oral or written, as it is comprehended by the subject. 

The self-imposed instruction is the instruction which the individual gives 
himself, e.g., “I must add as fast as I can” (command), “ Shall I look at the 
whole picture first?’ (query), “I may take my time” (comment), or “TI 
must not be distracted ” (negative command). 

In the occasional instruction the subject is incited to his task by some feature 
of the task itself, which directly suggests the mode of performance or the end 
to be achieved; e.g., the expression 

454 
5 


“ Professor Bentley (B), Dr. Griffith (G), Dr. Young (Y), Dr. Culler (C), 
Dr. Kingsley (K), Miss Anderson (A), and Miss Hopkins (Ho), members 
of the staff of the Department of Psychology, and Mr. Mikesell (M), Miss 
Wedekind (W), and Miss Hatfield (Ha), graduate students. 


STUDIES IN PSYCHOLOGY 5 
presented without words from the experimenter would be likely itself to give 
the instruction “Multiply,” whereas a column of three-place numbers, as 


621 
278 
342 
534 


would be likely to give the instruction “ Add these numbers.” But the occasion 
may be the source of instruction in other ways, e.g., any of the factors, light, 
the time of day, or the tone of the experimenter, might conceivably thus serve. 

You will find, furthermore, that each of these instructions takes two forms; 
namely, positive and negative, preparing either for or against a given type of 
performance. As you carry out the tasks to be assigned, note these forms and 
mention them as you find them. 


The Os were familiar with the two forms of report, the 
inspection (a descriptive account of qualitative variety, including 
the intensive, durational and other degrees in which a given 
quality might appear) and the commentary (O’s historical account 
of his experiences related in terms of performance and of the 
conditions of performance.’* It was made plain that the main 
report was to be made in the form of the commentary. The 
tabular outline of Table I was supplied for each observation. 
Columns 2, 3 and 4 have been filled in from sample observations 
to make clear the character of the report. Column 2 gives the 
sequence of the instructions reported, column 3 the psychosomatic 
function which the instruction induced, and column 4 the func- 
tional product, in terms of things perceived, understood, hinted 
at, guessed, queried, thought out, etc. After a “ready” signal, 
FE exposed the typed command “ Read the following,” and there- 
upon visually appeared for a few seconds and at a convenient 


”) 


reading distance the typed sentence, 


FEW ARE ABLE TO GRANT TO OTHERS THE RIGHT TO ERR. 


The results, put down in terms of instruction, of functions elicited, 
and of functional products are exemplified by the following Table. 


4 The terms employed and the conception of function follow Bentley, The 
Field of Psychology, 1924, 189ff, 384ff. For the distinction drawn between 
“inspection” and “commentary,” as forms of the psychological report, see 
pp. 20, 41-44, 197-199, 208. 


6 OSCAR F. WEBER AND MADISON BENTLEY 





TABLE I 
Form of Rep’ted P-S funct’ns 
instruction Obs. sequ’ce introduced Functional products™® 
Formal B 1 E’s words understood 
o 1 P&C Sentence seen and generally understood 
Y 1 €s E’s words understood 
Self B z C I am to get the meaning (Vb) 
¢ 3 C This is what I am expected to do (Vb) 
Y “2 C Just what does it mean? (Ps) 
4 The sentence is ambiguous (Kn) 
Occasional B 3 © The words challenge comprehension(Ps) 
4 EI That is a thought problem (Vb) 
5 E Ah! that solution is satisfactory (Ps) 
C 2 M Sentence suggested a passage in 
+ E This task is foolish: I resent it 
Og : El Thought problem (stage of formulation) 


El Is the statement true? (Vb) 

P = perception. M=—=memory. I—imagination. A—action. E—emotion. 
C=comprehension. El—elaboration or thinking. (Ps)—=posture (Bewusst- 
seinslage, attitude). (Vb) verbalization. (K)=kinesthetic vehicle. 


RESULTS 


Series I. Besides the sentence quoted above, the three follow- 
ing statements were employed under the same conditions: 


ANATOLE FRANCE HAS PRONOUNCED H. G. WELLS TO BE THE GREATEST 
INTELLECTUAL FORCE IN THE WORLD TO-DAY. 

THE PUPILS INSISTED THEY HAD THOUGHT TO RECITE TO BE TO READ THE 
EXERCISE. 

WHAT WILL BE McA——’s FIRST MOVE IN CHICAGO? 


To avoid the decay through repetition of the first formal (verbal) instruction 
the form of the phrase was constantly changed. Variations employed were 
“See what follows,” “I want you to read the following” and “Can you read 
the following?” Even with these variations this part of the instruction tended 
to change into the occasional kind, in which the experimental setting anticipated 
the entire exposure, finally to be abbreviated into the perceptive-kinesthetic 
eae common in the reaction experiment, with the meaning “ Here comes the 
tas 

When allowance is made for differences in completeness and accuracy from 
the various O’s, we observe that the results are practically the same for all 
and for all four sentences. Beginning with the formal instruction (F-I), 
“Read, etc.,” which led to a preliminary comprehension, the task was then 
sustained by from 2 to 5 self (S-I) and occasional (O-I) instructions which 


* Tt is necessary to make our reports in verbal form. The reader must 
remember, however, that in many cases neither the instruction (self and occa- 
sional) nor the functional performance itself proceeded by way of words. 
Many postures (Bewusstseinslagen), tendinous strains, organic configurations, 
and so on, served to carry both the instruction and the operations themselves. 
At times a general attitude (as of willingness, skepticism, rivalry, curiosity) 
appeared before the experiment began and carried right through, exerting its 
strong influence upon the entire course of events. The “good” observer knows 
how to neutralize, or at the least to allow for, these fixed settings which often 
predetermine his results and which not infrequently make the reports of the 
“poor” observer absolutely worthless. 


STUDIES IN PSYCHOLOGY 7 


issued in comprehension and elaboration. Once or twice a memorial or imag- 
inational apprehension appeared; once a distinct action came from the self- 
instruction, “ You must sweep your eyes .across”; and two or three emotive 
stirs cut across comprehension or elaboration. About three times as many 
S-I and O-I appeared as instructions of the formal sort. Had we included the 
preliminary period of adjustment (Vorperiode), doubtless we should have 
increased the ratio. Although the exposure-time was tempered to the reader’s 
rate, it never exceeded 20 seconds. 


Series I]. To shift the interplay of instructions we now 
increased the difficulty of the task, (a) by sense sentences typed 
with equal spacing— 


NO Wile ORG HEH EEN DH ALD COME 
PON to AN DO eM PO RE HE S'A TH ERE 
ONANDONARGUEDTHEAGEDANGLER 
Peel Ge Olbe hha oA AN Dil Tih RiW-E RoE ON UE 
and (b) with the intervening colon— 
Gh Ashe: Meh eNecHee WA: SLE eA“S :T WE C:0:M:E 
I:-N:A:N:T:N:A:N:E:W:A:Y:0:N:A:N:D:0:N:H:E:R:A:M:B:L:E:D 
Pies brisket ek SH Be BO Bah: O ss -B SA: OL: TAB: 
Posies bi ACL ithe) -Riej-O3S Hal tAcZe Bik UB: BAB: 
. ? 


E:L:A:N:D:H:A:G G:A:1:: 


The literate and bookish adult is so constantly primed for print that a simple 
formal command to read might be assumed to be sufficient to touch off that 
facile and highly integrated train of perceptive-actional-comprehending func- 
tions which we know as “reading.’”’ Under our experimental conditions, how- 
ever, where the observer is accustomed to take a specific task seriously and 
responsibly, we find that a fairly rich and varied supply of S-I and O-I is at 
hand. We shall not be surprised, moreover, when we increase the puzzling and 
enigmatical element in our typed objects, as in these samples in Series II, to 
find that both the number and the importance of the S-I and the O-I have 
increased. There the verbal formula to “read” does not carry the observer 
far into the task. Now the O-I take the forms “ Does that make sense?”, 
“That does not go,” “ What a puzzling thing!”, “ There is a real word: that 
is a beginning,” “ Now what is this word before it?” Frequently the occasion 
blocked the verbal instruction to “read” and substituted the O-I, “Is it a 
puzzle to be solved?” “ How is this to be read?” and the like. At times the 
immediate and persistent blocking of the “reading” functions turned the 
verbal command into a haunting master-instruction of the self-type which 
meant “I must manage to read the thing.” The chief form of the S-I came 
as goads, hints and encouragements. “There is a real word; now get the 
next,” “Go on from left to right and see what you can find,” “Try to group 
the letters,” “ That is not sense (‘O Nan, do’); try another combination,” 
“There is the end-word; now go backwards,” “I must run through again,” 
“Ah, I am getting the whole thing.” Frequently the S-I was loaded with 
“experimenter’s conscience,” which charged the whole procedure with such 
emotive flavors as “I must hasten,” “I am not doing well enough,” “ Stupid 
ass: why don’t I get on!” And there was not wanting the “pious self” 
(every laboratory has at least one) which commented “I could have arranged 
matters better,” “I will do my own way,” “This is nonsense,” “ Why bother 
to analyse: I am a behaviorist.” 

A perusal-of these typical S-I and O-I will make it apparent that the 
integrated and smooth “reading” complex was thoroughly broken up. What 
replaced it? Our protocols give us both the functions and their products. 
There is a good deal of what Kingsley (this volume, pp. 52-53) has called 


8 OSCAR F. WEBER AND MADISON BENTLEY 


“perceptive search.” Instead of words bearing symbolic meanings the observer, 
driven by occasional and self instructions, sought out literal integrations which 
should “make sense.” Presently came a partial comprehension, then a rejec- 
tion, then more comprehension, then more “search,” then more significant 
words, and finally the total meaning. On the way came, as in Series I, an 
occasional action (looking backward or forward under an S-I or O-I) and, 
more frequently, emotively-toned trains (vexation, remonstrance, self-con- 
demnation, despair, reproach, flurry, etc.). Of true elaboration we found 
none. Once the troublesome words came out and went together, O discharging 
his task. Nothing was left to “think out”; or at least the O’s did not instruct 
themselves to set thought-problems, as they frequently did in Series I. 


Fractionation: Although simple our “ reading tasks ” brought 
out a fairly large amount of reportable stuff. We did not seek 
anything like the “ complete introspections ”’ recently criticized by 
Pratt'* and long standing under suspicion. Our instructions did 
turn out, however, to be fairly varied and compendious. Still 
we cannot assume that the reports were exhaustive under our 
rubrics. There was, in particular, a tendency for the observers 
to translate their experiences into verbal associative trains and 
then to reconstruct, at the end, the individual instructions and 
to schematize the resulting functions. We therefore resorted to 
fractionation. A given sentence (of the kind previously used 
in Series I and II) was exposed for 1, 2, 4, or 6 seconds under 
the same conditions as before. New sentences were employed, 
so that the actual problem was fresh and untried. For the various 
fractionation times the sentences were given in unlike order and 
each of four Os (A, Ha, Ho and M) made 20 observations at 
each of the 4 fractionations; 320 observations in all. The 
numerical results follow (Table IT): 


* Pratt, C. C., J. of Philos., 1924, xxi, 225-231. 


_ STUDIES IN PSYCHOLOGY | 9 


TABLE II 
Exposure Total 
Instrn Times he ” Bo 6” —Instr’ns 
Formal Obs=A 20 20 20 20 80 


Self Obs= 25 25 15 25 90 


Occasional Obs=A 1 4 16 11 32 
Ha 2 7 8 5 20 

Ho 4 11 6 11 32 

M 1 6 10 7 24 

otaia wah S 26 AN Sac 3A tt 108 


It appears that, notwithstanding the brief exposures, about as 
many instructions of the “ self” and “ occasional ” kinds resulted 
as in the longer, unfractionated trials. It seems probable, then, 
that the latter went far beyond the O’s limit of report, thus losing 
a large part of the commentary. In the fractionated periods S—I 
are more frequent incentives to functional performance than the 
F-I given in the command (335 against 320). It also appears 
that O-I are relatively infrequent (108); and almost wholly 
wanting (8) with the l-sec. exposure. 


Intimations of individual tendency toward the form of instruction suggest 
that A and Ho were most inclined to substitute or supplement by inserting S-I 
and O-I. Together they contribute about 2/3 of these two classes. Psy- 
chologists of wide experience in analytical problems will have observed a 
tendency among untrained and instable observers to debate and to interpret in 
a variety of ways the fixed verbal commands which they receive. How little 
the mere words themselves actually determine function and output in the 
average “test,” where means and methods are prescribed only in the vaguest 
and most ambiguous manner, may be conjectured. The variety and diversity 
in S-I and O-I may be taken from the following samples. 


Obs.=A “ What more should I do?” “ Try hard to read it,” “ What does 
it really say?” “I will just look at it,’ “Why try really to 
understand,” “ No use; it goes too fast,” “Do I believe that?” 
“T’ll go back now to the earlier words,” “ Leave that word and 
go on,” “Be quick,” “Shall I try to answer the question?” 
“Does that make sense?” 


10 OSCAR F. WEBER AND MADISON BENTLEY 


Obs.==Ho “I must understand,” “I will just perceive the letters,” “I am 
not obliged to understand,” “I can read this,” “I am not satis- 
fied,” “I have done this one once,” “Is this text sane?” “I no 
longer notice the formal instruction,’ “ Nothing here but ob- 
scure perception of letters,” “I shall hurry over the first part,” 
“What does that word mean?” “I know this: I can be lazy,” 
“To ‘read’ means to ‘read words, not letters,’” “ There must 
be something coherent here,” “I wish that I had more time.” 

Obs.—=Ha “I am trying to understand the whole,” “I wish that I could 
have it again,’ “Those are just words, not sense,’ “ He is 
playing a joke on me,” “Are his instructions arranged in regular 
order?” “Don’t bother to read beyond the first two words,” 
“T wonder whether this one will be stupid?” “ Well; I have 
conquered one,” “I must get this one in the same way,” “I 
won't attempt a solution,’ “I want to agree with that, but I 
cannot.” 

Obs.=M “T wonder if this is true?” “ Only a jumble of letters,” “I ques- 
tion its significance,” ‘“ No need to include that,’ “There; I 
have understood,” “There is the same sentence again,’ “ Do 
not try too hard,” “ Perhaps you misunderstood,” “Too slow,” 
“Be careful,” “Guard your attention.” 

Series III. Puzzling search. Throughout the first series the 
psychosomatic functions chiefly elicited were comprehension and 
elaboration, with more of the former than of the latter. In the 
second series, with shorter times and more hindrance offered 
to solution, the functional integration of ‘symbols,’ which we 
commonly call “reading,” fell apart, throwing out elaboration 
and inducing fragments of the simpler functions; namely, per- 
ception, flashes of memory and emotion, and small impulsive 
actions. In order to call out a wider range of functional resources 
than in either of these series and then to see by what sort of 
instructional means these functions were brought into commis- 
sion, we continued our study with more complicated and more 
‘puzzling ’’ situations. Of these we tried three varieties. Our 
results are too few for general inductions; but they paid for 
prospecting in this fertile field. The three varieties were (a) the 
match puzzle (“ Arrange these five small sticks in such a way as 
to construct two closed figures, one of which shall be quadri- 
lateral’’), (b) the code problem (“‘ Try to decipher the code ”’), 
and (c) the nonsense sentence which made sense only when 
turned over, held to the light, and read through the translucent 
paper (“‘ Read the following message’). Most of the characters 
in this last puzzle were digits; but when seen through the page 


from the back the clear message appeared “ Send ten troops on 


STUDIES IN PSYCHOLOGY 11 


the noon express.”” The “code” (b) consisted of 13 nonsense 
characters. The equivalent of one of these was given as “t” and 
of a second as “‘his.’’ Seven observers were given (a) and (b), 
and six of them tried to solve (c) 

(a) Here the initial formal instruction (‘‘ Arrange, etc.’’) first 
developed toward perception (the sight and tactual knowledge 
of the five sticks) and only slowly toward comprehension (e.g., 
“so that is to be the construction’). Then followed various 
instructions. 


S-I: “How have I done this kind before” :—memory (Obs.—=G 

O-I: “They are to be moved so” :—action (Obs.—=K) ; 

S-I: “I must solve it” :—comprehension (Obs.—=W 

O-I: “What are the geometrical possibilities ”:—elaboration (Obs.—=M) 
S-I: “T’ll begin with a square” :—action (Obs.=A) 

S-I: “Iam failing” :—emotion (Obs.—=Ha) 

S-I: “Just how am I to take his command” :—comprehension (Obs.—Ho) 


This sort of task, then, led to a wide variety of instructions and these in- 
structions, in turn, to many functional operations. The fact that relatively 
more of the instructions were of the “Self” kind and fewer of the “ Occa- 
sional” kind than in the previous series suggests that in such dilemmas the 
organism drives itself toward suitable functional means by first representing 
itself as an empirical and efficacious agent. 


(b) The chief addition which came from the series of nonsense 
characters, to be deciphered by the aid of a fragmentary code, 
was the constant reference by the observer to the formal instruc- 
tion and to the code. The organism was not equipped with the 
means for solution, and so it had again and again to seek in the 
formal task and in the characters given for “t” and “his” 
the clue to the meaning. Here a progressive comprehension of 
the characters came to be the end immediately sought, and the 
instructions thereto were many and various. On the whole the 
S-I form was relatively increased. In one series of 33 instructions 


(5 Os) 21 were S-I. 


Ne os One yh the formal instruction mean? ” :—comprehension 
s.— 

-I: “The formal instruction means ‘These peculiar characters are to 
be read’” :—comprehension (Obs.—K) 

-I: “I must refer again to the key”:—comprehension (Obs.—=K) 

-I: “What does ‘+’ mean?” :—comprehension (Obs.==W) 

-I: “I must learn these four letters” :—memory (Obs.—=Ha) 

-I: “Here are symbols without a code; how can I do them?” :—com- 
prehension (Obs.—=Ho) 


OnOonN ms 4 


12 OSCAR F. WEBER AND MADISON BENTLEY 


(c) The formal instruction was most ineffective of all in the 
trick message, which was read only by holding the paper toward 
the light in a reversed position. Simply to “ Read the following 
message ”’ was quite impossible. The dubious half-understanding 
of the command was followed by various O-I, hints from the 
nonsense sentence itself (“‘ Has this a key?” “Is it similar to 
the preceding message?” “‘ Possibly this period is meant to be a 
decimal point,” etc.). As these O-—I failed to bring comprehen- 
sion, the observer had recourse to S—I (“I must do something,’ 
‘How long am I to try?” “ May I ask for help?” and the like). 
No one of these instructions leading to the desired comprehension, 
a real predicament developed and the trial ended with an emotion. 


Summary: ‘To study the forms of instruction and to observe 
the dependence of functional operation upon instruction we 
halted the prompt and high-organized “ reading” function (Per- 
ceptive-apprehension-action-comprehension), which flows directly 
in the literate observer from a single formal instruction 
(“Read”) or a single occasional instruction (‘‘ Here is the 
page’’). A large number of S—I and O-I then appeared, leading 
by more or less devious ways toward the task first set.1° Out of 
these intercallated instructions came representatives of all the 
psychosomatic functions; namely, perception, memory, imagina- 
tion, action, emotion, comprehension and thinking or genuine 
elaboration. While the results are by no means definitive, they 
illustrate a suitable method of approach to the experimental study 
of instruction. They display also the very wide variety of means 
for throwing into commission the resources of the organism. 

Aside from the factual information about the amount and 
variety of instruction present on a given occasion and the relation 
of instruction to subsequent performances of the organism, 
the experiments bear upon several important psychological 
matters. We take them in order. 

1. The correlation of “ stimulus ”’ and “ response”? by sound 
scientific methods is notoriously unsatisfactory. This one-to-one 


15 . . 
’ For our present purposes we may neglect those items in the commentary 
which indicate a procedure in course instead of introducing a new operation. 


STUDIES IN PSYCHOLOGY 13 


connection is as methodically bad as the older K onstanz-Annahme, 
which set the individual “ sensation’ into a state of unequivocal 
dependence upon the individual “ stimulus.” Against this formal 
correlation the Gestalt-Psychologen and others have, as every one 
knows, entered a vigorous protest. In the case of stimulus- 
response, one chief defect lies in the interposition of many variable 
and uncontrolled factors; factors which are best brought to light 
in instruction. On the physiological side is interposed, of course, 
the whole complex activity of the central nervous system. By a 
specious simplification the behaviorist ignores the “ report’ and 
reduces the intermediate bodily factors to a misconceived 
“reflex ’’; a simplification which appears more and more inade- 
quate the closer we come to a knowledge of experience and the 
farther we recede from the naive conception of “ faggots” of 
neurones and “ faggots’ of sensations. The correspondence of 
two distant end-terms a and 2 is not likely to be made out either by 
a neglect of the alphabetical filling or by a theory of undisturbed 
propagation from end to end."® 

2. The inference from output, as in the tests of performance, 
to “ mental functions’ is bound to be unwarranted so long as 
the “mental functions’? are no more than hereditary names 
(“reading functions,’ ‘‘ memory,” “logical associations,” and 
the like) set up to represent actual powers of “‘ mind.” It is only 
by the most carefully trained observation that we are likely to 
discover what actually precedes the turning out of a “ test’ result. 
Our study makes it clear that these antecedents are neither simple 
“mental functions ’’ nor are they constant and invariable activities 

* “For a long time psychologists were inclined to look upon ‘mind’ as a 
kind of hopper into which materials were poured by feeding in ‘stimuli’; that 
is to say, by providing that the body should be carefully restricted to certain 
influences from without. Many behaviorists still take this older view, attempt- 
ing to make a one-to-one correlation between ‘stimulus’ and ‘response’; and 
the rough and uncritical procedure of the ‘mental test’ overlooks the fact that 
the means, as well as the amount, of accomplishment depends upon the exact 
way in which the organism approaches a given task. But the descriptive 
psychologist has learned his lesson. He is just as careful to control disposi- 
tion and task as he is to standardize the immediate experimental situation. 
We may profit, therefore, by his discovery that the organism is not an idle 
machine which can be set into operation by pulling a lever; but that it always 


tends some-whither and always performs as it is functionally inclined.”— 
Field of Psychology, 386-387. 


14 OSCAR F. WEBER AND MADISON BENTLEY 


of the organism. The human organism is extremely facile and 
plastic. Except in discharging its most highly habituated func- 
tions it pursues a variable and devious course to a given end. It 
follows that like quantitative scores neither prove that two organ- 
isms have operated in the selfsame manner nor that the operations 
have been introduced by the selfsame instructions and the self- 
same bodily predispositions. Test results may, at times, be grossly 
prognostic; they are seldom indicative of the psychological 
conditions which brought them forth. 

3. Our small prospecting study suggests that individual differ- 
ences in instruction and in the means of performance have much 
greater psychological significance than have quantitative differ- 
ences of output. By observing the way-in-which the organism 
goes about a given performance we seem to approach the very 
essence of individuation. Habituation appears, so long as it takes 
a fixed course, as a leveler. It tends to mask individual uniqueness. 
But when the psychosomatic functions are halted and checked 
we offer an occasion for the organism to discover its own means 
and methods. There structural inclinations, the accumulations of 
experience, the effects of specific education, the momentary state 
of the entire organism, and so on, are likely to exert their com- 
bined influence upon the actual performance which issues from 
the dilemma. The observations made under our method require, 
it is true, training of the order and precision used by the com- 
petent microscopist and mineralogist ; a degree of training indeed 
which we did not wholly compass in our preliminary experiments. 
To know exactly “what is there’’ and to be able to report a 
matter-of-fact in the best possible terms and under the only ap- 
propriate categories is one of the two major results of scientific 
training in any subject. 

4. Our wealth of “informal” instructions emphasizes the 
warning previously made against the assumption in many descrip- 
tive and psychophysical experiments that a good intent on the 
part of the observer is a sufficient guaranty that his reports are 
made under the steady influence of the “ formal ’’ command. 

In fine, we have sought, by means of a standardized report. 


STUDIES IN PSYCHOLOGY 15 


upon “ instruction,’ to discover the exact conditions under which 
the total or psychological organism approaches its functional 
performance when confronted by a task. We have found these 
instructions to be more numerous and more varied than experi- 
mental procedure commonly assumes. They are conditions of 
functional output which are almost wholly neglected by the “ test 
methods ” and by the behavioristic correlation of stimulus with 
response. It appears that they should also be taken with greater 
seriousness by the descriptive psychologist, who is inclined to 
rely too confidently upon the formal command as the essential 
determinant of a psychological operation. 


SEARCH; A FUNCTION INTERMEDIATE BETWEEN 


PERCEPTION AND THINKING * 


By Howarp L. KINGSLEY 


TABLE OF CONTENTS 


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BO LaLenent OF WOO DICH Cow) nay eae ne 

Il. THE EXPERIMENTS: Apparatus and procedure... 
1 OW oe DN 848 boo BO Bead Rene DTG NSN UN LEAL ALi aut EMIS Mes Nip Cah 
A. First fractionation phase (f-1). Sets I, II, II1.. 

B. Second fractionation phase (f-2). Sets I, I, 11. 

C. Third fractionation phase ({-3) . Sets I, Il, IIL.. 

a. Perception in f-3 (P-functions).......... 

b,, Search (im) t-3) (oepertormance jeunes 

c. Thinking in f-3 (T-performance)........ 

d. Description ot the i-function ) Wn cae 

Do Repetitions oF) Si Onde Leimoetid wine aes 

IV. DISCUSSION AND INTERPRETATION OF RE- 


. Comparison of perception and search.......... 
. Comparison of search and thinking............ 
. Comparison of the T- and Ti-tasks............ 
. Concerning the reports themselves............. 
. Search regarded as psychological concept....... 
VS UM AMATRIY) JA NID ONG TS COIN SS nan ae ee 


gas ee sent. 


I. INTRODUCTION 


16 
18 
19 
21 
aa 
25 
26 
28 
28 
30 
35 
40 
41 


45 
45 
46 
48 
49 
51 
54 


Perception and thinking have long been outstanding topics in 
the study of the human mind. Standing as fundamental cate- 
gories in man’s reflections upon himself and his experiences, they 


* The research was carried out under the direction of Professor Bentley, 


Director of the Laboratory. 
16 


STUDIES IN PSYCHOLOGY 17 


have commonly been set apart in sharp contrast. Perception, on 
the one hand, has been regarded as a form of passive receptivity 
having a limited sphere of operation and dealing with the sen- 
suous and earthy; while thinking, on the other, has been magni- 
fied and extolled as man’s worthiest endowment, as an active, 
creative accomplishment capable of transcending the senses and 
attaining the spiritual and sublime. This traditional distinction, 
growing out of the ancient philosophies,’ and flourishing under a 
now discarded doctrine of soul and faculties, must—if it is to 
survive in modern psychology—secure the sanction of experi- 
mental evidence. 

The introduction of experimental psychology during the last 
century has changed the whole complexion of the discipline; but 
naturally enough the old ways have furnished the avenues along 
which experimentation has taken its course. Taken in a general 
way, the experimental work already done on thinking and percep- 
tion has tended to break down the sharply contrasting distinction 
which time has fixed between them.” It has failed to substan- 
tiate those novel and unique “mental elements” of thinking 
which a number of investigators sought;® and, on the positive 
side, it has indicated certain points of similarity between percep- 
tion and thinking with regard to the mental factors employed.* 
We can at most point to a general difference in the relative 
amounts and frequencies of the sensational and sensimaginal 

*Cf. Baldwin, J. M., A History of Psychology, 1913, 33, 41; Brett, G. S., 
A History of Psychology, etc., 1912, i, 30, 134; 1i, 75, 77, 201; Locke, J., An 
Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Phil. Works (Bell), 1892, i, 253; 


Bain, A., The Senses and the Intellect, 1868, 8, 321, 611-667; Sully, J., The 
Human Mind, 1892, i, 212, 388f. 

* See Titchener, E. B., Experimental Psychology of the Thought Processes, 
1909, for an account and discussion of the work of ‘Orth, Watt, Ach, Messer 
and Buhler. 

* Buhler, K:, Tatsachen und Probleme zu einer Psychologie der Denkvorgdange, 
1907; Stout, S. F., Analytical Psychology, 1896, i, 85£; Woodworth, R. S., 
Imageless Thought, J. Phil., etc., 1906, iti, 703£; A Revision of Imageless 
Thought, Psychol. Rev., 1915, xxii, 1-27; The Consciousness of Relation, in 
Essays philosophical and psychological, 1908, 489ff; Angell, J. R., Thought 
and Imagery, Phil. Rev., 1897, vi, 648f, 534£; Imageless Thought, Psychol. 
Rev., 1911, xviii, 295f; Durr, E., Ueber die experimentelle Untersuchung der 
Denkvorgange, Zsch. f. Psychol., 1908, 11, pt. I, 313-340; Clarke, H. M., Con- 
scious Attitudes, Amer. J. Psychol., 1911, xxii, 214-249. 

* Titchener, E. B., A Textbook of Psychology, 1911, 48, 364; A Beginner's 
Psychology, 1917, sec. 25; Rogers, A. S., An Analytical Study of Visual Per- 
ceptions, Amer. J. Psychol., 1917, xxviii, 546, 573, 576; Bentley, M., [bid., 239. 


18 HOWARD L. KINGSLEY 


qualities,’ a difference again which does not bear out the sharp 
distinction found everywhere in the earlier history. 

A survey of the history of this distinction reveals the fact that 
it has been based in part upon the alleged “ passive receptivity ” 
of mind in perceiving, as contrasted with the alleged “ active and 
creative’ powers displayed in thinking, and also in part upon the 
notion that, while perception is dependent upon the physical 
environment and the sense organs, thinking depends only upon 
the mind or “soul.” “Activity” and “ passivity’ as used in this 
connection are philosophical terms of only historical value. But 
something should be said of the alleged difference in the con- 
ditions of perception and thinking. No one will deny that the 
stimulus and the receptor are determining factors of importance 
in the initiation and organization of the perception, but observa- 
tion has demonstrated that thinking is no more free from physical 
conditions. The difference apparently lies in the relatively 
greater influence of the central nervous system in the case of 
thinking, for here, as a rule, the receptors play a smaller part and 
the performance is characterized by a central determination in 
the form of the problem or Aufgabe. But we cannot sharply set 
perception and thinking apart by saying that perception is deter- 
mined by outward factors and thinking by central conditions, for 
we know that the perceptive functions also are in part centrally 
determined. The nervous system is changed by the processes 
that run their course within it and these modifications or residues 
are always co-determiners of subsequent operations that take place 
within the brain.® ‘Every perception is shaped and moulded 
by the operation of nerve forces which show themselves neither 
in sensations nor in image. The nervous system . . . meets 
its impressions half way, and throws them into certain customary 
forms.””? 

On the other hand, we know that the conditions of thinking are 
not all central. For perception itself with all of its “ outward” 

*This term is used for the simple “centrally initiated” quality in the 
“image,” Cf. Bentley, M., The Field of Psychology, 1924, 47. 


* Bentley, M., Ibid., 117. 
"Titchener, E. B., A Beginner's Psychology, 1917, 115. 


STUDIES IN PSYCHOLOGY 19 


physical conditions not infrequently constitutes an immediate and 
fundamental part of thinking.* We also know that the influence 
of the stimulus and the receptor is not limited to the perceptive 
experiences. It indirectly determines to a fairly large extent both 
the qualities and the types of integration found in the subsequent 
imaginal formations.? Thus even the ideational material em- 
ployed in thinking is not free from the influence of the impress 
of the environment upon the organism. It appears, then, that 
perception and thinking have much in common in the way of 
conditions as well as with respect to their constituent mental qual- 
ities. The differences actually found in regard to these factors 
would appear, then, to be rather of degree than of kind. 

We find, as a matter of observation, that the fundamental dif- 
ference between thinking and perception lies in function. Both 
are functions, operations, performances of the total organism. 
We cannot, then, expect a search for distinctive “ mental ele- 
ments’ or for bodily dependence to be any more successful than 
the trite “ active’ and “ passive’ powers have been. Since per- 
ception and thinking are both modes of operation we must view 
and compare them as such. When we do this we find that per- 
ception is the apprehending of objects as present or of events as 
happening. It is thus an apprehending performance of the organ- 
ism, an operation through which the organism lays hold of 
objects or becomes cognizant of their immediate presence and 
activities. Thinking, on the other hand, is found to be an 
elaborative type of performance. It is a working-out toward 
something unique by the use of symbols. It is a problem-solving 
procedure. Here, as it appears, we have an empirical difference 
between perception and thinking which serves to set them apart 
for investigation. 

Our problem, then, is to explore by a suitable method these two 
types of functional operation in order to discover their funda- 
mental similarities and differences, and further to ascertain 

® Cf. Woodworth, R. S., Psychology; A Study of Mental Life, 1921, 469; 
Pillsbury, W. B., Essentials of Psychology, 1918, 229; Dewey, J.. How We 


Think, 1910, 68-71; Bentley, Ibid., 339, 366. 
* Bentley, [bid., 141-142. 


20 HOWARD L. KINGSLEY 


whether there may be intermediate modes which may serve to fill 
in or to bridge over the gap which tradition has fixed between 
them. We know that thinking is usually characterized by a stage 
of persistent groping for something not at hand. It moves by 
indirection toward a goal which is hinted at in the “ thought-task ”’ 
or Aufgabe. Now it occurred to us that in certain forms of 
perceptive scrutiny there is a similar factor of puzzling search in 
which the organism’s mode of operation is not mainly determined 
by stimulus and receptor, and where something not vet “ present ”’ 
is to be half-uncovered and half-wrought-out. It was the “ puz- 
zling perception’ which seemed to us to offer a possible inter- 
mediate between our extreme terms.'° We proceeded, therefore, 
to set our perceptive and our elaborative functions into commission 
under comparative conditions and then to add our puzzling, pry- 
ing variety under circumstances which would provide a direct 
comparison in both directions. 

* Results of earlier laboratory studies on puzzle-solving and on “ the elabora- 
tion of perceptual meanings” point to puzzling perception as something which 
partakes, to some extent at least, of both the nature of perception and of 
thinking. Cf. Rogers, S. A., An Analytical Study of Visual Perceptions, 
Amer. J. Psychol., 1917, xxviii, 545, 551, 552; Mather, J. E., & Kline, L. W., 
The Psychology of Solving Puzzle Problems, Ped. Sem., 1922, xxix, 269-282. 
The writer has had access to the results of two preliminary studies made in 


this laboratory on the “ puzzle-solution”’ by Gerold C. Wichmann and Elizabeth 
Jane Rutherford. 


STUDIES IN: PSYCHOLOGY 21 


Il. THE EXPERIMENTS 


In order to set into commission the three types of functional 
operation which our study undertook to investigate and to com- 
pare we presented pictures to our observers under fixed and 
formal instructions. During the presentation of each picture O 
was asked a question that pertained in some way to the presenta- 
tion. ‘The questions were of three kinds. The first type required 
only the perception of some readily observable part or aspect of 
the picture; the second called upon the observer to search for an 
obscure object, while the third type was designed to invoke real, 
though simple, cases of thinking. They are designated respec- 
tively as the perception-question (P-Q), the search-question 
(S-Q) and the thought-question (T-Q). The questions were 
simple enough to be readily understood and they were put as 
uniformly as possible in order to avoid any hint as to the type of 
operation expected. 


The pictures used included photographic reproductions of well known paint- 
ings and suitable cuts from newspapers and magazines. The prints were 
uniformly mounted on gray cardboard, 7 x 9 inches, and all printed words were 
removed from them. Three sets of pictures were prepared. The first set 
included six with which P-questions were asked, six with which S-questions 
were asked and six with which T-questions were asked. Set II as made up of 
24 pictures, six each for perception and search and twelve for thought. Six 
of the twelve thought-pictures were withdrawn before the question was asked. 
These are called the Ti-pictures to distinguish them from the others. In Set III 
there were four P-pictures, nine S-pictures and eleven T-pictures. 

The exposure apparatus consisted of a wooden frame, 27/3 ft. x 2°/4 ft., 
within which was fitted a metal screen covered with black cardboard. In the 
center of this screen was an opening, 71%4 x 5 in., fitted with an exposure shutter. 
This apparatus was mounted upon a table before which the observer was seated 
with his eyes two feet from and on a level with the exposure shutter. Large 
lateral squares of black cardboard were mounted at the sides of the exposure 
apparatus to restrict and simplify the field of vision. The experimenter stood 
behind the apparatus and out of O’s sight. The mounted pictures were placed 
in the holders behind the opening in the metal screen. After the instruction 
and the ready signal the shutter was withdrawn exposing the picture. 

The following instructions were given (save in the Ti-group): “At ‘ready’ 
you are to fixate. At the signal ‘now’ a picture will be presented and at the 
same time you will be asked a question about it. When you are able to answer 
press the button and immediately report your total experience during the 
exposure-period. Your report should be analytical and it should include in 
temporal order ; 

(a) The qualities immediately following the removal of the shutter ; 

(b) The qualities set up by the question ; 

(c) The subsequent qualities belonging to the period after the question, 
e.g., visual, kinaesthetic, verbal-kinaesthetic and organic qualities and all sens- 
imaginal qualities ; 


22 HOWARD L. KINGSLEY 


(d) The relative clearness of the several constituents of experience ; 

(e) A full statement of meanings (always in parenthesis ).” 

The order of presenting the pictures of each set was determined by chance. 
No time-limit was set for the exposure-period. When O pressed the button 
a small light appeared behind the screen. This light was E’s signal to close 
the shutter. O then wrote his report. The usual length of an experimentation 
period was about fifty minutes, during which time six observations were 
usually made, in some cases more. 

In those experiments where the picture was removed before the question was 
asked (the Ti-group of Set II) an attempt was made to provoke thinking that 
would involve sensimaginal qualities derived for the most part from the pre- 
ceding perceptual experiences. For the observations of this group the first 
part of the instructions was modified to read as follows: “After a ‘ready’ 
signal you are to fixate. At the signal ‘now’ a picture will be presented. When 
you are satisfied that you have fully apprehended the picture, press the button. 
You will then be asked a question about the picture. When you are able to 
answer the question press the button again and report your total experience, 
regarding particularly the period following the question.” The latter part of 
these instructions was the same as the latter part of those quoted above. 


During the course of the investigation it appeared to be instruc- 
tive to observe the effect produced by repeatedly presenting a given 
thought-picture with the same accompanying T-question or a given 
search-picture with the same accompanying S-question. For a 
situation which today presents a problem for thought or search 
may, if the problem is solved, tomorrow evoke some other func- 
tion. Repetition was used, accordingly, at unannounced points 
in Set III. This repetitive series we have designated as Set IV. 
The same instructions were given with them as with the original 
presentations. Two, three or four repetitions of a presentation 
were made at intervals of 2-11 days. 

The factual material was contributed by five observers, desig- 
nated as Y, Su, G, Land Sa. Three are members of the depart- 
mental staff at the University of Illinois. The other two were 
advanced students of psychology, apt and well-trained for the pur- 
poses of our study. These observers made a total of 210 observa- 
tions, of which 58 were on perception, 64 on search, and 88 on 
thinking.? 

*The writer wishes to acknowledge his indebtedness to all who have aided 
in this study. He desires especially to express his appreciation of the aid and 
counsel of Professor Bentley, at whose suggestion the problem was undertaken 
and under whose helpful direction and criticism this paper has been prepared. 
Acknowledgment is due to Professor C. R. Griffith for assistance and advice 
in planning the experiments as well as for his aid as an observer; also to 
Dr. Alice Sullivan and Dr. P. T. Young for their generous services as observers. 


The other observers to whom acknowledgment is due are Miss M. Libman 
and Professor N. W. Sanford. 


STUDIES IN PSYCHOLOGY 23 


WW od od Die ab Bnd Bes 


All the observations, whether of perception, search or thinking, 
fall into four fairly well defined temporal phases. We shall find 
it convenient and feasible to present and discuss the facts obtained 
under these divisions. The first fractionation phase (designated 
f-1) extends from the opening of the shutter to the beginning 
of the question (Q). The second fractionation phase (f-2) 
covers the comprehension of Q. The third phase (f-3) is that 
in which O seeks and finds the answer to Q. The fourth (f+) 
includes the pressing of the key. 

A. First fractionation phase: In this part of the exposure 
period (from the opening of the shutter to Q) there was with all 
observers a hasty inspection of the picture. F—1 was, of course, 
common to the P, S and T observations. The instructions, formal 
and occasional, set up a tendency which led to the perceptive 
apprehension of the picture upon exposure. The specific course 
of this apprehensive operation, however, was not determined or 
directed by the formal instructions. These instructions provided 
only for a general “ looking,” while the particular object or aspect 
of the picture apprehended was left to central determinations. 
The duration of f—1 was approximately one second. 

Of the experiential qualities appearing in f-1, the visual 
(blacks, whites, grays and browns) were the clearest and most 
prominent. These were arranged in a variety of patterns and 
carried the meaning of the picture as a whole or of specific objects 
within it. There were rapid and numerous eye-movements accom- 
panied by shifts in the visual patterns as O observed now one part 
and now another part of the picture. Illustrations of these facts 
are given in the following quotations from the reports: 

Now one set of visual aang and now another became clear as my 


eyes moved. (Su II 23 
Visual perception of now one, now another, object in the picture. (Su I 


Visual | qualities (grays, whites, blacks) changing in clearness as one 
passes from object to object (meaning: dog, seashore, ship). (GI 2 P.) 


*Each report is designated by reference to observer, set (roman numeral), 
place in the set (arabic numeral), and task (P, S or T). 


¢ 


24 HOWARD L. KINGSLEY 


Strain qualities were also prominent. They signified eye- 
movements and general bodily sets. As constituents of an 
obscure somaesthetic background they frequently helped to carry 
the meaning of the picture as a whole, empathic experiences and 
mental postures. Examples follow: 


Kinaesthesis, clear about eyes (active visual exploration). (G II 12 S.) 

Kinaesthesis making up bodily set; the bodily set seemed to carry the 
meaning of doubt, surprise, etc. (G II 10 T.) 

General bodily set (picture as a whole). (G II 17 T.) 

Followed immediately by kinaesthetic qualities, partly shivers, partly pres- 
sures in the chest (meaning: I was in the wolf’s place and very lonely). 
CSuititZi) 

Bodily set composed of diffuse somaesthetic qualities. (G II 15 Ti.) 


Verbal kinaesthesis (V. K.) was mentioned almost twice as 
often as the non-verbal forms. It served to carry comments 
upon the general character of the picture and the naming of 
objects noted. For example: | 

V.K. very scrappy, faint (naming objects in inner speech). (G II 12 S.) 


Sensimaginal qualities were rarely reported. When observed 
they appeared to supplement the sensational qualities in the per- 
ceptions of this period. They served to enrich the meanings of 
the pictures, sometimes by way of empathic experiences and 
sometimes by way of memorial reference. For example: 


Visual perception accompanied by cutaneous and kinaesthetic imagery of 
coolness and dull pressure (meaning: I was out in the snow and was 
shivering). (Su I 11 P.) 

Visual processes, a few imaginal and faint V. K. (apprehension of home 
and other objects, renewal in memory of visit to Mt. Vernon, etc.). 


(Ost T3 Py 
Affective qualities appeared as characteristic constituents of the 


empathic experiences and were often found in relaxation. To 
quote from the reports: 


A feeling of pleasantness blended with relaxation. (Su I 10 S.) 
A feeling of relief and agreeable relaxation. (Y II 9 S.) 
Visual qualities accompanied by a feeling of pleasantness and a certain 
amount of relaxation (meaning that I had put myself into the situation). 
(Su II 4 P.) 
Before passing to the second fractionation phase we must con- 
sider the relation of the initial unrestricted exploration of the 
picture (f-1) to the more specifically determined operations 


following Q. The object designated in the P-question was usually 


STUDIES IN PSYCHOLOGY 25 


observed at once and often it was seen in f-1. More frequently 
there occurred in f—1 the apprehension of a complex object or 
group of objects, some part or aspect of which was asked for in 
©. In such cases the P-task was simplified and abbreviated by 
the operations of f—l. 


An example is found in the following observation: 

Picture, “Old Charter Oak” (an unsymmetrical tree). 

Q: “Is the large tree one-sided? ” 

Report (R), (a) Visual and V. K. (wind-blown tree). Very little visual 
exploration. Other objects in total picture carried in obscure back- 
ground visual processes. (b) Auditory, (Q). 

Processes alternated in clearness with visual processes sustained by a 
general bodily set (assent). (GI 16 P.) 


The S-question usually instructed O to find some obscure object 
in the picture and since the preliminary survey familiarized him 
with various features of the picture it frequently prepared the 
way for and facilitated the search. 


Picture: “ Norwegians Making Hay.” 

Q: “Where is the baby-carriage? ” 

Report: One figure after another became clear. At the end of Q auditory 
perception was clearer than visual. Fixation moved to the baby-carriage 
almost immediately. (Su II 12 B.) 


Again, in f-1, certain features of the picture were sometimes 
noticed which furnished clues for answering T-question and so 
the way was prepared for an immediate solution of the T-task. 


Picture: “A Stampede,” Rosa Bonheur. 

Q: “What is happening?” 

Report: Visual perception of animals (and a hazy meaning of stampede). 
Then clear auditory perception of Q. Next, a period of waiting in 
which I tried to decide just what was happening. First one part of the 
picture and then another came clear. I observed the man, then the 
animals and wasn’t satisfied to say it was a stampede. This lack of 
satisfaction was meaning and I cannot say what processes carried it. 
Then I said in V. K. imagery, “It’s a stampede,” and pressed the button. 
(Why I decided just that way I cannot say.) (Su IJ 10 T.) 


Picture: “ The Ferryman’s Daughter,’ Adan. 

Q: “How deep is the water?” 

Report: (a) Visual—rapid shift in clearness. Obscure V. K. (meaning: 
total picture-woman-boat). Very clear kinaesthetic imagery (as if I 
were poling the boat). Faint visual imagery (myself poling in a fast 
stream). (b) Auditory (Q), clear. (c) Q seemed somehow to fuse 
with the kinaesthesis mentioned above; made it clearer; led to a sort 
of bodily state (by which I read myself into the picture.) I “felt” the 
water to be about 2 feet deep. Jydgment came in V. K. terms. (GI 
18/5.) 


Summary of f-1. Just before Q was asked there was a brief period during 
which O was occupied with apprehending the picture. O was disposed by the 


26 HOWARD L. KINGSLEY 


formal instructions and the occasion to observe the picture but not any par- 
ticular part of it. Visual qualities were clearest and most prominent. There 
were rapid eye-movements accompanied by shifts in visual patterns as O 
observed now one part and now another. Strains were prominent. They 
signified eye-movements and general bodily sets. Frequently they fused with 
organic qualities in an obscure background where they helped to carry the 
meaning of the picture as a whole, empathic experiences and mental postures. 
Verbal kinaesthesis carried comments and the naming of objects. Imaginal 
processes were not often reported. When observed they served to supplement 
the perceptions of f-l. Affective qualities were related principally to empathic 
experiences. The hurried inspection of the pictures found in f-l, which was 
common to the three types of observation, familiarized O more or less with 
the picture and so facilitated P, S and T in f-3. 

B. Second fractionation phase; comprehension of the Q: 
It is obvious that through the formal, occasioned and self 
instructions that preceded the exposure of the picture a fairly 
intricate pattern of functional tendencies was set up. In f-1 we 
found that a tendency to scan the picture was released by the 
exposure. But there was also a tendency which set O for com- 
prehending the awaited question, for he would be unable to carry 
out the instructions if he failed to understand what was asked. 
The first tendency was usually in complete control when the 
acoustic stimuli which released the second tendency were pre- 
sented. That there occurred more or less of a clash between these 
functional tendencies is shown by the comparative obscurity of 
the words during the first part of QO, by the continuation of visual 
exploration of the picture during Q, by the oscillations of atten- 
tion between the words of Q and the objects in the picture, and by 
the fight of QO for recognition. This clash was most pronounced 
when the time allotted to f-1 was insufficient for complete appre- 
hension and Q interrupted or cut into the apprehending operations. 
It seems that the more completely the picture was apprehended 
before Q was asked the more readily was made the shift from 
apprehension to comprehension. 

It is evident that the meaning of the question was the most 
commanding aspect of this part of the observation. Frequently 
this was all that O was able to report. It was immediate, unitary 
and clear, while “ processes’ were either not observed at all or 
very inadequately noted. For example, Y reports: ‘“‘ The words 
mean immediately, I do not hear them as bare sounds. I am 
aware of the meaning primarily.” The meaning of Q was a 


STUDIES IN PSYCHOLOGY 27 


topic and its comprehension was in most cases an abbreviated per- 
formance, since the questions were usually short and easily under- 
stood. The topic usually emerged from the convergence of vari- 
ous factors, prepotent among which were the words spoken by E. 
The individual words of Q were not as a rule perceived. Some- 
times, however, there were; while Q was being asked, attentive 
shifts to objects in the picture that were mentioned in Q. Here, 
then, visual perceptive meanings appeared prior to the topic. 
But the fact that so few meanings of this kind appeared seems to 
indicate that in most cases the words of QO immediately released 
specific neural tendencies which gave rise to the topic. For 
example: 


As Q is comprehended attention shifts from object to object mentioned 
in Q until the whole Q is comprehended. (G III 8 T 

Only at the end of Q did it occupy the focus. Until then it was in the 
background without meaning. (Su II 17 T.) 

Q was not clear until end, when it suddenly took on meaning and clear- 
ness. (Su II 18 S.) 


There was a barrenness of experiential factors in this compre- 
hensive operation compared with the significance of the meaning 
induced. Since Q was presented orally, auditory qualities were 
of fundamental importance. There occurred a shift, usually 
gradual, from visual to auditory experience. Most of the observy- 
ers reported verbal comments, for this phase, which appear to 
make no direct contribution to the understanding of the question. 
Strains were reported from the chest and other parts of the body 
meaning “ hesitancy ” and “ waiting ”’ for Q “ to come to an end,” 
and also from the eyes giving hints of eye-movements accompany- 
ing the visual shifts which sometimes occurred during the course 
of the question. Those of the former group were obviously 
irrelevant to the understanding of Q and diminished as the Os 
became more accustomed to the experiment. 


Summary of f-2. The visual exploration of f—-1 was interrupted by Q which 
O had been disposed, by the instructions, to understand. Comprehension now 
succeeds apprehension. The more fully O had perceived the picture before Q, 
the more readily was made the shift from apprehension to understanding. 
The meaning of Q came suddenly or gradually. The dominant and clearest 
processes were auditory. In many cases process and meaning were not differ- 
entiated. In general, the meaning was clear, unitary, dominant, carried by a 
meager phenomenal thread. Several factors converged to set up the topic. 
The scarcity of meanings prior to the appearance of the topic indicates an 
important contribution by topical tendencies in the central nervous system. 


28 HOWARD L. KINGSLEY 


C. Third fractionation phase: Now we approach the critical 
part of this analysis. Here we should find a difference—if it 
exists—between perception, search and thinking. The ques- 
tion once comprehended sets up a specific task in addition to the 
general instructions (“ Look at the picture’) of f-1. The P-ques 
tions were designed to set up the perception of a specific object 
within the picture; the S-questions to call out a quest for some 
obscure object, and the T-questions to invoke thinking. We shall 
first take up the description of the performances which followed 
the P-questions. These are designated as the P-functions, and 
the tasks thus carried out as the P-tasks. So with the other two 
types of question, performance and task (S and T). 

(a) Description of the P-functions; perception in f-3: The 
P-questions disposed O toward the perception of some particular 
object or part of the picture. It is to be noted, therefore, that 
the perceptions of f-3 were more highly and more specifically 
determined by the experimental procedure than those of f-l. 
The objects named in Q were perceived in the same manner as 
those perceived in f-1, but with the added meaning in each case 
that the perceived object was the specified object. As a rule, so 
soon as Q was comprehended there was an attentive shift in the 
visual pattern and a kind of focalizing or limiting of the visual 
field. A particular part of the picture, that which was called for 
in Q, was singled out. This object was known at once, for there 
was a kind of identification which satisfied the demand made 
upon the organism by Q. This was followed immediately by the 
verbal formulation of a ‘‘ yes”’ which led on to, or was accom- 
panied by, the pressing of the signal button. The performance is 
characterized by its brevity, its directness and the promptness with 
which it is carried out, due, no doubt, to the simplicity of the task 
and to the immediate availability of all the factors essential to the 
accomplishment. 

Both mental and bodily factors were employed by the organism 
in this performance. The clearest and most significant qualities 
for all observers were visual. Examples: 


ee hg oh (dog) became clearer than any other processes. (G I 


STUDIES IN PSYCHOLOGY 29 


Apprehension of white house carried by clear visual processes. (G15 P.) 

(A large development of branches to the right was noted), 7.e., visual 
processes—clear. (Y I 16 P.) 

Then visual perception was clear again. (Su I 11 P.) 


Next to the visual qualities, verbal kinaesthesis (at times 
imaginal?) is mentioned most frequently in P-reports. This 
served to carry verbal meanings, generally a subvocal “ yes,” and 
occasionally an irrelevant comment. 

Other forms of kinaesthesis played an important part in the 
P-functions. K was frequently referred to the eyes, meaning 
eye-movement, visual exploration or strain of fixation. In some 
cases it was referred to the throat, and again it was reported as 
general muscular tension. Among the meanings reported as 
carried by the more general forms of kinaesthesis were satisfac- 
tion, relaxation, uncertainty, certainty, annoyance and ease. 

Organic qualities appear to have played a comparatively incon- 
spicuous part. “ Bodily sets” are occasionally reported. These 
are usually constituted of a fusion of kinaesthetic and organic 
phenomena. 


Y reports a “bodily attitude” made up of a pattern of pressures in the 
trunk, shoulders, and arms which conveyed the meaning “leaning for- 
ward to see better.” L in one case reports organic pressures referred 
to the throat and stomach contributing “aversion.” Sa describes pres- 
sures referred to the stomach and related to a desire to be in the place 
pictured. 


Imagery apparently played a very small part here. It is rarely 
mentioned in the reports. 
G reports a memory after-image of Q, and Y speaks of the words of Q 
lingering in imagery. L and Sa report a variety of imagery in this 
connection. This imagery, however, was not a pertinent part of the 


P-function but due to associative tendencies released by the apprehension 
of the picture. 


Affective processes were not often reported. Pleasantness was 
reported in connection with satisfaction and relaxation which 
accompanied the answer to some of the questions. It was likely 
to appear when one of the P-tasks, all of which were compara- 
tively easy, followed a distressingly difficult S- or T-task. 

Mental postures are reported occasionally by most observers. 
They are usually unanalyzed experiences in which a relatively 
complex meaning is carried. Among the mental postures reported, 


30 HOWARD L. KINGSLEY 


the experiences most frequently mentioned are the following: 
uncertainty, an attitude meaning “yes” or “true,” “doubt,” a 
“problem,” “ satisfaction,” ‘‘ assurance,” “curiosity.” The most 
obvious relation of the attitudes to the function under considera- 
tion is found in the service which they render as indicators of 
the progress made or being made toward accomplishing the task 
at hand. 

As to the bodily factors that contribute to the perceptive func- 
tions in f-3, it is evident that besides the ocular resources the 
particular goal set by Q, as well as the general task carried over 
from the instructions, point to the presence of neural dispositions 
or determining tendencies within the central nervous system. 
There are also minor bodily contributions such as eye-movements 
and a straining forward to improve vision. 

Summary of f-3 of the P-function—Here, then, we have an apprehensive 
function which is more highly and more specifically determined (by Q) than 
the general apprehension of f-1. Q set for the organism a goal, the perceptive 
apprehension of a particular object. As soon as Q was comprehended, there 
were eye-movements and a shift in the clearness of the visual pattern. This 
usually was followed by the immediate apprehension of the specified object. 
Then appeared the subvocal answer to Q. Visual qualities were the clearest 
and most significant of the processes involved. Kinaesthesis of the throat 
muscles contributed verbal meanings, which appeared in the answers, and in 
irrelevant verbal comments. Kinaesthesis was a prominent element. It signi- 
fied eye-movements and eye-strain, and it figured in such experiences as 
feelings of ease, certainty, relaxation. Organic qualities, fused with kinaes- 
thetic, constituted “bodily sets” which sometimes meant assent to Q and the 
following of instructions. In a few cases, the memory after-image helped to 
carry Q over into f-3. The eye and the central nervous apparatus were the 


paramount bodily factors. The latter appears to have furnished a tendency 
which carried the organism through from Q to an appropriate goal. 


(b) Description of S-performance; search in f-3: In the S- 
tasks, O was instructed to discover some certain object in the 
picture which was not likely to be observed by a casual exploration. 
Here, then, was presented the possible occasion for a functional 
performance of a new type. The comprehension of Q initiated 
a problem, and with the problem the organism was thrown into 
commission for a certain kind of operation; that is to say, the 
search for the specified object. The search was terminated by 
the discovery of the object sought, whereupon the organism was 
released. The duration of this performance varied with the 
degree of difficulty,—approximately from one to thirty seconds. 


STUDIES IN PSYCHOLOGY 31 


In the resolution of this task, O visually scanned, scrutinized 
and explored the picture. Visual apprehension with rapid shifts 
from object to object was characteristic of the performance. The 
visual qualities of experience were, therefore, numerous and by 
contributing the meaning of objects pictured, including the object 
of the search, they played an essential part. But the exploring 
and scrutinizing of the picture involved also certain non-visual 
qualities. Of these, muscular strain was by far the most in 
evidence. Verbal kinaesthesis was mentioned by observers G 
and Y on an approximate average of twice for each report on 
search; by other observers, less frequently. All of the successful 
S-performances were terminated by a subvocal “ there,” or a sim- 
ilar verbal meaning, carried by V.K., which served to announce 
discovery. V.K. also carried relevant comments made by O 
which appear to have helped him on his way toward the goal, and 
sometimes it aided in carrying into the period of search the 
instructions by way of a repetition of all or a part of Q. There 
were cases in which the name of the object of the search was 
repeated several times. To quote from the reports: 

V.K. (There’s one person), (Where are the other two?). V.K. (There!). 
vie ss fat more scrappy but clearer (Coil-spring, coil-spring, coil- 
spring.) (G IIT 14 S.)? 

Non-verbal kinaesthesis was found to play a conspicuous part 
in search. It is mentioned in practically every S-report and in 
most of the cases mentioned it seems to be relevant to the opera- 
tion. A large part of the strain qualities reported in this con- 
nection was referred to the head, particularly to the eyes and the 
region of the face about the eyes. The K. of the eye-muscles 
signified eye-movements and combined with strains from about 
the face to carry the meaning of visual search, visual exploration, 
or active effort to find. These qualities were frequently supple- 
mented by more general bodily strains and diffuse pressure qual- 
ities to bear the meaning of visual search. The “ bodily set,” 
represented in experience by the diffuse strains and obscure 


2 A coil-spring was what O was looking for in this observation. 


32 HOWARD L. KINGSLEY 


organic pressures, furnished a background for the search per- 
formance and sometimes bore the awareness of carrying out the 
instructions. The termination of the effort to find the object 
specified in Q was usually marked by some form of relaxation or 
shift in the bodily set. Moreover, the reports indicate that relax- 
ation is an important factor in the identification of the object, the 
discovery of which is the goal of the search. 


Much K. about the eyes, general K. pattern about face, general K. of 
bodily setting, or attitude (search). (GI 8 S.) 

K. pressures in head and neck (movement of head to and fro in endeavor 
to see man on horseback). (I was aware of eye-movement kinaesthesis 
during period of search.) (Y I1 S.) 

General K. strain in forehead and throughout upper part of body (move- 
ments of head and trunk to and fro as in looking). Pressures in eye 
(awareness of eye movement). (Y I 3 S.) 

At Q, muscular pressure, weak intensity, and not very clear, waiting and 
search for the temple. (Su I 3 S.) 

Vague scraps of K. (bodily set, instruction-following). K. about eyes 
(visual search). (GII 9S.) 

K. about eyes—general bodily set (visual search). K. about eyes clearer, 
general bodily set clearer. (Search of perceptual kind, exploration). 
(G II 24 S.) 

There was bodily K. during this period (which meant that I must find 
the figure). (Su II 24 S.) 

When QO came, my eyes went to the man who was stooped over and there 
was a pause and a slight relaxation (meaning: “He is the beast of 
burden”). Then when Q was finished with “which the peasants use,” 
the attitude became active again, made up of organic and K. sensations, 
of strain localized in chest and head. This gave way almost immediately 
when I saw the donkey in the background. (Su I 7 S.) 

Finally a group of processes became clearer. V.K. (There). General 
release of high muscular tonicity. (G18 S.) 

V.K. (There)—(five). General change of bodily set (active to passive 
disposition). (G III 24 S.) 

This gave way to relaxation (which meant my answer was formulated). 


(Su 18S.) 

It appears from the reports that imagery was used very little 
in these S-operations. Observers G and Y occasionally found 
that the memory after-image and auditory verbal imagery served 
to carry Q into the period of active search. In only one of 57 
S-reports do we find evidence that the observer experienced 
during the period of search a visual image of the object sought. 
Even in this case the visual image was accompanied by V.K. 
which carried the name of the object and because the image was 
not a true picture of the object it seemed to hinder rather than to 


STUDIES IN PSYCHOLOGY 33 


facilitate its discovery. It is evident that the factor which 
guided the organism in the quest grew out of the instructions.® 

Affective tones were likewise not an important feature of the 
ordinary S-performance. 


Then a feeling of dissatisfaction because I saw nothing more. This ended 
in relaxation accompanied by slight unpleasantness and I pressed the 
button while pressure in throat meant (I can’t find it). (Su I15 S.) 

Slight unpleasantness soon begins to cover whole organic state (unsuccess- 
ful search). (GI 15 S.) 

Vague K. about face and slight unpleasantness (vexation that dog can’t 
be found easily). (G III 13 S.) 

When I found I could answer the Q, I felt an immediate relaxation (this 
and the knowledge of being able to answer bringing with them the 
meaning of pleasantness). L I 1 S.) 


Mental postures* (Bewusstseinslagen) were indicated by such 
terms as “exasperation” (G), “doubt-search-puzzle” (G), 
» ability to-answer, ©’) (L.),..* doubt”... CY, Sa),.“\ hesitation.”’ 
(Y, Su), “uncertainty”? (Y, Su), “keep on, you'll find him” 
(Su), and “wonderment” (Su). Thus the postures served 
chiefly as indicators of O’s progress toward the accomplishment 
of the task in hand. These postures are usually reported by com- 
mentary, but in a few cases we have a partial inspective descrip- 
tion of them. ‘The processes reported are usually kinaesthetic 
pressures and strains referred principally to the eyes, forehead, 
throat and chest. 


In the meantime certain strains about eyes and forehead became clearer 
(doubt-search-puzzle). (G III 6 S.) 

At time there was a weakly developed attitude of hesitation. (Y II 

This wonderment was carried by dull pressure in throat, but it was not 
as distinct as if I had actually said the words. It was as if I had made 
a shortcut in the nervous system so that a “ humm—m—m”’ in the throat 
could mean sufficiently without really saying the words. (Su II 7 S.) 

Then I observed a mental attitude (which meant “ yes”) but which was 
not verbal motor imagery. It may have been carried by a bit of pressure 
_ ae throat, a shortcut for the complete act of saying “yes.” (Su II 
12:5.) 


*Pyle found something similar in his analysis of expectation. “It is not 
the image of the coming impression, but the initial perception that throws the 
body into the attitude which gives rise to the characteristic consciousness we 
call expectation. In a very few of the experiments with any of the observers 
was the image a prominent factor. Even when images were present, they 
were seldom images of the coming impression.” Pyle, W. H., An Experi- 
mental Study of Expectation, Amer. J. Psychol, 1909, xx, 561. 

“Cf. Bentley, [bid., 351. 


34 HOWARD L. KINGSLEY 


This something was an attitude (meaning “keep on, you'll find him”) 
but this was not said in words. (Su II 18 S.) 

This whole latter phase of the experience seemed merely a vehicle for 
the meaning (ability to answer the question). (Li I 15 S.) 


Upon the bodily factors our study did not report directly ; but 
certain relevant facts are obvious in the results. It is clear that 
the eye-muscles were essential and fundamental to the whole per- 
formance. Contraction of the extrinsic and ciliary muscles con- 
tributed numerous and rapid shifts in accommodation and fixa- 
tion. These served to bring new and varied stimulus patterns to 
the retina which in turn were largely responsible for those rapid 
shifts in visual pattern which were found to be characteristic of 
the S-performance. The head was often moved from side to side 
and frequently also the trunk. Sometimes there was a leaning for- 
ward to improve vision. These gross bodily movements, as well 
as the various forms and abundance of kinaesthesis, indicate a 
rather widespread codperation on the part of the general muscula- 
ture. The bodily set held O to the task in hand until the goal 
was reached in the apprehension of the specified object. It was 
characterized by strained muscles and movements of the eyes, 
head and trunk. The mental aspects of the set are kinaesthetic 
processes, often obscure, resulting from such muscular conditions 
and movements; but the set is essentially and fundamentally a 
bodily condition. The neural mechanisms underlying are, of 
course, not revealed by the reports of our observers. But the 
facts indicate a functional priming of the central nervous system 
established by the Aufgabe.’ It apparently is what carried the 
organism through from the comprehension of Q to the goal of 
the search. 

Summary of f-38 of the S-performance. The observer was instructed by 
the S-questions to find some obscure object in the picture. The problem thus 
set initiated and sustained a search. The organism was primed for the appre- 
hension of a particular object and was released from the disposition to search 
as soon as the object of the quest was discovered. Rapid and numerous shifts 
in visual patterns were characteristic of the operation. V.K. was prominent. 
It was employed in naming objects, in the verbal formulation of the answer 


to Q, in sub-vocal comments, and occasionally it supported the memory 
after-image in carrying the instructions. The search meaning was carried 


°C. Bentley, Ibid., 384-396; Ach, N., Ueber die Wiaillenstatigkeit und 
das Denken, 1905; Kries, J., Ueber die Natur gewisser mit den psychischen 
Vorgangen verkniipfter Gehirnzustande, Zsch. f. Psychol., etc., 1894, viii, 133. 


STUDIES MN PSYCHOLOGY 35 


by kinaesthetic processes referred to the face and eyes, together with the 
general bodily sets in which were fusions of general bodily kinaesthesis and 
organic pressures. Sometimes the bodily sets helped to carry instructions. 
There was practically no imagery except verbal and the auditory memorial 
after-image of Q. Affective processes were occasionally present and served 
to indicate success or failure. Mental postures were frequent. They indi- 
cated more specifically progress toward the goal of the search. The bodily 
factors employed were the eyes, ocular and throat muscles and the muscles of 
the trunk and limbs; also, of course, the central nervous system. The latter 
furnished the determining tendency which carried the organism through to 
the solution of the task. In fine, we have, following the comprehension of Q: 
(1) an exploration in quest of the object designated in Q involving rapid 
shifts in the visual pattern and muscular strain; (2) discovery of the specified 
object accompanied by a sub-vocal answer (usually “there’”’) and relaxation. 


(c) Description of T-performance,; thinking in f-3. The per- 
formance which worked out the answers to the T-questions has 
certain unique and distinguishing characteristics. The P-task 
was accomplished with the apprehension of a certain part of the 
picture. The S-task involved search and discovery on the percep- 
tive level. The T-task involved both apprehension and search, 
and in addition, a certain amount of elaboration. The answer is 
not apprehended; it is thought out. It issues in part from the 
perceptive materials of the picture and in part also from associa- 
tive materials. QO presented an occasion for thinking and the 
comprehension of © as a rule gave rise to a problem which 
in turn initiated a search for solution. But the goal of this 
search was not a pictured object. It was rather an idea or opinion 
that should satisfy the demands of Q. It is clear that this perform- 
ance was not “ mental” alone. It involved both mental and bodily 
_ factors ; and the scarcity and barrenness of experiential factors at 
certain critical stages is in many observations well marked. 

It is evident from the frequent mention of shifts in visual pat- 
tern, visual explorations and visual apprehension that visual 
qualities of experience occupied a prominent place in many of the 
operations of this group. Frequently a visual exploration of the 
picture revealed clues which suggested the solution to the thought- 
problem. For example, the picture ‘“ The Lone Wolf” was pre- 
sented with Q: “ What time of day is it?” When O examined 
the picture with care he found evidence (symbolical meanings) in 
the stars and in the lights shining from the windows of the 
cottage. 


36 HOWARD L. KINGSLEY 


White dots (meaning stars) became clear. They were clear and then 
obscured alternately several times. Inner speech “evening,” then inner 
speech “night.” (Inner speech was V.K.) Star dots again clear. An 
attitude of assurance not analyzed (meaning: It is night because the 
stars are out—that is right answer). (Y I 17 T.) 

Clear K. (visual search). Mass of jumbled background. V.K. and bodily 
set (Are there any stars? Are there lights in houses? When do 
wolves come out? Are there any persons near? Are there any cattle 
about?). Along with the processes went visual exploration with run- 
ning judgments carried automatically in V.K. (Two stars! No cattle! 
Lights in houses! It’s about nine o’clock in the evening!) Judgment 
followed automatically an apprehension of the above objects—carried 
this time almost wholly in V.K. terms. Just a machine-like unfolding of 
(a) What time is it? (b) What are the signs of a time of day? 
(c) Are they present? (d) Yes! (e) Judgment. (GI 17 T.) 


In several cases, however, clues to the solution of the problem 
were not found in the picture but in associative material. Then 
visual qualities played a much less important part. With the 
picture “A near view of the Colosseum, Rome,” Q, “ Why don’t 
they repair this building?’ was asked. Report follows: 

K. about eyes changing rapidly in intensity as if eyes were in movement 
(doubt, why don’t they, etc.). V.K. automatically (It’s a relic). (It 
wouldn’t be worth it.) General bodily set (hesitation, doubt). Sudden 


resolution of doubt—no previous warning—appearance of V.K. (Why! 
Who would think of touching an old landmark like that?) (G III 2 T.) 


There is a marked abundance in the T-functions of kinaesthesis 
of the throat muscles carrying verbal meanings. V.K. is men- 
tioned in practically every T-report and several times in many of 
them. It served, as in P and in S, to carry the answers to Q, 
subvocal comments and instructions. But a large portion of the 
V.K. reported for T referred to words, questions and comments 
concerned with clues and evidence bearing directly upon the solu- 
tion of the problem. In other words, V.K. made a unique and 
effective contribution to the thinking operations in the form of 
“symbolical meanings.” 


V.K. and other qualities. (What clues are there to loud singing, open 
mouth, bodily posture.) Faint hints of muscular settings and V.K. 
(What would I do if singing loudly?) (GI 4 T.) 

V.K. (Child walking away from house. Child wouldn’t be out during or 
right after rain-storm.) (GI9 T.) 

Automatically formed judgment in V.K. terms. (They are going to the 
corral.) (G II 1 T.) 

Memory after-images and V.K. (instructions)—V.K. (What evidence is 
there?)—V.K. processes (so large a figure couldn’t be made of a single 
piece).—Judgment automatically came in V.K. terms. (GI 6 T.) 

V.K., unclear (question)—V.K., unclear (must be mild). Immediate 
judgment (Spring). (G III 7 T.) 


STUDIES IN: PSYCHOLOGY 37 


Background V.K. (a running comment on things that might be used). 
(G III 8 T.) 

First a verbal “ There is a storm. The wave raises the boat.”—Verbal 
“There are heavy fish on deck.” (This also seemed to answer Q.) 
Oy 134-7.) 

Then immediately in verbal motor imagery came the answer (Because 
the fish is so heavy). (Su II 14 T.) 

V.K. (are they rocks?) (They are too close to land for icebergs to be so 
upright and relatively uniform. They resemble the smaller projection 
in the shore and therefore must be rock.) (Sa I 13 T.) 


Non-verbal kinaesthesis is reported frequently though not so 
often as the verbal kind. It has a less direct bearing upon the 
progress toward the solution than V.K. has. It is chiefly con- 
cerned with furnishing a substantial background as well as cer- 
tain secondary aids to accomplishment. The forms of. kinaes- 
thesis and the meanings furnished are varied. Thus G made 23 
T-reports in which non-verbal K. was mentioned 22 times. It 
was referred to the eyes and forehead 16 times. Usually the 
meaning carried was that of visual exploration. Eye-movement 
was specified once. General kinaesthesis or bodily sets were 
reported 7 times; relaxation was given once. Upon three occa- 
sions, it is stated, kinaesthesis carried the meaning “ doubt ”’ and 
“puzzle.” The other observers made fewer T-observations and 
did not refer to kinaesthesis as often as G did, but it is clear that 
kinaesthesis was an important part of their experiences. Frequent 
mention is made by them of eye-movement, attentive and bodily 
strains, and relaxation. 

Diffuse and obscure organic qualities were occasionally re- 
ported. They apparently made no specific contribution to the 
thinking operations but cooperated with general K. in furnishing 
the background and general setting. A few cases of imagery 
were mentioned, the most noteworthy of which are memorial 
after-images of Q, an occasional pattern of visual sensimages 
bearing object-meanings relevant to the solution, and a case where 
kinaesthetic sensimagery furnished an empathic experience which 
helped O to arrive at an answer to Q. Simple feeling qualities 
were rarely reported. 

All Os reported those flashes of meaning known as mental 
postures or conscious attitudes. Obs. Y mentioned them more 
frequently than the other observers. They sometimes carried a 


38 HOWARD L. KINGSLEY 


comparatively elaborate meaning which served as the solution of 
the T-problem or which was employed in working out this solu- 
tion. More often, however, we find that type of mental posture 
which serves as an indicator or gauge of the progress being made 
toward the solution. The meanings appearing in these indicatory 
flashes are expressed chiefly in the following terms: uncertainty, 
certainty, doubt, hesitation, uneasiness, assurance and dissatis- 
faction. 


Incipient verbal starts (How should I know. I don’t know. They look 
like ice. They must be rocks because it isn’t cold.) (P.S.—AIl of 
these meanings were present one after another, each one in a nutshell. 
They were not explicitly expressed.) The only part of the attitude 
definitely observed was pressure, weak, in thrvat and slight tension on 
forehead.) CYT. 15 272) 

Then a conscious attitude—not analyzed. (Its meaning might be elab- 
orated in the form: The sphinx is made of many stones placed 
together—not a single stone. This was all given at once, i.e., this mean- 
er eo Ont.) 

Attitude (I don’t know. How should I know), not analyzed. Not explicit. 
Another attitude grading over from the first (meaning: There is only 
one house in the picture. The child must belong to it). (Y I 9 T.) 

The background processes lent a certain amount of uncertainty, perhaps 
discomfort, in the judgment as passed. (G II 14 T.) 

K. about eyes changing rapidly in intensity as if eyes were in movement 
(meant doubt—Why don’t they?)—General bodily set (hesitation— 
doubt). (G III 2 T.) 

An attitude of assurance, not analyzed (meaning, it is night because the 
stars are out. That is right answer). (Y I 17 T.) 

Conscious attitude (not analyzed but meaning might now be stated as fol- 
lows: both reasons are o.k., the storm and the heavy fish). (Y II 14 T.) 

A feeling of uncertainty as to the lights in the house; certain of the time, 
however. (Sa I 17 T.) 


On the bodily side, the eye, face and throat muscles were em- 
ployed in the thinking operations which resolved the T-tasks. 
The cerebral operations we can only conjecture. But the deter- 
mining influence of the instructions, including the question, points 
to the existence of central functional tendencies set up under 
instruction which served to carry the organism through to the 
goal of the performance. In some cases specific mention of the 
determining effect of the instructions was made by the Os. 

Verbal experience (Why is the man at the stream?). (This seemed to 
determine my search, or to limit or restrict the search. There was a 
fixation upon the man pattern.) Visual pattern clearly delimited—rest 
of visual structure obscurely present. (Y II 13 T.) 

Then at the end of Q, the meaning came (I must decide this question; 


—although this was not said in words) and I began moving my eyes 
about. (Su I 17 T.) 


STUDIES IN PSYCHOLOGY 39 


There was a total lack of puzzle or doubt, somehow a kind of lazy feel- 
ingless set to explore until end of path was found (a set which meant: 
there is an end to which it leads or he would not have asked it). 
eS RRA a 


Thus O seemed to be impelled toward a goal prescribed by the 
instructions and he was not released from the urge to find the 
solution of his problem until a meaning emerged which resolved 
the problem. The appearance of the appropriate meaning was 
commonly accompanied by muscular relaxation and a feeling of 
satisfaction which marked O’s release from the problem-solving 
set. This is made evident by such reports as 


Judgment (“That’s it”) in V.K., terms not accompanied by the relaxation 
usually appearing. (G III 8 1 ) 

Auditory was replaced by nite motor imagery (meaning: “How do I 
know ”). Noticed no tension or relaxation in this experience. (SuI9T.) 

After an instant, I pressed the button, but there was no satisfaction as 
there is when I can answer Q correctly. I think the dissatisfaction was 
mostly muscular tension in the forehead. (Su II 17 T.) 


The duration and complexity of the T-performances varied 
greatly. In some cases, the solution appeared immediately, while 
in others it arrived only after much effort and many intermediate 
meanings. 


Summary of f-3 of the T-function. —-Finding answers to the T-questions 
involved both apprehension and search, and, in addition to these, elaboration. 
The goal of this functional performance was not the apprehension of a par- 
ticular object in the picture but the possession of an idea or opinion that would 
satisfy the demands of Q and that of necessity transcended the picture. Visual 
materials were prominent. The question and occasion disposed O to scan 
the picture. There were shifts in the clearness of the visual patterns as the 
eyes moved over the picture. Out of these visual patterns came meanings 
which were often symbolical, furnishing clues, to the solution of the problem. 
V.K. played an important role. It carried subvocal comments, clues, evidence, 
relevant questions and the answer to Q. Sometimes it helped to carry the 
instructions. The most conspicuous kinaesthetic qualities were localized about 
the face, eyes, and forehead, connected with eye-movements, and visual explora- 
tion. There were miscellaneous strains and pressures. These were some- 
times found in the mental postures and empathic experiences. Imagery, out- 
side of the verbal type and memory after-image which carried Q, was not often 
present and rarely aided in the resolving of the task. Mental postures fur- 
nished symbolical meanings and solutions, and served as indicators of the 
progress being made. Symbolical meanings were characteristic of all the 
T-functions. They appeared in the form of clues furnished_by perceived 
objects and in the meanings of words used in the operations. Organic sensa- 
tions were rarely mentioned. On the side of body, it is obvious that the eyes, 
muscles and nervous system were chiefly concerned, the latter by way of a 
functional trend. In general, after the comprehension. of Q, we have (1) visual 
exploration of the picture, perceptions, inner speech, word-imagery, mental 
postures, memory after-image of words of Q; (2) answer to Q (the solution) 
in V.K. terms, or carried by a mental posture. 


40 HOWARD L. KINGSLEY 


(d) Description of the Ti-function—In Set II each O was 
given six tasks wherein the picture was presented under the 
instruction to press the button when it had been carefully scruti- 
nized. No time limit was placed upon the period for examining 
the picture. When O pressed the button E closed the shutter and 
then asked the question. In solving this thought-problem O 
could appeal to the picture, therefore, only by way of memorial 
reference. 

The first phase (f-1) of the observations of this group was 
substantially the same as f-1 in P,S and T. If there was any- 
thing unique about f—1 of Ti, it was the fact that O, anticipat- 
ing the question, increased his efforts to make the apprehension 
of the picture circumstantial and complete. for example, Obs. G 
reports a bodily set which meant “ see everything you can for you 
will be asked a question.”” The question was comprehended in 
these observations in the same manner as in P, S and T; and it 
served the same purpose as in the T-tasks. 

The mode of operation in the solving of the Ti-problems was 
the same as that for the T-tasks. The difference lies in the fact 
that the visual qualities used in T were peripherally aroused while 
those used in Ti were centrally aroused. Relevant visual (sensa- 
tional) qualities, prominent in T, were wholly lacking in Ti. 
Kinaesthesis of eye-movement and eye-strain carried the meaning 
of visual attention and reference to the recently scrutinized pic- 
ture. Closely integrated with these were visual sensimaginal 
qualities which supported the same meaning. So complete was 
this blending that at times the ocular strains actually served to 
carry the visual meanings. 

Auditory (‘“ Why is the girl standing under the tree?”) (Process and 
meaning together). With “girl” a visual reference (i.e., I seemed to 
be looking. I do not know whether I had any image content or whether 
it was wholly meaning). Visual reference is a pattern of strain. Then 
scrappy visual content, a patch of gray with lines (meaning, rain). 
gah Os id bee 

Auditory (“ Why has the man raised his rifle?”’?). Immediately a pattern 
of facial strain—a pattern of attention—visual attention. Awareness of 
general bodily attitude. Then verbal inner speech, “ because he is being 
attacked by wolves.” Then (pressing key), with the attentive attitude 
there was a reference, very fleeting and scrappy. (Y II 15 Ti.) 


Auditory (“Is the boat approaching or going away?”), meaning imme- 
diately apprehended. With “approaching” and before the rest of the 


STUDIES IN: PSYCHOLOGY 41 


sentence, there was inner speech “ yes” and a vague visual reference was 
not clear (I seemed to be looking at the picture. I doubt if there was 
any sensory content present other than eye-pressures given in pattern of 
looking.) (Y II 20 Ti.) 

A period at the first of the Q when no meaning was clear. Then the 
meaning of Q became clear and I observed a period of waiting in which 
I seemed to be deciding the answer. There were a good many shortcuts 
in this period and all that was attentively clear was a movement of the 
eyes Causing a sensation of dull pressure (this meant the picture again; 
it was as if the eye moverient bore a visual meaning). (Su II 8 Ti.) 


Memory after-images, verbal experiences, mental postures and 
symbolical meanings rendered the same services here as they did 
in the solving of, the T-problems. The following reports depict 
the general character of the performance: 


Q in memory after-images, becoming rapidly less clear, and in V.K. 
becoming clearer, then fading away into a kind of bodily set (effort- 
puzzle-doubt-hesitation). Rapid review in visual imagery of objects 
in the picture. First, formulation of meanings not in original inspec- 
tion (stag hunt). (Are they dogs or wolves? Is there a hunter near ?) 
Shifting clearness of visual imagery. V.K. (There were only two dogs, 
no hunter). In background there were imaginal processes which meant 
(stag bleeding) but these processes could not seem to halt forming of 
decision—“ Yes,” which came “automatically,” but rested somehow on 
the clearness of visual imagery and upon the vagueness of other imagery 
(meaning: bleeding). Had this last meaning become clearer, decision 
would have been reversed. (G II 8 Ti.) 


The following report illustrates the general character of the performance 
and, more specifically, the manner in which a symbolic meaning carried by 
visual imagery may be the key to the solution. The picture (‘Two Farewells,” 
by Boughton) shows a ship in the distance and on the shore in the foreground 
are two women, one waving a handkerchief. 


Q: “Is the ship arriving or departing? ”” The commentary is as follows: 
Auditory (is the ship arriving or departing?) meaning immediately 
apprehended. ‘“ Attitude” of perplexity. Attentive strains in forehead 
and possibly a diffuse pattern of bodily pressures (meaning: ‘“ Here I 
sit looking”). Then an obscure visual image of the picture. One 
pattern (white handkerchief in hand of woman symbolizing “ Good- 
bye’’—no words), became relatively more clear than others. (This is 
the solution). (Y II 21 Ti.) 


Summary of Ti—The procedure was similar to that of T. The picture, 
though withdrawn before Q was asked, sustained a similar relation to the 
function. The following modifications in function appeared, as revealed by the 
inspections and commentaries. While relevant visual sensations were prom- 
inent in T, they were lacking in Ti, but a corresponding place was filled in the 
latter by visual sensimages. Kinaesthesis, verbal and non-verbal, and mental 
postures appeared frequently and performed the same services as in T. The 
bodily factors concerned were also about the same as in T; namely, eyes, 
muscles, and central nervous system, the latter supplying the functional trend 
and conditioning the incorporations of the sensimages found in the memorial 
reference to the picture. 


D. Description of Set IV; repetitions of S and T.—This set 
embraced a short series in which a “ search ”’ or a “ thought ”’ pic- 


42 HOWARD L. KINGSLEY 


ture was repeatedly presented under the same instructional ques- 
tion. The aim was to discover if possible how the organism is 
affected by the recurrence of problematical occasions of this kind. 
The experimental conditions were exactly duplicated in the 
repetitions. 


The foreground of picture II 12 S (Norwegians making hay) was filled 
with relatively large human figures, a horse, load of hay, etc. In the back- 
ground were mountains and a village. These were the obvious features for 
apprehension in an ordinary brief survey. In one corner was an obscure and 
distant female figure pushing an infant’s carriage. The Q ran: “ Where is 
the baby-carriage?” The original presentation had involved the usual steps of 
the typical S-performance; namely, (1) survey of picture, (2) comprehension 
of Q, (3) search for carriage, and (4) discovery. Upon the second exposure, 
O (G) asked in inner speech (V.K.), “ Have I seen this picture before?” 
Before Q was half finished, V.K. appeared with the meaning, “ Yes—there’s a 
baby-carriage.” Thereupon, came the immediate subvocal “There.” At the 
third exposure, there was an immediate apprehension of the picture as a whole, 
a background set, and scrappy, unclear verbal comments, “Oh! yes! That’s 
the one we were talking about! There’s the carriage.” The object for which 
Q asked was apprehended before the question was presented. In the fourth 
exposure, there were clear visual patterns but no exploration. The visual and 
V.K. qualities together meant “Oh, yes! baby-carriage picture! there’s the 
carriage!” This took place as soon as the picture was exposed and before QO 
was asked. With the fifth exposure, there appeared the usual visual qualities, 
but this time they were reported as obscure. There was clear V.K. and a 
bodily set meaning “ That old picture, baby-carriage, there.” 

The picture for G II 18 S, was of a glacier, with mountains in the back- 
ground and an obscure figure of a man in the lower right-hand corner. The O 
was: “ Where is the man?” Following the original presentation, there was 
a typical S-operation. In f-1 occurred the usual apprehending and naming of 
objects. This was followed by the understanding of Q. Next appeared K. 
about eyes and head, meaning visual exploration. This ended abruptly when 
the man was discovered and then appeared the usual “ There” in V.K. Upon 
the second exposure, as soon as Q was grasped, there was an immediate shift- 
ing of the eyes, followed by a clear visual pattern (man) and a “ There he is” 
in V.K. “Ina brief after-period, there was a slight change in the bodily set 
and slight V.K. scraps (Why of course, this is familiar: I should have seen 
the man right away! I should have remembered the question).” The next 
time this picture was presented, there was, prior to Q, besides the apprehension 
of the objects a vague general set (I’ve seen this before). As soon as Q came, 
the “eyes moved as if I knew where the man was, but full recognition of the 
picture did not come until after the eyes had moved and the man was appre- 
hended. It was as if the appropriate eye-movements had been touched off and 
the man apprehended before recognition of the picture appeared.” With the 
fourth exposure, the glacier was at once clearly apprehended, there appeared 
V.K. (glacier) which carried also the meaning of the rest of the picture. 
There was no visual exploration, but a movement of the eyes and more V.K. 
(There’s the man!), all of which took place while Q was still under way. 


These observations make it clear that if an occasion sets up a 
search-problem and initiates a successful quest, the same occasion 


may not institute the same kind of performance if it occurs sub- 
sequently in the same manner. The search under the influence of 


STUDIES IN PSYCHOLOGY 43 


repetition at first becomes shorter and more facile. With con- 
tinued recurrences of the same situation the problem and the 
search drop out and the individual comes to apprehend im- 
mediately without search. By virtue of the resolution of a search- 
problem, the object once sought may become the outstanding 
feature of a situation. We then have a perception determined 
largely by the outcome of the previous search-performance. 

The reports show results which correspond to those found in 
search. At first, O tried to recall his former solution instead of 
trying to work one out. He was thus frequently relieved, by 
recall, of the necessity of thinking. As the pictures were repeated 
a second and a third time, the meaning which resulted from the 
former thinking became attached to the meaning which issued 
from direct apprehension. This meaning was carried largely by 
background K. and organic processes. The picture used in If 
13 T was of a man standing by his saddled horse beside a river. 
The Q was: ‘‘ Why is the man at the stream?” At first O (G) 
elaborated. But upon the second presentation he recognized the 
picture before Q came; and after Q he tried to recall his former 
answer. At the third exposure and before Q, there appeared the 
meaning, carried by background organic and V.K. processes, 
““T’ve seen this before; I must have a reason for the man being 
at the stream.” The answer apparently was the result, not of 
thinking, but of recall of his previous solution. 

For f-3, G reported; “V.K. becoming clearer at end of Q. (Oh yes, I 
have a reason. I gave it once—What was it?) In the meantime, background 
processes, organic and K. carried meaning (to go across, of course) and these 
led to pressing button; but the clearer V.K. were still present and merged 
into an unpleasant organic setting all of which meant (I have another reason, 


What is it? What’s the use?, the judgment is already made, that’s funny— 
becoming obscure—there must "be a reason, etc.). 


The picture for G II 6 T (Avenue of Trees; Hobbema) pre- 
sented a view of straight rows of trees on either side of a road. 
Q. “ Were these trees planted by man?” The original presenta- 
tion set up a real, though simple, bit of thinking. The report for 
this observation is a typical T-report. With the second presenta- 
tion and as soon as Q was begun, “there was a sort of organic 
change which meant (This is familiar: trees in a row: planted by 


ad HOWARD L. KINGSLEY 


man; that is the question he will ask). Report immediately 
followed Q. The whole experience was crowded into a single 
unit. The principal processes were visual (with little explora- 
tion), V.K., organic and K., the latter carrying most of the 
meanings.’ As the picture was exposed for the third time, there 
appeared before Q clear visual apprehension of the trees, which 
seemed to carry with it the meaning of the whole picture, and 
V.K. (meaning, planted by man). Thus a new meaning became 
attached to the apprehension of this picture due to the previous 
solution of the thought problem. While in f-1 of the original 
exposure O apprehended the various objects of the picture, he 
later apprehended the trees as planted by man. 

These reports on the repetition of occasions which originally 
aroused thinking reveal that: (1) The repeated occasion may or 
may not set up a problem. (2) Where the problem is set up, it 
may be solved by recall of the previous solution and thus no real 
thinking occurs. Memorial search may take the place of think- 
ing. (3) Where a problem does not appear, the meaning of the 
situation may be enhanced by an attachment to it of the solution— 
meaning which emerged from the previous thinking. In this ex- 
periment, the answer sometimes appeared before Q was asked. 
It seemed to be linked with a part of the occasion which of itself 
was not directly responsible for the problem of the original pres- 
entation. Here, then, as in search, we have extended or modified 
perceptions due, in this case, to the outcome of former thinking. 
Such perceptions might be termed “ sophisticated,” to signify that 
they yield meanings deriving from former operations. 


STUDIES IN PSYCHOLOGY 45 


IV. DISCUSSION AND INTERPRETATION OF 
Rit UES 


A. Comparison of the*P- and the S-tasks—The first two 
fractionation phases were common to P, S and T. In our com- 
parisons then we shall deal almost exclusively with the third 
phase, f-3; namely, that part of the total performance which 
came after Q was comprehended. The tasks set by the P- 
questions and the S-questions are not the same, and the 
performances initiated are not the same. In P there is 
merely an immediate shift in the visual pattern to that part 
of the picture specified in Q. O then directly apprehends the 
answer. It might be said that O “recognizes’’ that particular 
object as the answer, the solution of his task, meaning by recog- 
hition merely that, in addition to the object meaning, there is 
the meaning that “this is the thing I was to note,” or “ this is 
what the experimenter asked about, now I must press the button.” 
The specified object is there before him. He has merely to re- 
mark it. In S something different is done. A simple shift in 
attentive clearness does not here suffice. O must discover the 
object demanded. This is our ‘“‘ search’’; a procedure sustained 
by a functional urge or disposition until terminated by the appear- 
ance of the specified object or (it may be) by a conviction that 
the quest is hopeless. 

Visual perceptions occur in S as well asin P. In both, there is 
“identification,” 1.e., the meaning that a particular object is the 
one demanded. But P is characterized by brevity, simplicity and 
directness, while S is slower and more complex, being charac- 
terized by muscular tension, effort, a striving for a specified goal 
and a visual exploration of the picture. It is, then, this sustained 
seeking for a specified object, a striving for a particular appre- 
hension, that functionally distinguishes S from P. 

The commentaries indicate that in S there was a greater num- 
ber of visual patterns, a greater abundance of the verbal type. of 
meaning, and much more kinaesthesis, especially K. of eye- 


46 HOWARD L. KINGSLEY 


movements. Organic and affective qualities appeared more often 
in S. No significant difference, however, is found with respect 
to imagery. 

The stages involved in P and S may be summarized as follows: 

P-task.—(1) General visual survey of picture, (2) compre- 
hension of Q, (3) eye-movements, clearness shifts, (4) appre- 
hension of specified object and subvocal answer, (5) finger- 
movement upon signal key. 

S-task.—(1) General visual survey of picture, (2) compre- 
hension of Q, (3) searching of picture for specified object, visual 
explorations, many clearness shifts, much tendinous strain and 
eye-movement, (4) discovery and identification of specified object, 
verbal ‘‘ there’ (usually), relaxation, (5) key. The first, second 
and last of these stages are respectively alike. In P, the stages 
3, 4 and 5 were brief, compact, and often telescoped. The stages 
of S were, asa rule, not so condensed. In P, again, the “ answer ” 
(stage 4) was usually a verbal “ yes ’’; while that for S was most 
often a verbal “ there,’ a difference traceable to a difference in 
the task assigned. 

B. Comparison of the S- and the T-tasks—Both S and T are 
determined performances. In both, the question asked sets up a 
specific problem in the observer who has been previously disposed 
by appropriate instructions toward a solution. The functional 
tendency thus established initiates, sustains and advances the 
problem. In both S and T, the observer seeks something not at 
hand, a meaning which will satisfy the demands of the problem. 
Since there is, as a rule, no experiential reference to the task dur- 
ing the period of search, it appears that an important contribution 
is made to both S and T by the central nervous system in the form 
of neural sets or functional trends. But the operation that follows 
Q is not the same in the two cases. In S, there is a visual explora- 
tion in quest of some perceptible object specified by O. The goal 
of S is, then, a specific perception. In T, while there is also 
search and a striving toward a certain meaning, the goal is not, 
as in S, reached by the apprehension of an object. Here the goal 
is a bit of knowledge, an opinion or an idea; and it is reached 


STUDIES IN PSYCHOLOGY 47 


through an elaborative process which is made possible by the use 
of symbolical meanings. These meanings in turn are obtained 
through a functional fusion of search, apprehension, and under- 
standing. Furthermore, the search which follows the S-question 
is restricted to the picture. A successful resolution of this task 
depends in large measure upon the ability of the observer to 
sustain a shifting of visual patterns until a pattern appears which 
bears the required meaning, 1.e., the object to be found. Sus- 
taining this shift of patterns involves much ocular movement, 
changes of bodily posture and a considerable amount of muscular 
pull and tendinous strain. On the other hand, the search involved 
in solving the T-problem is not restricted to the picture. Visual 
exploration occurs, to be sure, where there is a possibility of 
obtaining through perception hints toward a solution; but often 
the search is extended to an exploration of O’s memorial and 
other associative resources. This latter form of search we may 
call “ideational”’ to distinguish it from the perceptive variety. 
The use in T of ideational search implies that cerebral states and 
processes play a relatively more important part. 

S and T have, moreover, much in common on the side of visual 

processes and visual meaning. In the reports of both, there is 
_ frequent mention of “ shifts in the clearness of visual qualities,” 
“visual exploration,” ‘clear visual processes,” ‘ recognition of 
pictured objects,” “shifts of attention,” and “ shifts of visual 
patterns,’ though a comparison discloses the fact that these vis- 
ual factors are mentioned less often (a ratio of 2 to 3) in T 
than in S. Again, while the visual terms furnished in S the 
“solution ”’ meaning, in T they furnished only clues or symbolical 
meanings which the observer used by way of elaboration to hit 
upon the solution.* 

It is found upon examining the reports on V.K. and verbal 
comments that these experiences are given about as often in one 
as in the other set of reports. In both they serve to 


2, Se 


*' Visual exploration did not occur in all of the T-tasks for, in some cases, 
Q suggested no direct clue in the picture. Here the search was necessarily 
turned toward the exploration of imaginal resources or, more often, toward 
a fuller use of verbal symbols. 


48 HOWARD L. KINGSLEY 


define the answer. For S the answer very often comes in the 
word ‘there,’ while for T there is a greater variety of verbal 
expression. Besides furnishing the answer and occasionally repre- 
senting the task in the third stage, words in S usually had to do 
with naming and identifying objects in the picture; while in T 
they had chiefly to do with statements of fact gleaned from the 
picture or from the observer’s knowledge and serving as symp- 
tom, clue or hint. Non-verbal forms of kinaesthesis are reported 
less than half as many times for T as for S. It is significant for 


this study to note that the most pronounced difference between 


S and T with respect to kinaesthesis is to be found in the local 
ocular variety meaning “ visual search,” “ visual exploration ”’ or 
changes of fixated pattern (48 times in 45 S-reports and only 18 
times in 47 T-reports). 

The stages involved in the complete observations for the two 
tasks under consideration are as follows: 

S-task.—(1) general perceptive survey, (2) comprehension of 
Q, (3) searching the picture for object specified, (4) discovery 
and identification of object, verbal answer, relaxation, (5) finger- 
key. 

T-task.—(1) general perceptive survey, (2) comprehension of 
Q, (3) search for symbols, (4) appearance of solution in verbal 
terms, (5) pressing key. 

C. Comparison of T- and Ti-tasks.—As observed above, these 
tasks were very much alike. Both were elaborative psychosomatic 
functions. In the case of Ti the picture was not before the O 
during the solving operation as it was in T. Consequently there 
was a difference in the visual material employed. For in T 
peripherally aroused visual qualities were used, while in Ti a cor- 
responding place was filled by visual sensimages. General and 
local K., verbal experiences and mental postures were about the 
same in both tasks. New meanings, not present during the 
original survey of the picture, appeared with the sensimaginal 
qualities under the influence of Q in Ti, just as new meanings 
appeared with the sensational qualities in T under the same 
influence. 


a — 


STUDIES IN PSYCHOLOGY 49 


Our T- and Ti-experiments indicate that in solving a thought 
problem the organism will make use of sensational material where 
it is at hand. Examples given in other researches, as well as our 
own T-performances, furnish ample evidence that perception does 
contribute to thinking. But in thinking the organism is not 
limited to sensory material. It can swing free from the im- 
mediate physical surroundings, when these are insufficient, and 
carry on its operations by means of kinaesthetic, imaginal and 
other resources. This fact and the one demonstrated by the 
comparisons of P, S and T, namely, that the organism uses like 
experiential factors in different modes of operation, support our 
previous contention that analysis by way of inspection alone does 
not yield a complete description of the organic performances in 
which experience is involved. 

D. Concerning the reports themselves: Our instructions called 
for an analytical account, phase by phase, in terms of quality 
and meaning. To increase the adequacy of the report the typed 
instructions were either presented to O before each observation 
or left with him for constant reference.” 

All observational reports we divide into the two forms of 
inspection and commentary.® Inspection is wholly confined to 
attributive terms. It never goes beyond “experience” (taken 
in the strictest sense), and it always describes experience in terms 
of its ultimate phenomenological character. But neither the total 
course of the experiential event nor its incidents and phases is 
reportable in inspective terms. These appear in the commentary 


* Jacobson was among the first to succeed with a methodical procedure 
involving clear-cut parallel reports of process and meaning. In his paper 
“On Meaning and Understanding” (Amer. J. Psychol., 1911, xxii, 552-577), 
he makes the following statement: “We do not here enter upon the question— 
which indeed is a question rather for epistemology than for psychology—how 
it is possible to give two parallel accounts, in terms of process and in terms 
of meaning, of one and the same total experience. The possibility has been 
taken for granted by previous investigators (Buhler, Dirr, Von Aster), and 
we simply follow in their footsteps. It should, however, be said expressly 
that the shift of attitude, from process to meaning or conversely, presented— 
after preliminary training—no insuperable difficulty to the observer. If a 
process or a meaning stood alone in the report, the failure was due to an 
inadvertence. All the observers found that duplicate accounts were possible, 
that processes could be summed up in a meaning, and that meanings could be 
paralleled by processes” (p. 556). 

% See Bentley, /bid., 1924, 42-46. 


50 HOWARD L. KINGSLEY 


which is made up, as the name implies, of the observer’s coherent 
and first-hand “comments”? upon the course of events. It is 
obvious that most of the reports from most of the psychological 
laboratories are not “‘inspective”’ at all. They stand instead 
under the class of “comments.” In such a functional inquiry 
as ours, more material comes from the commentary than from 
inspection. It is quite as legitimate, when used methodically and 
with trained observers; and—in our case at least—it is wholly 
indispensable to a description of the functional operations of the 
total organism. 

There was, however, enough inspective observation to denote 
the type and character of the materials involved. The inspective 
reports on P and T agree in general with like results of previous 
studies of perception and thought. This agreement speaks well 
for the reliability of the inspective descriptions of ‘‘ search.” Since 
our study was primarily concerned with a functional comparison 
of search with perception and thinking, however, the information 
given by way of commentary has been of the greatest value to us. 

The presence of self-instruction as a factor in the reports is 
evident. This influence must be always considered in comparing 
the observers. Except under the most specific instructions, an 
observer’s failure to report a given process or a given functional 
item is not a proof that the process or the item was absent. Self- 
instruction particularly affected the observations and the reports 
of f-l and F-2. As the investigation proceeded, some of the Os 
seemed to get a hint that f-3 was the crucial part of the observa- 
tion and therefore tended involuntarily to concentrate on that 
phase to the neglect of the others. There were enough detailed 
reports of f-1, however, to give us a fairly adequate idea of the 
functional activity of that period. The comprehension of the 
question was not reported fully enough to enable us to give a 
satisfactory account of it. The observers took it as incidental 
and usually reported it briefly or merely referred to the “ ques- 
tion” without giving either inspections or comments. A study 
of comprehension did not, however, fall within our primary aim. 

There are hints also of self-instruction throughout the reports on f-3. For 


example, affections are not reported at all by Y, whose chief experimental 
work has been devoted to the feelings, but frequently by L who was at work 


STUDIES IN PSYCHOLOGY 51 


on a problem in feeling at the time she observed for this experiment. The 
less experienced observers reported irrelevant processes more than the others. 
G’s reports were more inspective than Su’s. These facts must be taken into 
account in making quantitative comparisons. It will be seen, however, that 
the type of self-instruction noted is, for a given O, common to our P-, S-, 
and T-performances, and for that reason does not seriously affect our func- 
tional comparisons. 


E. Search regarded as a psychological concept: In the resolu- 
tion of our S-task we have found a type of performance 
resembling both perception and thinking but still possessing 
characteristics of its own. It is an active, attentive seeking. It 
is a quest, an anticipatory exploration initiated and sustained by a 
problem; and its goal is the discovery of a specified object or a 
defined end. 

A preparation or disposition to perceive a certain object is 
common to both our P- and our S-tasks. But the fact that our 
perceptive operations were directed by the question upon a par- 
ticular object does not render them less fit for the purposes of our 
study; for it is an established fact that all perceptions are deter- 
mined in part by the stimulus and the receptor and in part by 
central or cerebral conditions. To ask a question that leads an 
observer to perceive a particular object may merely be adding a 
prepotent condition for perceiving. This may or may not initiate 
a search. Whether search follows will depend in part upon the 
nature of the Aufgabe and in part upon the availability for 
perception of the object specified. 

The organism in searching looks toward the future; it antici- 
pates. This it may do also in preparation for perception, as when 
the object is distant or delayed. But in search there is more than 
a disposition or preparation for a specific perception. There is 
more than anticipation, more than waiting, more than expectation. 
In search the organism aggressively goes after the thing to be 
apprehended with a view to discovering it instead of merely tak- 
ing it as it is “‘ given.” The organism explores and hunts in an 
endeavor to discover. Perception may be used in the search, but 
the perception in that case is only a phase of the more complex 
searching function. Some of the searching operations of our 
experiments were much more difficult than others. The simpler 
and less difficult forms most closely resembled the perceptive 
functions. But even in these cases there was aggressive explora- 


52 HOWARD L. KINGSLEY 


tion in seeking out something not at hand under the direction and 
urge of a problem. It is this feature that distinguishes search 
from perception. 

On the other hand, search is like thinking in that both are 
determined, problem-solving performances. Both are initiated 
and sustained by a problem and both move toward a goal. Both 
exceed perception in that they reach out for something not at 
hand. But just as search includes and goes beyond perception, 
so thinking includes and goes beyond search. The search of our 
S-tasks has as its goal the apprehension of a specified object. 
The search found in thinking is functionally the same kind of 
operation, though its goal, instead of being a specific apprehension, 
is the derivation of symbolical meanings. Sometimes this search 
for symbolical meanings went on at the perceptive level, 1.e., the 
observer sought by way of visual exploration for signs that would 
suggest a solution. But this seen “ object’ was not apprehended 
as itself; it was used as a symbol. At other times, the organism 
explored its memorial and other associative resources in the same 
way for symbolical “ suggestions’”’ pointing toward a solution. 
The thinking operation is not finally consummated, however, 
with the symbolical meanings obtained by way of search. It goes 
further. The organism makes use of these symbols in setting up 
something unique, something new. Where search “ finds,” think- 
ing “elaborates.” Search brings the suggestions or materials 
out of which the thought solution emerges as the final step in the 
elaborative operations. 

While the simplest forms of search appear most like perception, 
it does not follow that the most complicated forms most nearly 
approach thinking. A “ difficult” search may last for a compara- 
tively long time and involve a great number of meanings; while, 
on the other hand, simpler thought problems are sometimes solved 
in a flash. Search seems more nearly to approach thinking in 
those forms that do not have a specified perception as their goal. 
It is evident from this investigation that search may involve the 
use of the organism’s associative resources, standing for its past 
experiences and knowledge, as well as the exploration of its 
physical surroundings. We may, as a matter of convenience, 
designate that form of search found in the S-task of this investi- 


STUDIES, IN PSYCHOLOGY 53 


gation, in which the organism explores visual objects and reaches 
its goal by way of perception, by the terms “ perceptive ” search,‘ 
in order to distinguish it from those forms of search in which 
the organism explores its associative materials and arrives at its 
goal by way of memory, imagination or comprehension. Where 
the goal is the derivation of symbolical meanings we may qualify 
search by the term “ elaborative.” The difference here between 
‘perceptive’ and “ elaborative ” is not a difference in mode of 
operation; rather it is a difference in the materials employed and 
in the outcome. 

It is probable that we should come nearest the boundary 
separating search and thinking were we to call for an evidence or 
sign in the picture that would suggest a possible thinking solution. 
Here the goal would not be rigidly fixed by the Aufgabe upon a 
particular object; for the symbolical meanings might be attached 
to any one of several. Add to this the greater freedom in a 
search for symbolical meanings among “ ideas’ and we approach 
still more closely to real elaboration. But even then there is still 
the final step which is to be found in thinking and not in search; 
the step from the symbols to that which they suggest or create; 
to the solution of the problem, the new conviction, belief or idea. 

If search does not give us perfect continuity of psychological 
operations, it does point to a real intermediary that relates percep- 
tion and thinking in a functional way.® 


*'We speak of our own S-performance. Of course, “perceptive” search 
is not limited to vision. 

5In report Y II 10 T occurs the following statement which bears upon this 
point: “Auditory, ‘What is happening?’ (Then a period of mental search, 
a groping for words.)—(P.S. This was characterized by a long period of 
suspense and doubt. The meaning was clear from the first, and it developed 
as I continued looking. The search was a search for words.)” Clarke made a 
study of the mental factors involved in “seeking” for the name of a forgotten 
acquaintance. The reports made by her observers and her generalizations 
resemble our own. After quoting several reports, she concludes: “It is 
evident that the consciousness of seeking consists of strain in the head and 
eyes or internal organs, and a feeling of effort localized in the head, together 
with images of any kind which have any connection with the required fact 
and would be likely to recall it.’ Crarxe, H. M., Conscious Attitudes, Amer. 
J. Psychol., 1911, xxii, 214-249 (quotation from p. 227). 

®In a recent volume Spearman refers to the “ profound gulf which has from 
the most ancient time been declared to lie between sensory perception and 
abstract thinking.” He maintains that there are transitional forms of cognition 
which effect a gradual passage from perception to thinking. See Spearman, C., 
The nature of “intelligence” and the principles of cognition, 1923, 78-81. 


54 HOWARD L. KINGSLEY 


V. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 


Throughout the history of psychology perception and thought 
have commonly been regarded as sharply contrasted aspects of 
mind. In this study we have undertaken to test by experimental 
means the validity of this tradition. We have approached our 
problem with the observation that first of all perception and 
thinking are neither mental powers nor mental “ processes” but 
operations or functions of the total organism and that they 
are not sharply distinguished from one another on the basis 
of mental items. A distinction based upon the organism’s mode 
of operation has seemed more appropriate. We then attempted to 
discover whether there was an intermediate mode of operation or 
function. It was noted that in thought there is a groping for 
something not at hand, a moving toward a goal suggested in the 
Aufgabe or problem. It occurred to us that in certain forms of 
perceptive puzzle-solving there is a procedure that is perceptive 
in character but which like thinking moves toward a goal sug- 
gested in the problem and that is not mainly determined by 
stimulus and receptor. It was this “ puzzling perception,” char- 
acterized by a searching and exploring similar to that found in 
thinking, that seemed to us to offer a possible intermediate func- 
tion. Our experiments have yielded, by way of inspection and 
commentary, parallel descriptions of perception, thinking and this 
puzzling, prying variety of operation which we have called 
“search,” carried on under comparable conditions. 

Since the search found in the resolving of our S-tasks involves 
an exploration of objects physically present and includes and 
terminates with perception, we designate it by the term “ percep- 
tive search.” The search found in our T-operations, on the other 
hand, we term “ elaborative ”’ because its goal is the derivation of 
symbolical meanings which are to be used in elaboration. 

When we repeated over-and-over occasions for thinking and 
search, we came upon a significant foreshortening. In the case of 
search, the problem dropped out and search lapsed into perception. 


, 


STUDIES IN PSYCHOLOGY 55 


In the case of thinking, the problem at first reappeared, arousing 
recall; but with continued presentations this problem too dis- 
appeared and the solution came at once. Thus thinking lapsed 
under repetition into search, and search into perception. 

The results of the investigation seem, then, to justify the 
following conclusions: ~ | 

1. Search is, like perception and thinking, a function or opera- 
tion of the total organism. Standing midway between these two 
it serves to connect and to relate them. 

2. The mental items employed in search are of the same kind 
as those used in perception and in thinking. There is here, then, 
no novel or unique mental “element” or mental constellation. 

3. Search may include perception, but it also includes some- 
thing more. While in simple perception the organism is engaged 
in apprehending present objects or on-going events, in search it 
is actively and attentively endeavoring, by way of anticipatory 
exploration, to discover a specified object or a defined end. In 
“perceptive search ” this discovery is made by way of perception. 

4. Search may be included in thinking; but here it is only a 
part of the entire operation. Thinking “elaborates” by the use 
of its symbolical meanings which are derived through search. 
This form of search is the “ elaborative ”’ form. 

5. The intermediate relationship of search to perception and 
to thinking is further attested by the fact that thinking may be 
resolved under repetition into search, and search likewise may 
be resolved into perception—very much as choice under repetition 
drops to the impulsive forms and impulse in turn to automatic 
action. 


STUDIES IN PSYCHOMETRIC THEORY 


By ELMER CULLER 


TABLE OF CONTENTS 


PAGE 
I. The Fechnerian) time-space verrorse a0 ana 56 
II. Absolute impression and the “tendencies of judg- 
Est MENON OLED a taniRIN GL OHS y LIN Uh SU pact be 63 
III. The methodological importance of X1........... 7\ 
IV. On the use of a variable standard..... RTE Ds Ve 76 
V. Onthe Urban weights and their reliability........ 80 
VI. The probable error of the limen and its derivation.. 85 
VII." On ithe :percepniomiotiehan een. eee te ee 91 
VIII. On the use of an intermediate category of judgment 
(equal for Srdoubtril ac ernment: meee arene 97 
IX. On adopting the probable error of the psychometric 
function "(CUrban)sasathe iimen gene i eee 115 
XX: The stimulus-errong: cin. ae eee b 3 


I. THE FECHNERIAN TIME-SPACE ERRORS 


We shall attempt to prove that, along with the traditional time- 
space errors (p and q), first noted and named by Fechner, a third 
form of constant error (which we shall call m) appears when 
the receptive mechanism (hand or eye) moves twice to the right 
in passing from first to second stimulus and twice to the left. 
Although wholly ignored in the classic treatments of Fechner (8), 
Muller (19), Titchener (24) and others, m has precisely the same 
logical position and theoretical import as p and q. 

In the method of constant stimulus differences, any response 
is affected with three forms of constant error, when the stimuli 
differ in temporal and spatial relation to the observer: time (p), 
space (q), and movement (m). Given two stimuli, a standard, S, 

56 





STUDIES IN PSYCHOLOGY 57 


a comparison (judicandus), J; four time-space combinations are 
then possible, as denoted by Muller’s four Hauptfalle (19, 64) : 


(a) S-J, left (J to the left and second) 

(b) J-S, left (J to the left and first) 

(c) S-J, right (J to the right and second) 
(d) J-S, right (J to the right and first) 


If we represent the four limens, which eventuate from these 
four combinations, by L,, L,, and so on, the time-error (p) 
equals (4%) (L,+L.—L,—L,); the space-error (q), equals 
(%) (L.+L.—L.—L,); and the movement-error (m) equals 
(%4) (L,+L.—L,—L.). In terms of lifted weights, the three 
may be defined as follows: suppose the two stimuli, S and J, are 
equal ; if the first one, whether to right or left, seems heavier than 
the second, p is positive; if the one to the left, whether first or 
second, seems heavier than the one to the right, q is positive; if J 
seems heavier when the second weight is to the left of the first, 
m is positive. In other words, if the gross (uncorrected) limen is 
larger: when J follows S, p is positive; when J is to right of 5, 
q is positive ; when the second weight is to right of the first, m is 
positive. The error is negative, in each case, when the reverse is 
true. 

In these three are comprehended all the modes of error which 
the time-space relations of S and J can possibly induce. The first 
two, dating from Fechner, are known to all students of psycho- 
physics; the nature and purport of the third (m) will here be 
briefly examined. Whereas the classical studies and statements 
of psychophysical theory make much of p and q, m is wholly 
passed by; they not only fail to accept it as a necessary form of 
time-space error on a parity with the other two, but they appar- 
ently fail to suspect its existence at all. We may well tarry a 
moment therefore with a constant tendency which has been so 
amply neglected in the literature of this field. 

If we derive a limen for each of the four time-space combina- 
tions, the following equations hold (for convenience, we make 
the errors positive in the first) : 

' L—=—L+p+q+m 
L.=L—p+q—m 


L.=L+p—q—m 
Lo Lp qer'm 


58 ELMER CULLER 


L is the mean limen and equals (4%) (L.t+L,+L.+La), while 
the values of p, q and m are found with the formulae just given 
above. 

Compare these equations with Muller’s treatment of the matter, 
which is adopted and, in part, paraphrased by Titchener (19, 63 fE ; 
24, 272 and 302). We have, he says, a “ konstante Gesamt- 
fehler ”? c (==+p-kq) which, as the word implies, embraces and 
sums into one total every kind of error induced by the time-space 
relations of the stimuli; he thus expressly fails to admit the exist- 
ence of m. He now sets up equations for getting the true limen, 
“vom konstanten Fehler befreit,” which in our terminology 
become (19, 67): 


Lae at Ca — Dict Da 1s 
Lb=L+o—L—pp + a 
L. = L— cp = L + po — Gp 
a= L—ca = L— pa — Qa 
The p and q (and their sum c) in L, and Ly, as in L, and L,, are 
given the same subscript (a or b) in order to signalize that he 
considers them equal in magnitude, differing only in sign; there © 
is “gar kein Zweifel”’ that we are justified in assuming p and q 
to be “ absolut gleich gross” in a and d, as also in b and c; their 
equality may be taken for granted ‘ohne Bedenken”’; for the 
reason that these two pairs are completely opposed, differing in 
time- and space-order both. When however two combinations, 
like a and b, differ in one order (time or space) alone, then, we 
are warned, it is “nicht statthaft’”’ to assume p and q equal in 
size; they may indeed be of equal magnitude, but this is by no 
means necessary (19,65). For example, a and b agree in space- 
and differ in time-order. We cannot here assume equality of the 
two p, inasmuch as “der Vorgang, auf welchem der Zeitfehler 
beruht, kann bei zuerst kommender linker (linksarmiger) Hebung 
von anderem Betrage und Erfolge sein als bei zuerst kommender 
rechter (rechtsarmiger) Hebung”’ (p. 66). No reason is given 
why the two q should differ, but he repeatedly asserts that neither 
one may be assumed equal in partially opposed orders (19, 65, 66, 
69). 


From his equations Miller finds the true limen, freed of all 





STUDIES IN PSYCHOLOGY 59 


Space-time errors, in two ways: L=(%) (L,tlha)=(%) 
(L, + L.). The two values thus obtained should agree closely ; 
if they fail to do so, the reason lies with “ absolute impression ”’ 
or other factors which do not concern us here. But the errors 
p and q, he is careful to say, are indeterminable; c, and c, can 
indeed be found, but neithér is separable into its two components. 
We could do so only by assuming with Fechner that p and q have 
the same absolute size in all four cases, which Muller calls an 
“unerwiesene und sogar tberhaupt nicht kontrollierbare An- 
nahme ”’ (19, 70). Of p and q therefore we can say only twofold: 
(1) that a given p or q (as p, or g.) of an upper limen (say, 
heavier than S) is equal to the corresponding p or q of the lower 
limen (lighter than S); (2) that, in completely opposed cases, 
Pa—Pa Pp=p-, and so with q; about the relation of p, to p, 
and of q, to q,, however, we can say nothing (p. 70). We thus 
know various interrelations of the several p and q; but their actual 
magnitude cannot be determined in a single case. 
What are the facts? We may state them as follows: 


(1) L is equal neither to (%) (L,+1L,) nor to (¥%) 
(L, + L,); on the contrary, it is the mean of these two 
quantities, that is, of the four empirical limens. 

(2) b+ Ly does not equal’ L,,4-L.; on the contrary, 
ee ee An Wile ni og ei, 

(3) None of Miller’s four “‘ konstante Gesamtfehler ”’ 
Gce Ca) 1S equal to any of the others; on the contrary, 
they all represent differing combinations of m, p and q. 

(4) All of the four p or q or m are, by definition, equal ; 
their values can be readily found. 

(5) His assumption (after Fechner) that p and q are 
equal for both upper and lower limens (say, heavier and 
lighter) is unwarranted; this can be no more taken for 
granted than equality in the limens themselves. 





To all these errors, m is the key; they vanish as soon as it is 
introduced to our equations. Professor Miller himself provides 
the evidence for m and thus confutes his own position, as a little 


60 ELMER CULLER 


analysis will show. He tells us that we dare not assume equality 
of p when the first weight lifted is now on the right, now on the 
left ; inasmuch as the process, upon which the time error depends, 
may be of different amount and consequence in the two 
cases (19,66). He later confirms and elaborates the above state- 
ment. “Ein Fall, wo der linke Reiz zuerst gegeben wird, ist 
anders geartet als ein Fall, wo der rechte Reiz an erster Stelle 
kommt ”’ (p. 69); in illustration of the statement, he points out, 
“das sich die Aufmerksamkeit der Versuchsperson dem Reiz der 
einen Seite, z.B. dem rechten Reize, mehr zuzuwenden pflegt als 
dem Reize der anderen Seite. Ist also der Grad der Einpragung 
des ersten Reizes mit von Belang fur den sich ergebenden Betrag 
des Zeitfehlers, so wurde man gelegentlich zu wesentlich un- 
richtigen Resultaten gelangen, wenn man diesen Fehler beim 
Vorangehen des rechten Reizes fur gleich gross ansetzen wollte 
wie beim Vorangehen des linken Reizes’”’ (p. 69). This holds not 
merely for mental factors like attention, but for purely physio- 
logical ones like fatigue as well (p. 70). In face of these une- 
quivocal statements, he ventures explicitly to equate the two 
quantities, L, + L, and L, + L., even though they differ in pre- 
cisely the way he mentions: in a and d the right weight is lifted 
first, in b and c the left one (p. 67, equations 11 and 12). 

No more need be said to prove that we have reached an impasse. 
Muller well appreciates in theory that the psychological situation 
alters if we take the right stimulus now first and now second; 
but when it comes to applying the principle, he is apparently 
misled-by his own equations /(L, -+- Lj=2L, L, + L.=2L).; singe 
both quantities equal 2L, they must equal each other. This un- 
fortunate conclusion vitiates, in large part, Muller’s whole analysis 
of the time-space errors. The equations, of course, are inadequate ; 
for the reason that he fails to recognize that four time-space 
combinations necessarily induce three distinct modes of error, no 
one of which has logical priority over the others. By the ordinary 
laws of probability, six combinations are possible with four things 
(the four limens.L,—L,) taken two at a time: ab, ac, ad, be, 
bd, cd; whence we have three pairs which are opposed in one 


STUDIES:\IN PSYCHOLOGY 61 


respect while agreeing in the other two: limens ab and cd differ 
in the spatial relation of J and S, but include the same time-orders 
and relative position of first to second weight; limens ac and bd 
differ in time-order, but agree in the spatial relation of J to S and 
of first to second weight; while limens ad and be differ in the 
relative position of first and second weight, but agree in time- 
order and spatial relation of J to S. Is there any logical or 
practical reason for adopting the first two of these and rejecting 
the third? None whatever! There is no more justification for 
the equation, L, + La=L, + L., than for L, + L,=L, + La, or 
for L, + L.=L, + La; all three are equally wrong: in the first the 
two members differ by 4m, in the second by 4q, in the third by 4p. 
On first thought, it may indeed look natural to assume one time- 
and one space-error, as Fechner did; but however natural, it is 
assuredly incorrect. 

With p and q alone, therefore, we cannot do justice to the com- 
plexity of the psychological situation; a third tendency, m, is here 
operative and must be given room in our equations. In theory, 
as we have seen, Miiller seems to recognize an additional factor ; 
but he persists in treating it as a component of p, with which it 
has no more and no less to do than with q. In consequence he is 
forced to conclude that the four p are not all equal in magnitude; 
they change as the left stimulus is now taken first and now 
second; whereas all he succeeds in proving is that p-+m is not 
identical with p—m. He nowhere gives evidence that the several 
q are unequal in size; he always resorts to p for illustrative pur- 
poses and then generalizes the argument to include q. Having 
made his conclusion, he proceeds to criticise Fechner for assuming 
the four p (and q) equal in magnitude. In so doing he states the 
situation wrongly: the several p and q (as also m) are equal, not 
by assumption, but by definition. We have just four observation 
equations (L, La); each equation has four unknowns (L, p, 
q, m); each unknown therefore is uniquely determined. The 
value of p is simply the figure which emerges upon solving the 
four equations for p, just as L is fixed by the figure we get upon 
solving for L. Our only means of knowing that there are constant 





62 ELMER CULLER 


tendencies like p or q or m is that the four observation equations 
are not identical. It is quite beside the mark to speak of “ assum- 
ing’ that p is equal in the four equations; p can have but one 
value if the equations hold at all. 

In illustration of correct procedure, we may cite an eee 
from the writer’s study of thermal discrimination (7). The 
four warm limens (L, Tea) at GS arer 040) hire Doan: 
179°, 059°; whence the four unknowns are found: 





==  .061° 
p== © .049° 
q== —.058° 
m=. 041° 


Miiller’s (and Fechner’s) assumption, finally, that p and q are 
equal for both upper and lower (heavier and lighter) limens, is 
without foundation. We have two different sets of observation 
equations, four with the upper and four with the lower. 
Obviously, there is no reason why p or q should be identical 
in two independent sets of equations; the limens are notoriously 
unequal in the two. 

To sum up: when we use four time-space combinations, four 
limens are found; no one of these, and no combination of them, 
is equal to any other; each is affected with a separate combination 
of three constant tendencies, all of which follow with necessity 
from the use of two time- and two space-orders; and each can 
be adequately presented only by an observation equation with 
four unknowns, all of which are uniquely determined. 

Miiller’s unquestioned authority in this field has led to general 
acceptance of his conclusions; but one may hope that all of the 
constant errors will hereafter be given due consideration in 
psychophysical theory and experimentation. 


STUDIES IN PSYCHOLOGY 63 


II. ABSOLUTE IMPRESSION AND THE “ TENDENCIES 
OF JUDGMENT ” 


In this article we desire to point out and rectify an error in 
Miuller’s treatment of the judgment-tendencies, to develop a more 
adequate theory in accounting for them, and to propose a simple 
and reliable means of preventing them. 

The doctrine of absolute impression was introduced by Martin 
and Miller (17, 45) to explain the “ generelle Urteilstendenz ” 
and the “ typische Urteilstendenz.”” Muller defines the former as 
follows: “ Es besteht im allgemeinen eine Tendenz, bei gleicher 
wirksamer Differenz mehr richtige Falle zu ergeben, wenn das 
Vergleichsgewicht das zuzweit gehobene Gewicht ist, als dann, 
wenn dasselbe an erster Stelle kommt” (19, 115). The phrase 
“ equal effective difference’ (gleiche wirksame Differenz) is the 
crucial matter here, and may be defined as follows: When a given 
time-order increases the number of correct judgments, we may, 
as Fechner suggested (8, 115), regard it as enlarging the objective 
stimulus difference (D) by a given amount, p; the space error 
likewise equals +q; so that the “effective difference’’ equals 
(+D-+p+q) as opposed to the mere stimulus difference =D. 
Consider the four time-space combinations, both when compari- 
son (J) is larger than standard (S) stimulus, so that D is positive, 
and when J<S (— D): 


I II 
arta Let: Dir a 2 Dia pd 
b +D—p+t+q —D—p+q 
c. +D+p—q —D+p—dq 
Gott, De Deg —D—p—gq 


We find that each of the four in I is a direct negative of one in II; 
thus, (I,a)=-—-(II,d). InJI,a, J exceeds S by (D+p+q), in 
II, d, S exceeds J by (D+p-+q) ; we thus have the same “ effec- 
tive difference”’ and should get the same percentage of right 
judgments (a slight difference from the fact that the first stimulus 
in II, d is smaller, by the amount D, than in I, a need not concern 
us here). On the contrary, Muller found, in the case of all his 


64 ELMER CULLER 


observers and with a variety of experimental procedures, that 
these pairs by no means give equal proportions of correct re- 
sponses: time-order S—J on the whole yields more rights than 
does J-S. 

A “typical tendency of judgment’ appears when the sum of 
the right responses for the four combinations of I (+D) is not 
equal to that of II (—D). When the latter (— D) shows more 
rights the “type” is positive; when fewer, the type is negative. 

Miiller proposes to explain these facts with his doctrine of 
absolute impression, which may be summarized in the following 
propositions (19, 117): 

1. A given judgment (heavier, lighter) may issue from an 
actual comparison of S and J, but may also eventuate merely 
because one of them seems “ absolutely’ heavy or light without 
regard to the other. 

2. This absolute impression appears oftener with J than with S. 

3. It appears oftener when D (== J —S) is large than when 
D is small. 

4. An absolute impression from the second stimulus affects 
the response more than does one from the first; in the latter case 
it acts upon the judgment “ nur mit Hilfe der Erinnerung ”’ and 
is ‘ zuweilen schon ganz vergessen” by the time judgment its 
reached. 

5. Vigorous lifters (kraftige Heber) get an absolute impres- 
sion of lightness more easily than of heaviness ; with less vigorous 
subjects the reverse is true. 

Three questions now engage us: 

Is Muller’s factual presentation correct ? 

Is his theory adequate? 

How can the tendencies be prevented ? 

(1) What shall we say of Muller’s analysis? Mainly that 
none of the four equations (I, a==— II, d and so on) is correct. 
We have shown in the preceding article (1) the existence and 
operation of a third time-space factor (m) which is on precisely 
the same plane as p and q; to pass it by as nonexistent or 


STUDIES IN PSYCHOLOGY 65 


negligible is quite indefensible. The true combinations for (+D) 
and (—D) are as follows: 


I II 
at), Dip qi im soe ie ta oi Nam yh 8 
b D—p+q—m —D—p+q—m 
c D+p—q—m —D+p—q—m 
d.. D—p—a+im —D—p—qt+m 
{f we now try the equation, I,a==-—TII,d, we have: 


(D-+p+q+m)=—(—D—p—q-++m), which of course does not 
hold; the two members differ by 2m. This is true of the four 
pairs which Muller equates; indeed we are no more warranted 
in setting I,a==—TII,d, which differ by 2m, than in putting 
I, a==—TIlI,c, which differ by 2p, or I,a==—TII,b, which 
differ by 2q. Whatever unlikeness in the proportion of right 
judgments is found between I,a and II,d must therefore be 
ascribed in part to the disparity of 2m in their effective differ- 
ences ; even were no judgment tendency operative, the two would 
be equal only when m is zero. 

The factor m can be removed by appropriate combination: 
I, a+I, c=2(D+p)= —(II, d+II,b). We are now ready to 
apply Muller’s argument: the effective differences being really 
equal in these two equations, we may expect the same percentage 
of rights from each member, unless some other influence is help- 
ing determine the response. Referring to Muller’s table (19, 114; 
Tabelle 5 and 6), we find that the proportion of rights in I, a+ 
I, c (time-order S—J) definitely exceeds that in II, d+II, b (time- 
order J-S). Our analysis therefore agrees with Muller’s in 
constating the tendency to give more rights in the example just 
cited when J follows S than otherwise; the factor m is here 
relatively small; but our treatment aims to be adequate in theory, 
which can hardly be said for Muller’s. 

(2) What of Miiller’s general doctrine? It appears defective 
in no less than three ways: (a) the concept “ absolute impression ” 
is but loosely and casually defined; (b) it is credited with an 
import far beyond its demonstrated significance; (c) the doctrine 
explains nothing: it gives a name to a group of facts without 
trying to expose their underlying connection with related phe- 


66 ELMER CULLER 


nomena of judgment. Let us consider these points in order. 
(a) To our knowledge Muller nowhere says just what “ absolute 
impression’ (a.i.) means. He refers to the common experience 
that a book or child may seem heavy or light without being com- 
pared with another specific book or child; so it is with lifted 
weights. But suppose, in a given series, we are comparing weights 
in the vicinity of 100 gm; 200 gm would then, without any ques- 
tion, seem “ absolutely’ heavy; but would 200 gm give the same 
a.i. had we been comparing weights of 300 gm just before? 
Obviously not. It is clear that the term “ absolute ’’ must be 
taken in a kind of pickwickian sense; the impression from 200 gm 
is wholly relative, not perhaps to a single other impression, but 
to a group or series of repeated impressions at least. Suppose 
weight A is compared with B, the two impressions combining 
into a single gestalt; certain criteria (intraorganic responses) 
appear which are characteristic of this mode of configuration and 
constitute what is called the perception of difference; whatever 
this means in neural terms (a flow of ions or difference in potential 
between the two members of the gestalt; cf. 16), the process 
eventuates in the response “ heavy” or “light”: this is what we 
mean by direct comparison. But sometimes the new impression 
from A forms a configuration with a group of residual impressions 
left over from antecedent stimulations and now more or less re- 
vived: this is what happens in “ absolute impression.” With a.i. 
indeed the criteria are often more stable and well defined, and the 
perception of difference accordingly less obscured with irrelevant 
factors, than with direct comparison. In any event the distinction 
between a.i. and one-to-one comparison is one of convenience 
and not of theory. The relative character of a.1. appears further 
in the fact that, other things equal, recent impressions have dis- 
proportionate influence upon a judgment; an “ absolute” im- 
pression is obviously affected more by the weights we handled an 
hour ago than by those of yesterday. 

Absolute impression therefore is relative to both the number 
and recency of antecedent impressions. Properly understood, the 


STUDIES IN PSYCHOLOGY 67 


term denotes a fact; but the name and usage Muller gave it fail 
to reveal its true character and its relation to direct comparison. 

The intimate relation of these two serves to explain the diffi- 
culty of deciding when or to what degree a response is due to 
a.i. and when to actual comparison. We have no means of know- 
ing save by O’s verbal report (“‘introspection’’) ; but Muller to 
our knowledge gives no results at all where O is required to an- 
nounce for every case whether a.i. determined the judgment or 
not; while without this explicit and detailed evidence, Miuller’s 
explanation of either judgment-tendency is barren of any real 
proof. After protracted experience in comparing temperatures 
and some with lifted weights, we find e.g. that the first weight of 
a pair may seem markedly heavy, to be sure, and thus arouse a 
kind of expectation that the second is likely to be lighter ; but regu- 
larly, and we believe invariably, the first seems “ heavy ”’ in rela- 
tion to the pair or pairs we have been handling just before. If 
these preceding weights were, say, twice as heavy as they now 
are, does anyone believe the first member of the next pair would 
still seem “ absolutely’ heavy? When a first weight is unusually 
heavy we have asked again and again, why? to which we could 
only reply, because the last pair or two were much lighter. We 
have also tried reporting for each trial whether a.1. determines the 
response in case it appears with the second stimulus; and have 
never been able to find that the “ absolute’ heaviness or lightness 
of the second was independent of the first. It is almost sure to 
be affected of course by other antecedent impressions, as we noted 
above; the two factors (comparison with the stimulus just pre- 
ceding and with others more remote) seem to combine in 
varying degree from case to case; but the former in our expert- 
ence is invariably present.’ 

We are in short convinced that the concept a.i., as defined by 
Miller, is too elusive and casual to be usable for quantitative 
purposes. 


*In a long series O may become weary and inattentive and thus begin to 
reply more or less at random; so that the first stimulus (and for that matter 
the second) may then have little influence upon his response. But in our 
discussion, of course, we presume that O is doing what he is instructed to do 
and what his responses, if they mean anything, presuppose he is doing. 


68 ELMER CULLER 


(b) Does Miiller’s doctrine have the significance he ascribes to 
it? Consider the five propositions in which he applies it (p. 64). 
A.i. being defined as above, the first three seem acceptable, even 
obvious ; but they have nothing to do with the judgment-tendencies 
which the ductrine is designed to explain. The fourth purports 
to account for the general Urteilstendenz but seems inadequate, 
not to say incorrect, for at least two reasons: (1) we have just 
seen that, in our experience, a.1. is never pure when it appears with 
the second stimulus; the first member of the pair always helps 
to determine and modify the total impression; (2) Washburn 
(27, 220) reports, when S follows J, a tendency to estimate the 
first stimulus absolutely ; O does not wait for the second (S) but 
tends to report at once that J is “ pretty small’’ or “ unusually 
large.” Muller admits that the effect of a.i. in this case would 
“sich der Selbstbeobachtung der Versuchsperson leichter auf- 
drangen ” than when J follows S (19, 123). This fact well agrees 
with our conclusion that a.i. affects the response more when J 
precedes S than otherwise, but is hardly consonant with Muller’s 
proposition 4. The typical tendency of judgment (that vigorous 
lifters give more “rights” with J <S than with S> J), finally, 
which proposition 5 is designed to explain, may be taken simply 
as showing that vigorous individuals develop greater precision in 
estimating a decrease and smaller in detecting an increase of stimu- 
lation. It is of course almost always true that the degree of pre- 
cision (h) is not identical for heavier and lighter psychometric 
functions with the same standard. An increase of weight evokes 
criteria of one form or type, a decrease those of another; so that 
one group may well be more stable and sharply defined than the 
other. 

(c) We have stated that Muller’s concept is not explanatory; 
how may we then account for the preponderance of correct re- 
sponses when J succeeds S? We may approach the question in 
two ways: (1) Direction of attention. Muller himself remarks 
the influence of O’s attention upon a.i.; as Klein’s observer, he 
gave special heed to the first impression of each pair and thereby 
wholly abolished the general judgment-tendency (19, 120). Klein 


STUDIES IN PSYCHOLOGY 69 


had an analogous propensity for attending to the right stimulus 
and so judged more correctly when J was to the right than to the 
left of S. When, as usual, judgment applies to the second stimulus, 
most observers seem disposed to give it more attention as the final 
and crucial impression. Even were S, when it precedes, to be 
wholly unnoticed, attention to the following J would serve to set 
off its criteria from those of the oft-experienced residual im- 
pressions of S and thereby induce some right responses; but no 
amount of attending to S when second will give any clue to the 
preceding J, which may be heavier or lighter. Time-order S-J 
therefore yields more rights than does the opposed order. 

(1i) To the above approach by way of the conventional concept 
of attention we may add another in terms of the gestalt-doctrine. 
It is a commonplace of perception that a new impression tends 
to be ‘‘ assimilated’ to a frequent or usual one. When J pre- 
cedes, it will tend to arouse not merely its own characteristic im- 
pression but the S-process as well, the two having repeatedly 
combined in a single configuration before; by the time S arrives, 
therefore, the whole SJ gestalt with its criteria of disparity is 
already sub-aroused. If this sub-arousal be sufficiently intensive, 
J will appear “ absolutely ”’ heavy or light before S is given; be- 
cause the same SJ pattern has previously yielded this same re- 
sponse (heavier). When the sub-arousal is fainter but still 
present, the addition of S a few moments later will add but little 
to the existing energy-interchange within the pattern; whence the 
disparity or e.m.f. between the two neural excitations is lessened 
and discrimination becomes difficult. When S precedes, which 
has repeatedly been configured with every one of the J, it tends 
to activate all the SJ patterns equally and therefore not revive any 
of them to an appreciable degree; accordingly, when J is applied, 
a sharp disparity or p.d. results and discrimination is made easy. 
The time-orders differ essentially in the rate of energy-interchange 
within the SJ-gestalt ; the faster this rate, that is, the greater the 
p.d. or e.m.f. within the pattern, the easier and finer discrimina- 
tion proves to be. 

(3) We now come to our final question: can absolute im- 


70 ELMER CULLER 


pression and the judgment-tendencies be abolished? According 
to Miller a.i. can be done away if O be specially instructed to 
attend “ hauptsachlich’”’ and “ ausdrucklich und in ganz beson- 
derem Grade ”’ to the first stimulus of each pair (19, 118). The 
end is much more simply and in our opinion reliably attained by a 
method used in the writer’s study of thermal discrimination (7) : 
using each stimulus in turn as the standard. Let there be seven 
weights, going from 85 to 115 grams by 5-gram steps. In one 
series | (85) is made standard and compared with all the others 
for say 12 trials; then II (90) becomes S for 12 trials and is com- 
pared with each of the others; and so on. We thus achieve the 
important end of having all the stimuli experienced in a given 
period the same number of times. Weight I is used for S 12 
times and for J 12 times; so with all the others. No stimulus has 
the advantage of frequency over any other,’ whence it is hard to 
see how any sort of judgment-tendency could possibly arise. Even 
were one to appear temporarily (say when I is standard), it would 
tend to arise equally with all the weights used, and the several 
tendencies would then compensate in the final combination of 
results. In our study referred to, the general tendency of judg- 
ment, that is the preponderance of “rights” in time-order S-J 
over the opposed order J-S, amount to 2.7 per cent; the typical 
tendency, that is, the preponderance of “rights” in group I 
(+D) over group II (—D), equaled 1.6 per cent. These figures 
well show how effective our method is in nullifying the Urteils- 
tendenzen; whenever one desires therefore to eliminate instead 
of analyzing them, the above procedure may well be employed. 

To sum up: we have tried to relate judgment by absolute im- 
pression to more simple and immediate forms of comparison; to 
show the correct method of finding the judgment-tendencies, to 
develop a theory of their origin, and finally to propose a simple 
and reliable means of preventing them. 


* Unless more than one stimulator is given the same weight. 


STUDIES IN PSYCHOLOGY 71 


Ill. THE METHODOLOGICAL IMPORTANCE OF XI 


We here desire briefly to notice the methodological value of Xi 
in psychometric work. - | 

In the so-called psychometric function ® (y), we assume that 
as we increase the magnitude of a comparison-weight (J) in rela- 
tion to some standard weight (S), the proportion of “ heavier ”’ 
(H) judgments will rise, not linearly as one might suppose, but 
at first slowly, then rapidly, then again slowly; the whole curve 
forming a gaussian ogive, the integral of a normal frequency 
distribution. In like manner the “lighters” (L) trace a corre- 
sponding ogive while the “doubtful’’ judgments distribute in 
some fashion between the two." 

Where now shall we set the boundary-line or point of indiffer- 
ence between H and L? There are several possibilities to con- 
sider : 

(1) At the objective standard, S. In theory we should expect 
100 gm to be rated H and L about equally often in comparison 
with 100 gm; S might therefore seem the natural or “true” 
division between H and L. But a set of comparisons is always 
affected with a variety of tendencies which are inherent in the 
experimental situation; and any limen derived under these con- 
ditions will inevitably have some errors imbedded in it. This ob- 
jective standard therefore tells us nothing about the subjective 
line of demarcation between H and L in a given case; but it is a 
good criterion by which to determine whether and to what degree 
constant tendencies are at work. The less the subjective boundary 
departs from S, the more nearly have all constant errors been 
evaded or nullified. 

(2) At the central tendency (mean, mode or median) of the 
“ doubtfuls.”. No figure drawn from the distribution of these 
judgments can be considered a reliable or useful indicator of the 

1The “doubtfuls”’ will be truly symmetrical only when the “heavier” and 


“lighter” curves both have the same precision or s.d.; which of course is 
rarely true. 


72 ELMER CULLER 


boundary between H and L, for the reason that they have no direct 
relation to the curves which determine these two thresholds. Every 
comparison issues in one of the three responses, H, L or D; in per- 
centages, D=-100—(H+L). This equation of course reveals 
nothing about the proportion of H and L; the relative magnitude 
of the two may vary indefinitely without affecting D at all so long 
as their sum remains constant. An average based on D is then 
obviously no satisfactory means of fixing the point where 
“heavier ”’ ends and “ lighter ”’ begins. 

(3) At the arithmetic mean of the H and L limens. If the 
former is 3.0 and the latter is —3.2, their mean is —.1 which lies 
.1 gram below the standard. By this method however we assume 
that the two limens are equal in absolute value, for which there is 
no justification whatever. The limens for H and L may indeed 
prove equal in a given case, but there is no a priori reason why 
they should. The two series of judgments involve differing 
processes, H and L have unlike criteria; hence we cannot assume 
the two equal unless a wide margin of error is tolerable. 

(4) Finally we may draw the subjective line between “ heavier ”’ 
and “lighter ’’ at the place where the two psychometric functions 
intersect, where H and L are equally probable. Urban calls this 
place the “ point of subjective equality’ (25, xvi, 201). Being 
fixed by the two curves conjointly, it is immediately related with 
both limens and thus becomes the natural “ zero’ or indifference- 
point whence each limen is to be reckoned. The true H-limen 
then is the distance from Xi, where the percentage of “ heavier ”’ 
just equals the proportion of “ lighter,’ to the median-point of the 
H-ogive, where py —.50. 

We may illustrate the problem by an example from our thermal 
study (7). With an S of 24.00° “cooler ”’ begins to appear at 
24.15° which is far above the warm-median (24.086°), and 
“warmer” continues down to 23.95° which is well below the 
cold-median (23.988°). In a case of that kind where shall we 
say that “ warmer” ends and “cooler” begins? The point Xi, 
where the tendencies to respond W and C precisely balance so that 
both are equally likely to appear, just fits our need; the true 


STUDIES IN PSYCHOLOGY 73 


limens, measured from Xi which falls at 24.047°, thus become 
049° and —.049°; that they happen to be equal is of course 
merely coincidental. 

By giving us the true point of subjective indifference, Xi enables 
us to detect and measure certain constant errors which other 
means do not even touch at all. Any limen as directly computed 
from the original data is affected with a combination of constant 
tendencies (time-, space-, movement-, and other errors). It is 
commonly assumed that upon combining the values for the four 
time-space orders we secure a mean limen freed of constant error. 
This is by no means true; other tendencies, notably habituation or 
expectation, still remain imbedded in the figures and cannot be re- 
moved by mere combination. This habituative or expective error, 
for example, arises as follows. Given an S of 100 gm and a set of 
five J symmetrically grouped about it, ranging say from 96 to 104 
by 2-gram steps. Were no constant tendency of any sort involved 
we should expect the number of H and of L to be the same when 
all five J are compared with S an equal number of times’; but 
owing to various tendencies we may find a propensity to over- 
estimate J and so get a disproportionate number of H. This 
preponderance of H may lead to a kind of habituation; that is, it 
may induce a tendency to say “heavier ’’ in doubtful cases and 
thereby artificially decrease the H-limen. Despite every pre- 
caution this mode of error appeared in our thermal study. It 
was found that in every case the sign of Xi was opposed to that 
of pw-Pc (percentage of “warmer” less percentage of 
“cooler ’’). At 16° e.g. the mean value of Xi for all time-space 
orders was —.006°; which means that quite apart from time- 
space errors “ warmer” and “cooler” were equally probable, 
not when S and J were the same but when J was .006° lower 
than S. This fact shows that something was favoring the 
“warm” response; and therewith we find, sure enough, a pre- 
dominance of W (-+.02). In every case this opposed relation 
appears; when W is in excess Xi is negative ; otherwise it is posi- 


‘ 


* This will be strictly true only when the two limens are identical in absolute 
amount. 


74 ELMER CULLER 


tive. We see then that even when the proportion of “ warmer ” 
and ‘“‘cooler”’ differed by only a few per cent, some degree of 
error was still induced. 

How can we nullify this mode of error? The remedy which 
Boring prescribes (2, 282)—trying to keep the S-D symmetrical 
about the prospective limen, that is, about the place where pre- 
liminary observations lead us to expect the limen—is gravely in- 
adequate; for general psychometric purposes indeed the proposal 
is irrelevant.* The best modern procedure (use of Vollreihen) 
disposes the J symmetrically about S, not about the prospective 
limen. We begin with a set of J equally spaced above and below 
S and then keep to the same set in determining both upper and 
lower limens (heavier and lighter) ; no guessing about the size 
of the limen is needed or indicated.* In brief, we hold it im- 
possible, even under the simplest experimental conditions, so to 
dispose the stimuli in advance as to avoid a preponderance of H 
or L; the time-space errors alone, by favoring now one now the 
other, keep the two from being equally probable; and we have 
just seen that even when the frequencies of W and C differed by 
only a few per cent, the limens were in every case shifted to some 
degree in favor of the preponderant response. If the error ap- 
pears with so small a disparity in the opposed judgments, we can 
never hope to remove it by arranging or adjusting the stimuli in 
advance ;” the relative proportion of H and L or of W and C 
depends upon a complex of subjective (organic) tendencies whose 
influence can be measured and eliminated only after the event. 
Here is where Xi comes in. If H is in excess, its curve will be 
shifted downward and the crude H-limen will be too small (the 
crude L-limen being too large) ; but Xi will be correspondingly 
displaced and thus the true value of each limen can be determined. 
Even though the crude limens be affected with all sorts of error, 

* Boring was apparently thinking of problems like the two-point threshold 
where this device is good as far as it goes. 

“To save time and energy, we avoid S-D so large as to evoke all heavier or 
all lighter judgments ; but this has nothing to do with the matter of habituation. 

®In Urban’s study (16, 287), for example, which was conducted with every 
precaution under conditions which may be considered ideal, the seven observers 


had a mean difference of 10 per cent in the frequencies of “heavier” and 
“lighter.” 


STUDIES IN| PSYCHOLOGY 75 


Xi provides an extraordinarily useful and convenient and reliable 
device for measuring the degree of their displacement. 

The value of Xi and of the true limens can readily be found. 
Suppose the distance from the “ warmer” median (pw=—=.50) 
to the “cooler” median (pg==.50) to be .116°, the gross warm 
limen (measured from S==32.00°) being .111°, the cold being 
.005°. Both figures are obviously much displaced by constant 
tendencies. The precision (h) of the “warmer” function is 
304, of the “cooler” .379, their sum being .683. The true 
warm limen then equals (.379/.683) .116° ==.065°, the cold 
limen being (.116°—.065°) or .051°. Xi finally equals 
(.111°—.065° )=.046° ; that is, it lies at 32.046°. 

For anyone using the customary psychometric functions, there- 
fore, we believe Xi to be an indispensable tool. 


76 ELMER CULLER 


IV. ON THE: USE OF A VARIABLE STANDARD 


In this article we wish to signalize the marked advantage of 
using a variable standard in psychometric work; that is, of using, 
within a given series, each comparison-stimulus (J) in turn as 
the standard. The discussion will cover three topics: description 
of method, possible objection, advantages. 

First of all, what is the method? Given 10 weights, consisting 
of five S and five J, the latter ranging from 96 to 104 grams 
by 2-gm steps. Ordinarily the five S are all equal and midway of 
the J-series (100 gm); whence we have five D from —4 to +4. 
By our method the five S are duplicates of the five J, the two 
series being equal and parallel; we then have the same total 
equipment (10 stimulators) as before, but the number and range 
of D are much increased. Comparing the lowest S (96) with all 
the J, we get as D: 0, 2, 4, 6, 8; the next S (98) gives: —2, 0, 
2,4, 6; andso on. In tabular form we have: 


S-D in Gig i an ieee 8 6 4 z 0.) (+2 —4) 6 8 
Orthodox method... 1 1 1 1 1 
Our method......... 1 Z 3 4 5 4 3 2 1 


Whereas by the one method we have but five D with a range 
of 8, by ours we have twenty-five D with a range of 16, sym- 
metrically disposed about the standard. By the close of a working 
period every stimulator (both S and J) has been used precisely 
the same number of times. 

But we start an objection at once: how is the limen affected by 
using each J in turn as the base? With a D of 2 grams, say, 
“heavier ’ will appear more often on base 96 than 100. Our 
method theoretically induces an error which, however, is neglible 
and can, if desired, be easily measured and removed. With the 
above group of stimuli, we have fifteen D from O up; 104 is the 
base for one D (0), 102 for two D (0 and 2), and so on. Now 
the Weber ratio for lifted weights may be taken as .025; hence 
we should expect a limen with base 104 to be about (4.025) 


SLUDIES IN PSYCHOLOGY 77 


larger than with the true standard, 100. Applying this reasoning 
to all the S-weights, we have: 


4X .025 X 1= 100 
2X .025 X 2= 100 
0X .025X3= _ .000 
—2 X .025 X 4= —.200 
xX .025 X 5== —.500 

1 —.500 


Dividing by 15 we have —.033, which is the net error in this 
case; that is, the limen by our method is about .033 less than the 
true value (2.5) or 2.467; the two differ by 1.3 per cent. A dis- 
parity of this magnitude is small enough to be neglected; the 
margin of error from other sources will usually far exceed this; 
but of course we can easily multiply the limen as found by 1.013 
and thus get the true value.’ 

What now are the advantages, the reasons for proposing our 
method at all in lieu of orthodox procedure? There are several: 
(1) By its means we achieve a maximal range and number of 
S-D with minimal equipment. In our example, if the zero-D are 
dispensable, all the others may be secured just as well from the 
J-series alone. This is a matter of moment when, as in our 
_ thermal study, the individual pieces are extremely bulky and ex- 
pensive, so that each added unit makes the whole much more 
cumbrous and costly. 

(2) The range of stimulus-differences, being just twice as wide 
as by the usual method, has the advantage of insuring some high 
and low values of p in every case; these, being notably more 
reliable, have likewise greater effect upon precision and limen both 
than does a p near .50.* We thus save time and energy by 

* The net error is a function of three variables: the Weber ratio, the number 
of J, and the size of the steps between them. Thus, in our study of thermal 
discrimination the error in a typical case sank to about .0002°. We may also 
observe that in our calculation we assume each D to count equally in fixing 
the Ree this is not wholly true; the unlike percentages of “heavier” with 
D of 0, 2, 4, 6, 8 have unlike Urban weights and therefore unequal effect upon 
the position ‘of the limen. The matter is not of much moment, but the D which 
preponderate below the true S have relatively low weight; so that our com- 
putation really tends to magnify what error creeps in by this source. 

?Urban (25, xvi, 182) and Boring (2, 285) both contend that a p near .50 


affects the position of the limen more than does any other; a plausible error, 
since the Urban weight, P, is maximal at p==.50 and minimal at p= .00 and 


78 ELMER CULLER 


including some large S-D instead of confining ourselves to small 
D whose percentages (of heavier and lighter) vary little from .50. 

(3) In addition to a few large S-D, the method provides more 
smaller ones as well (in the example, five D of O, four of +2, 
and so on). In view of (2) above we may be tempted to ask: 
Why not use nothing but large S-D, omitting the smaller ones 
wholly? All our p would then have high reliability with few or 
none around .50. To any such plan two facts are decisively 
opposed: (a) When we try to determine any theoretical function, 
sound policy invariably demands as many empirical measures as 
can reasonably be secured; the more ordinates we have the better. 
In lieu of the old method of two or three stimuli, we now use 
complete series of S-D (Vollreihen), which are expressly designed 
to give an empirical picture of differential perception through the 
range from 0 to 100 per cent. Percentages near .50 are then 
indispensable and can be made as reliable as in the extremes by 
simply taking more cases; which is just what our method does. 
(b) O’s attitude and performance depend on the number of 


stimuli; his response to one is conditioned by others gone before; 


were there no small D, the large D would be otherwise perceived. 
Small D furthermore provide an incentive for the alert observer 
and give the comparative process a kind of “ intellectual ” inter- 


1.00. Urban’s P however is composed of two factors with wholly unlike 
function (art. VI): the one a purely mathematical device for reducing the 
data, the other an index of reliability, 1/pq. How much a given p will affect 
the course of a fitted curve is wholly due to the latter. This factor equals 
4.0 at p==.50 but rises to 101.0 when p=.01 or .99; whence it follows that 
the Urban-function fits the tails much more neatly than the mid-range of a 
distribution. This over-weighting of the tail-percentages is necessitated by 
the greater stability of judgment near the extremes; it is but natural that 
these values define the smooth curve more than do the less reliable p around .50. 
Should the reader insist on empirical verification of the above statements, let 
him consider Boring’s example (2, 284) where h=.3670 and L=.2001. How 
are these values affected if we omit in turn p—.16, p=—.45 and p=—.86, 
retaining in each case the other four? Here are the figures: 


Amount of change 
h 


h if: 
True values 3670 .2001 
Omitting p—=.16 410 .261 043 061 
Omitting p=—=.45 361 .180 .006 .020 
Omitting p= .86 321 330 .046 130: 


Omitting the p at .45 affects the value of both h and L far less than does 
omission of the other two; which proves of course that the p nearest .50 had 
but little to do with fixing the position of h and of L in the first place. 


ii i a 


STUDIES IN PSYCHOLOGY 79 


est; a few easy judgments are useful in keeping O “ steady ”’ and 
confident (2, 282), but if at all numerous he tends to become 
perfunctory in his work. In our method then we gain the benefits 
of a few easy comparisons and likewise have enough small D to 
make their frequencies reliable. 

(4) A fourth advantage of our method is that we escape what 
Miller calls the effects of “absolute impression”; that is, the 
typical and general tendencies of judgment (19, 113). The rea- 
sons have been given in article II of this series and need not be 
repeated here. All the stimuli whether S or J being presented 
equally often, we fail to see how any trend, typical or general, 
could possibly arise; especially if we change S from trial to trial. 
In our thermal study, the general tendency reduced to 2.7 per 
cent, the typical to 1.6 per cent; these figures clearly show how 
effective our method is in nullifying the ‘‘ judgment-tendencies.”’ 

For the reasons given we believe that the variable standard 
deserves careful attention from anyone seriously engaged in 
psychometric work. 


80 ELMER CULLER 


V. ON THE URBAN WEIGHTS AND THEIR 
RELIABILITY 


In this article we propose to examine the theory of the Urban 
weights, to demonstrate with an actual example their limited 
reliability, and to present a means of finding the true weight 
when needed. 

Let S and J be two stimuli, presented to an observer under 
specified conditions; let O respond to J upon each presentation 
in one of three ways (Heavier, Doubtful, Lighter); let py be 
the proportion of Heavier out of the total number of judgments 
applying to a given J. As J is increased py will rise from .00 to 
1.00, roughly describing in its ascent a curve known as the psy- 
chometric function or integral ® (y). Let a be the median of 
the ogive which best fits the ascending series of H-percentages 
and let h (== 1/cV2) be the precision of their distribution. Then 
¥.==h (J,—a). From a group of these equations we find the 
most probable values of h and a, such that the mean-square devia- 
tions of the observed p from the calculated p (p,) will be minimal. 
Since the mean-square adjustment is designed only for directly 
observed quantities like p and not for derived values like y, the 
y-deviations are reduced to p-deviations by means of a factor, 
y, such that 

¥ (y= Yo) (De Po), (1) 
where po is the most probable (adjusted) value of p and yo is 
correlative with po. We have shown elsewhere’ that 

2 


1 2 ae 
Bates te ‘ (yoyo) ctye? Gyo) goa / oe 


—y? 2 
e ay en at (2) 
In general, the larger the number of terms in the right-hand 
member, the nearer will its value approach that of (p— po). 


*In our thermal study (7) to which the reader is referred for derivation of 
this formula and full discussion of the Urban method. 


STUDIES ING PSYCHOLOGY 81 


When employing the ® (y) procedure, however, we assume that 
our series of py trace an approximately Gaussian ogive. When 
this is true the magnitude of (p—po) is small and likewise 
(y— yo) is so small that its higher powers may be neglected in 
the above series. Muller and Urban in fact retain only the first 
power of (y— yo), so that : 

~2y? 

(papier Uhr) oi ih: Cr vO)7, (3) 
and it is from this abbreviated equation that the weights in the 
Muller and Urban tables are derived. We see that the factors 
needed to minimize the sum of all the (p—p.)* when we have 
the correlative figures for (y — yo)? is 

~2y? 
Y= (1/n) e (4) 


But Urban in his weights (P) incorporates an additional factor 
of widely differing function: he weights each p in such wise that 
its contribution to the course of the psychometric curve will be 
proportional to its own precision or reliability. The py which 
we obtain with a given value of J is assumed to be itself merely 
a sample from a normal distribution; that is, if we made an 
indefinite number of trials at the same point (say a thousand sets 
of 50 each when J equals 102 and S = 100), the thousand values 
of px should form a closely normal distribution about their mean. 
The sequence of py (pi, pz, . . . , prooo) evoked from a practised 
O under uniform conditions is taken to be a true Bernoullian series, 
the elements conditioning the appearance and nonappearance 
of a given response being constant throughout (cf. 10, 118 ff). 
The distribution has a s.d. of Vpq/n, q being (1—p) and n 
the number of trials on which p is based (50 in our example). 
If n be constant, the s.d. of these p,-distributions for the several 
values of J will obviously not be constant; for the reason that pq 
varies, being maximal at p==q=— 1/2 and minimal when p or q 
equals zero. In fitting the most probable ogive to these values 
of py Urban weights each one, in the usual way, inversely pro- 
portional to its s.d.*; that is each p weighs n/pq. 

The Urban weight, P, therefore, unites two distinct functions: 


82 ELMER CULLER 


(a) it enables us to apply the mean-square adjustment to our 
simple linear equations, yx=h (Jx—a), so as to minimize 
s+ (p—p,)* instead of > (y—y,)*: (b) it weights every p of 
the series to which the curve is being fitted inversely proportional 
to its own precision. Hence the course of the ogive is such that 
the sum of the weighted and squared deviations of p from po 
is minimal. 

From the above it 1s clear that the complete Urban weight is 
(cf. equation 4) : 

P==¥y (n/pq) ; (5) 
but for purposes of tabulation n is treated as constant (that 
is, unity) and ¥ in each case is multiplied with 7/4. This is quite 
permissible since only the relative weight of the several p is 
needed; while by so doing a more convenient table is secured, 
the maximal weight being reduced to unity instead of an improper 
fraction. In Urban’s procedure, therefore, the following equation 
is fundamental : 

(7/4pq) (p— po)* = P (y—)’. (6) 
When the deviations (y— yo) are small, this equation is indeed 
accurate enough; but otherwise, an example from Urban’s own 
work may be taken to show that it is far from correct. 

Take the results for observer I, heavier (grosser) judgments, 
as given in the Archiv (25, xv, 287). The values of py for the 
several J (84, 88,-—-—, 108) range from .0022 to .9400; that is, 
obs. I called 84 heavier than S (100 gm) in .0022 of the whole 
number of trials (450). The most probable values of h and a, 
calculated from these p’s, are given (xvi, 192, Tabelle 44) as 
.1361 and 99.68. If we now compute the several po by inserting 
these values of h and a into the equation 


1361 (J — 99.68) 
1 
x2 
Var eu idx, 
oe 


and deduct them from the observed values p, the following 
residuals will be obtained in order: .0009, .0077, .0192, —.0172, 
—.1113, 0984, —.0054. The sum of these, when each is squared 


po == 1/2 + 








: 
: 
: 
| 





STUDIES IN PSYCHOLOGY 83 


and multiplied by the corresponding value of 7/4pq, equals 
.129450. This is the figure for the left member of equation (6) ; 
the right member is computed as follows. The actual values of y 
and the correlative weights P for obs. I are given in xvi, 190, 
Tabelle 40. If the several values of yo be calculated from 
ho (J—ao) and deducted from the actual values of y, these 
residuals will be obtained in order: .1190, .1376, .0924, —.0400, 
—.1985, .3008, —.0330. The sum of these, when squared and 
multiplied by the weights P, equals .098450 (Urban’s figure is 
098550; see xvi, 226, Tabelle 68). The agreement with .129450 
is distinctly poor, and shows that the abbreviated equation with 
only the first power of (y— yo) is hardly satisfactory. If, how- 
ever, the second-power term of equation (2) be retained in the 
weight, we have 
2+? 
ERO en RULE Cy vO) Wey Cy70) 7. 

If the right member of equation (6) be calculated from this 
weight we get the value .1290 which, in view of the numerous 
approximations involved, may be called a good agreement with 
1294. 

The limited approximation of the weights in Urban’s table 
could not be remedied merely by using additional terms from 
equation (2); by so doing we should introduce the variable 
(y— yo) into every weight; no table of reasonable size would 
then compass the possible combinations of p with (y—vyo). So 
long as the deviations (p — po) are small, we may well dispense 
with any finer approximation than the weights afford; but in 
the next article we shall have occasion to see, when considering 
Thomson’s formula for the p.e. of a limen, how gravely the 
accuracy of his figures is prejudiced by the use of P which depart 
widely from their true value. In cases where the tabulated weight 
is not sufficiently precise, we may secure a much truer approxima- 
tion by using additional terms in equation (2) above; as appeared 
so clearly in our example.” 

? We trust this article may show once for all how needless and wasteful it 


is to retain four decimals in the Urban weights and to insist upon 100 trials 
(or a sub-multiple thereof) in a series for the purpose of securing integral 


84 ELMER CULLER 


In general the Urban method will be used only with data which 
conform reasonably to the psychometric function; but the worker 
in this field will do well to bear clearly in mind the limited 
reliability of the tabulated Urban weights, and to make use of 
the more extended formulae when a truer value is required. 


values of p, as many investigators still seem to do. The case herein examined 
(Urban’s observer I) has no inversions of either first or second order and 
would commonly be regarded as a “ good” set of data; and yet we have been 
able to show that the tabled Urban P are, in the mean, but 76 per cent of 
their true value. By the side of such a margin of error, an additional 1 or 
2 per cent from dropping the third and fourth decimals is surely tolerable. 
In our own work we have never used more than two decimals either for p or 
for the tabled weights. 


STUDIES: IN PSYGHOLOGY 85 


VI. THE PROBABLE ERROR OF THE LIMEN AND 
ITS DERIVATION 


In lieu of Urban’s and Thomson’s complex formulae for the 
probable error of the limen [that is, of the median of the integral 
function ® (y)], we wish here to propose a simple and equally 
reliable method of deriving and computing it. 

Urban in his monograph computed, by a formula of his own, 
the p.e. of the upper and lower limens and of the intervals be- 
tween them—the “intervals of uncertainty ’’—and obtained 
values which in every case were larger, by as much as 10 times, 
than the quantities whose deviations they represented (25, xvi, 
225 ff and 192). These surprising figures lead him to conclude 
with the statement: ‘Die sogenannte Konstanzmethode ist 
demnach die ungenaueste der hier dargelegten vier psycho- 
physischen Methoden” (p. 227). He ascribes its inaccuracy to 
the fact that errors of theory combine with errors of observation 
in the ® (y) method. That his explanation is forced and his 
derivation erroneous, however, is clear for several reasons: 
(1) It would be strange if data secured under optimal conditions 
from an observer as skilled as Urban himself, should have devia- 
tions so large as almost to deprive them of any value. (2) He 
shows himself (p. 224 f.) that the ® (7) curve agrees better with 
the observed data than does the arc-tan hypothesis, the other 
psychometric function which he tested; if this be true, how can 
the former be less accurate? (3) Since the 450 trials were made 
in nine groups of 50, each having its own value of h and a, the 
p.e. from these nine should roughly agree with the one derived 
from his formula. When so computed the p.e. of the limen 
equals .276, which is of a wholly different plane of magnitude 
than Urban’s figure, 9.477 (cf. Thomson, 23, 52). 

In lieu of Urban’s formula for the p.e. Thomson, in the paper 
just cited, has developed another by the customary basic pro- 
cedure : 

If Z is any function, f, of 21, 22, ... and if X is the error pro- 


86 ELMER CULLER 


duced in Z by the concurrence of errors 41 in 21, ¥2 in 22, . . 
then 


Let x eet it Chieti) ez olst uce aren 


Expanding the second term into a Taylor series in powers of 


41, #2, ..., and deducting Z =f (41, 22, ...,), we have 
aaa ont. ( ag Ob AMD ra ayn: 
x x, Se + x, 9Z, A 7 353 + 2X, Xz Oz, Za +X% See: 


Assuming that the deviations are small enough to neglect all 
powers of *1, v2, ..., beyond the first, we have the usual formula 


from which 


ez - (3£) pez + (2£) pei, Si! 


STUDIES IN PSYCHOLOGY 87 


This formula is acceptably approximate only when the p.e. of 
£1, 22, ... (that is, of pi, pe, ...) are quite small. The p.e. (p) 
is found by the Bernoullian formula .6745V pq/n. 

The final form of Thomson’s equation is given (23, 50). 
While presenting no inherent difficulties either in derivation or in 
application, the formula is so cumbrous that its use in compu- 
tation becomes excessively laborious. It well behooves us there- 
fore to look for a method that is equally reliable and much less 
toilsome and time-consuming. 





Now it is obvious that the p.e. of both h (== ) and a 


—_— 


Pra W A 

(the limen) may be found directly from h itself. This quantity 
is the ‘‘ measure of precision” of the differential (normal) curve 
whose integral is fitted to the observed percentages (pi, po, ...). 
The s.d. of this normal distribution is 1/(hV2), whence the p.e. 
of the median, a, is 84535 [1/(hV2n)] and of h itself is 
6745 (h/V2n). For comparative purposes we shall deal with 
the same data (taken from Urban) which Thomson discusses, in 
which h==.1361, n==450; upon applying our equations above, we 
find that p.e.(h)==.003 (Thomson’s figure—.003) and p.e.(a)=—= 
.207 (Thomson’s value=.151).? 


* Boring (3, 315) uses the same method in finding the p.e. but his derivation 
has two errors: (1) he determines the p.e. of the mean whereas the Urban 
limen is the median, of which the p.e. is greater than of the mean by 
.8454/.6745; (2) he uses a weighted value of m in lieu of the actual figure; 
thus from five series of 50 each (p. 317) he has five p of .40, .50, .60, .80, 
1.00 whose correlative Urban weights (P) are .98, 1.00, .98, .77, .00. Each n 
being weighted with the corresponding P their sum becomes 186.50 and their 
mean 37.3, which he takes as the value of n (in lieu of 50) for computing 
the p.e. of the limen. We now have the anomalous result that, while a p of 
1.00 (P=.00) has no effect whatever upon the position or variability of the 
limen, it grossly affects the calculated p.e.; indeed by using ever larger stimulus- 
differences and thereby getting more and more p at 1.00 we could enlarge the 
p.e. without limit. The method is clearly defective, and for this reason. We 
have above just five p of unlike weight from which to determine the psycho- 
metric curve; the absolute size of these weights (P) is wholly immaterial, 
their relative magnitude alone being significant. Of the five P four are larger 
than their mean (.746), the fifth very much smaller. The p of weight 1.00 
has an effective value of 1.00/.746 or 1.34; likewise .98 of 1.31, .77 of 1.03 
and .00 of .00; the relative contribution of the several p to the psychometric 
curve is shown by these figures. If we wish to weight the various n, we must 
then proceed as follows: 


50 X 1.34, 50 X 1.31, and so on. 


88 ELMER CULLER 


The difference between these last two (the most important) fig- 
ures is pretty large. We have now to choose between the Thom- 
son formula, which gives an approximate p.e. of the limen for the 
exact (observed) values of p and the h-method, which gives an 
exact p.e. for the approximate (adjusted) values of p. Neither 
of course is wholly accurate: our h-method, because it shows the 
deviation for the “ most probable”? smooth (normal) curve in- 
stead of for the empirical values of p; and Thomson’s, for at 
least two reasons: (a) because of the abbreviated p.e.-formula 
which he uses; and (b), what is doubtless more important, be- 
cause of the merely approximate values of P (the Urban weights) 
which appear again and again (some 11 times) in his equation.” 
In the article just preceding we saw how much too small they are 
in this very case, being on the whole merely 76 per cent of their 
true value (.09845 as compared with .12945). The smallness of 
Thomson’s figure (just 73 per cent of our own) seems unde- 
niably due, in large if not major degree, to the fact that he uses 
a set of P which are about three-fourths of their true value and 
so gets a p.e. which is too small by about the same amount. Our 
h-method, we may add, is fully confirmed in this case by Wirth’s 
interpolation-procedure (28, 192, where is found the original 
derivation).. The Wirthian formula makes use of the extreme 
value, where p== 1.00. The highest p for obs. I being .94, how- 
ever, this value is not precisely known; but we may assume with 


The mean of these five products will of course be 50; which means that the 
weighting may be omitted altogether. The only reason for using 1.00 as the 
maximal weight (P) in Urban’s table is convenience or simplicity; the 
maximal figure might just as well be 5.00 or .03, so long as the others all 
had the same proportional values. But Boring’s weighted frequency, n, is a 
direct function of the particular values tabled by Urban; so that if the 
maximal weight were say 2.00 instead of 1.00, the weighted n would turn 
out to be just twice as large as above (74.6 instead of 37.3). Being thus 
arbitrary and factitious in character, this “weighting” of n has no real 
meaning. 

*In solving, to be sure, the positive and negative values of P tend partially 
to nullify each other; their net contribution to the final result is thereby much 
reduced. From the nature of the formula we should judge the p.e. which it 
yields to be (roughly) about P times the figure which would emerge in case 
every P were simply dropped altogether from the equation. In the example 
(from Urban via Thomson) already cited, the tabulated P which Thomson 
employed in deriving the p.e. by his formula were, in the mean, only 76 per cent 
of their true values; in consequence his figure for the p.e. (.151) is but 73 per 
cent of ours (.207). 





. 
| 
) 
] 
( 
4 
‘ 
‘ 
( 
' 


STUDIES IN PSYCHOLOGY 89 


practical certainty, there being 94 per cent heavier judgments at 
108 gm, that the ratio would rise to 100 per cent at either 112 
or 116 gm, or at least approach 100 per cent so nearly as to 
make the error negligible. Setting 100 per cent at 112, we get a 
p.e. of .205, at 116 of .208; they both depart widely from the 
Thomson figure .151 while our .207 lies between the two. We 
may also note that our figure lies much nearer the rough check- 
value (.276) than does Thomson’s. 

In short our figure seems to be more accurate than Thomson’s 
for at least three reasons: (a) he uses P which are known to 
be but 76 per cent of their true value and gets a p.e. which differs 
from ours by nearly the same amount; (b) Wirth’s method 
clearly corroborates our figure; (c) our figure agrees better with 
the check-value drawn from the nine separate groups of 50 each. 

Either method is really trustworthy only when the adjusted p 
differ but little from the observed. The evidence above pre- 
sented all favors the h-procedure and we know of none which 
opposes it; and while we may not, without more ado, assume our 
method to be universally superior to the other, we may at least 
conclude that the Thomson procedure has no demonstrable advan- 
tage in its favor to outweigh the inordinate labor which its use 
involves® ; for these reasons we used the h-method in our thermal 
study and commend it to the attention of other workers in the 
field. 

One matter remains. Since both of our formulae involve n 
(the area of the normal curve fitted to the observed p), the ques- 
tion arises: what is the value of n when the number of trials 
upon which the several p are based is not constant? When each p 
is a certain proportion of the same number of judgments (450 
in our example from Urban), then the area of the normal curve 
(n) is obviously this constant number (450). When however 
the number of trials with successive J is not the same (as by the 

*One p.e. may be computed from h in about three minutes; by Thomson’s 
method, if the writer may judge from his limited experience with it, some- 
thing like four hours of intensive labor, with every mechanical aid for rapid 
work, are consumed in finding a single p.e. in a case like the above. When a 


great many have to be computed, as in our thermal study, this difference in 
time is of no little practical importance. 


90 ELMER CULLER 


method which we recommend in Article IV), what area (n) shall 
we assume for the fitted curve? This is the formula: 
> Pink 
Xm = ———— (k = 1, 2,---,s) 
Px 


where nm is the weighted mean value of n. In illustration of 
the procedure, take the following series of warmer judgments 
(even ONO Ori fe 

Jd BbR 19.008) O52 BO DOn A Oo Oe tO ee nae 


Pw .O9 We, 44 1 .69 .69 .90 
n 11 89 107 85 110 59 20 
Nie ‘pt .89 iy 1.00 91 ‘Or 04 


(J is the comparison-stimulus to which the judgment applies; 
p is the percentage of warmer out of the total number (n) of 
judgments taken for the corresponding value of J; P is the Urban 
weight. ) 

The sum of Pxnx here equals 440.55; the sum of Px equals 
5.75; mm therefore equals 76.59. In other words, if 76.59 com- 
parisons had been made in each of the seven series above, the p 
remaining as they now are, the whole psychometric curve would 
also have turned out precisely as it now is. 

In cases where the Urban method is applicable at all, we be- 
lieve the h-procedure above presented to be a reliable, simple and 
rapid way of computing the p.e. of the limen; and as such com- 
mend it to the notice of psychometric workers.* 

*The reader will note that both the Thomson- and the h-method yield the 
p.e. of the crude (uncorrected) limen, which extends from S to that value 
of J where p==.50. The true limen, measured from Xi, will presumably, in 
our opinion, vary about the same; but inasmuch as we are acquainted with 


no procedure for finding its p.e., we have, for the present, to be content with 
the p.e. of the gross limen. 





STUDIES IN PSYCHOLOGY 91 


VIl. ON THE PERCEPTION OF CHANGE 


In this article we propose to examine the questions: What do 
we mean, in sense-perception, by an “intensive ” and by a “ quali- 
tative’ change? and, How do we come to perceive them? 

No theory which has to do with comparison, the judgment of 
difference or the perception of change can evade this underlying 
problem ; even though (dealing as we are with the ultimate nature 
of perceptual experience) we may be able to reply merely in 
suggestive or indicatory ways. We do not wish here to belabor 
again the hoary questions: whether an intensive change invari- 
ably conditions a qualitative alteration, whether “‘ sensation ”’ is a 
measurable magnitude, and the like; these have all been treated 
with an erudition that continues to be impressive even when it 
has ceased to be luminous. But having developed, in the course 
of our study on the thermal senses (7), a well-defined theory 
about the nature and criteria of sensory discrimination, we deem 
it well here to include a brief exposition of our point of view. 

Let an observer immerse the hand successively in two jars of 
water ; he thereby receives, within a brief interval, two complex 
somesthetic impressions, which as a rule differ perceptibly in 
certain ways; upon passing from one jar to the other, a notice- 
able change occurs. By this we mean that, insofar as the two 
are compared or otherwise related, they merge into a single 
gestalt, which gives rise to the perception of unlikeness and 
eventuates in some overt differential response (“‘ warmer’) by 
the organism. Without making assumptions about the nature 
of this differentiative process or the character of the changes 
which appear, we may take them as given; together with the 
organic configurations which condition them, they are the ultimate 
source of any thermal discrimination. A similar process goes on 
and the same conceptions obviously apply with any other mode 
of sensory comparison as well. Two questions now arise: 

(a) Could a naive (untrained) observer tell of what kind or 


92 ELMER CULLER 


¢ 


nature a given difference is; whether “ qualitative”’ or “ inten- 
sive,’ Say? 

(b) Assuming (a) to be possible, could the same observer, if 
given a number of stimuli differing intensively, tell which is most 
and which is least intense (warmest, heaviest) ? 

We know of no reason for a positive answer to either question 
and therefore negative them both; in default of affirmative evi- 
dence we believe it wise to assume as little as we can, to wit: that 
a wholly naive observer, with no antecedent opportunity of any 
sort for correlating subjective changes of impression (that is, the 
unlike and varied organic configurations ) with objective changes 
of stimulation, could only report a “ difference” or “‘ change ”’; 
nothing more. He could observe that two successive stimuli 
were not identical but could not say whether a given change was 
qualitative or intensive, or whether an intensive change was up- 
ward or downward. The most primitive form of perception, the 
final source of all discrimination, we take to be this elemental 
perception of difference or change, which eventuates from the 
energy-interchange going on within a neural gestalt; but our 
untaught observer could not yet say whether a given gestalt was 
due to a qualitative or intensive change in stimulation, or whether 
to an increase or decrease in degree of stimulation. 

To simplify exposition let us turn for a moment to the field 
of vision. Take the two series of qualities from red through 
orange to yellow and from red through light red to white. Each 
of the two has continuity, its members seem to belong together ; 
our naive O, if given samples chosen at random from the two, 
would presumably have no difficulty in restoring each sample to 
its own series and its true position therein. Question (a) now 
takes the form: is there anything whatever about these two con- 
tinua that marks the transitions from R to W as a set of “ in- 
tensive ’’ changes and those from R to Y as a series of “ qualita- 
tive’ changes? In our opinion, there is nothing of the kind; two 
adjoining tints of red resemble each other no more and no less 
than do two hues of orange, if the difference in each case be 
equally perceptible; saturate red differs from Y no more than 


STUDIES, INV PSYCHOLOGY 93 


it differs from a medium tint of red.t. When the naive O passes 
from one stimulus to another, he finds then no mark or sign to 
apprize him that two tints of red, say, or two warms differ in 
degree (more or less of the same thing) whereas R and Y or 
warm and cold differ in kind or quality. On the contrary, we 
come ‘to look upon the transitions from red to white and from 
warm to warmer as “intensive’’ only because we have learned 
that they accompany changes in the intensity or degree of objec- 
tive stimulation. 

Question (b) remains: given two stimuli a and b from the 
intensive series (varying intensities of red light, or differing tem- 
peratures), could a naive O tell which of the two is more in- 
tensive (lighter, warmer)? Again the reply is negative; we 
come to call b lighter or warmer than a for the sole and suf- 
ficient reason that we have previously found b to go with a higher 
degree of stimulation than a, or that the transition from a to b 
(that is, the configuration which results when they are presented 
together) reveals criteria which we have found to accompany a 
rising stimulus. What is our evidence for this view? It is 
twofold: 

(1) Objective. The “all or none” law in muscular and 
nervous response, which “seems to have found favor with most 
of the workers who have investigated the matter” (15, 29), is 
pertinent here. An individual muscle-fiber when stimulated re- 
acts with a maximal contraction if it gives any at all. The same 
law is found in neural function, according to the work of Adrian 
on the nerve-impulse, who proved “ that a disturbance, after hav- 
ing been decreased by passing through a region of decrement, 
recovers its original magnitude when it reénters a normal area”’ 
(1, 385) ; whence Bayliss concludes that “there is no gradation 
of excitatory state in the normal condition” of nerve-fibers; a 
fact which “ must be accepted whatever consequences may follow 
from it.” This being true, we should not expect a perceptual 
pattern to show variations of degree or intensity, of more or 


ins 


* We find in fact many more discriminable steps from R halfway up to W 
2 aon R to Y, as anyone can see by referring to Warren’s color spindle 
26, 171) 


94 ELMER CULLER 


less within a specific cell; as the temperature rises and the response 
becomes “‘ warmer,” more nerve-units are actively involved in the 
total gestalt but there is no increase in excitation of any one. 
Warmer differs from warm therefore “ extensively” rather than 
“intensively.” * 

(2) Subjective. This evidence is drawn from the writer's 
extensive experience in making some 35,000 temperature-dis- 
criminations and may be taken as the mature conviction which 
emerged during that protracted period of service. The testimony 
of others might not wholly agree with his; but the intensive and 
prolonged experience which it resumes may serve to justify its 
inclusion at this point as an important line of evidence. 

“Assuming the second impression to rate warmer, is the dif- 
ference of the two purely ‘intensive’? So far as I can say, no; 
the second, to be sure, always resembles the first, but rarely if 
ever seems to be simply ‘ more of the same thing.’ I am not sure 
I know just what this phrase means in actual experience ; and this 
fact of itself may show how rare and unaccustomed the phe- 
nomenon was for me. In any event, the change from warm to 
warmer does not seem to be a mere matter of intensive incre- 
ment. Typically, the second impression carries certain marks or 
characters which have been noted many times before upon pass- 
ing from a lower to a higher temperature; the presence of these 
indices or criteria thus becomes the determinant of my response, 
and I call the present change warmer. Wherever it occurs, 
whether at 20°, 32° or 40°, this transition has a kind of family 
trait, bears much the same brand; somewhat as the notes of a 
melody continue to bear the same relation to each other even 


though pitched in various keys or played in differing parts of 
the scale.” ® 


*We may think of the matter as follows: “warmer” is reported either 
when the first impression is cool and the second warm, or when each is warm 
and the second is more “intensive.” In the former case, presumably, different 
receptors and therefore separate neural tracts are in action; in the latter, the 
second stimulus activates the same neurons as the first and some others in 
addition. 

* The above statement is offered in evidence on question (2) ; and its brevity 
may show how hard it is, in any real sense, to give a significant description of 
the process of thermal discrimination. In a case of this kind, “ introspection” 





STUDIES IN PSYCHOLOGY 95 


From these lines of evidence, however tentative and incom- 
plete, we conclude that perceptual configurations (complex sense- 
impressions) vary in more ways than one; and that a given dif- 
ference comes to be known as “intensive ’”’ solely for the reason 
that we have learned to ascribe it to a change in degree of objec- 
tive stimulation. We may look at the matter somewhat as fol- 
lows. We give O a number of preliminary series during which 
he is at all times apprised of the relation between the stimuli he is 
comparing ; he knows, e.g., in every case whether the second tem- 
perature is higher or lower than the first. If, under these con- 
ditions, we expose the same receptive mechanism again and 
again to a medium whose temperature (as known to QO) is rising, 
we are likely to get a considerable variety of sensory configura- 
tions in the successive trials ; some of the factors which constitute 
the several patterns are casual and incidental (arising from a 
particular jar, room-temperature, time of day, temporary physio- 
logical conditions, and the like) while others are stable or invari- 
able, appearing every time. At each trial the judgment “ warmer ”’ 
is given; each gestalt, though differing in some way from the 
others which have preceded it, eventuates in the same overt 
response ; and so the invariable elements common to all or most 
of the configurations, the modes wherein they are identical, be- 
come more intimately associated with, culminate more readily 
and surely in, the “warmer’”’ response than do the occasional 
tingles, pricks, smoothness, lightness and other somesthetic factors 
which now appear in the gestalt and now do not. The fixation of 
these bonds between the stable elements of a perceptual configura- 
tion and some overt response (warmer) provides the necessary 
and sufficient condition for inducing true thermal judgments of 
“warmer.” O’s task in the training series therefore is to isolate 
seems to be limited to suggestive and indicatory reports; by it we seem able 
to find out where something is going on and gain some clue to the nature and 
course of the ongoings, but the real mechanism of the process is “below the 
surface” and not discoverable by introspective means. One can, to be sure, 
describe the change from warm to warmer with metaphors borrowed from 
other senses (‘“ cooler” is more open, light, smooth, velvety; “ warmer” is 
more snug and prickly); but apart from the fact that we thus introduce 
irrelevant, non-thermal criteria which should have naught to do with O’s 


judging, these figurative designations surely contribute nothing to our com- 
prehension of the matter. 


96 ELMER CULLER 


these invariable concomitants of thermal change until they stand 
in clear relief, and fix them by attentive repetition so well that 
future judgments will be consistently determined by them alone. 
This training is best achieved, not by haphazard “ practice series ”’ 
of the usual sort, but with systematic procedure wherein O is 
acquainted with the direction of thermal change and correlates it 
with concomitant variations in the perceptual configuration. With 
such tuition, O is gradually prepared to function properly in dis- 
criminative work, because he has gained a relatively clear and 
stable concept of “warmer” and “cooler.” The improvement 
with practice which, as in our own case, may persist over many 
days of careful work, is therefore due not to changes in the 
receptive mechanism but to increasing refinement and clarity of 
the concept ‘“‘ warmer,’ which is gradually being isolated and 
defined. 

Thermal* discrimination therefore consists in observing the 
kind of (subjective) criteria which appear within the configura- 
tion evoked by two thermal stimuli when applied under stated 
conditions to a given receptive surface. The totality of these 
indices and criteria makes up O’s concept of “ warmer” (and 
“cooler ’’); it is achieved by means of preliminary training 
wherein the stable features of the discriminative patterns come 
out with increasing precision and permanence, and are thereby 
relieved of casual and non-thermal adjuncts. 

We have tried to show that all discrimination is in reality an 
estimate of stimulus-relations by means of certain subjective 
indices, which appear with neural or intra-organic configura- 
tions; that when O reports “warmer,” he finds in the present 
gestalt those criteria which have previously gone with a transi- 
tion from lower to higher temperature. By so doing, we may be 
accused of consorting, openly and unashamed, with the “ stimulus- 
error.’ In a later article therefore we propose to submit this 
concept to a brief examination. 


“We are, of course, merely using the perception of thermal change as an 
example; the same principles hold for any other sense-field. 


ae 


STUDIES IN PSYCHOLOGY 97 


VIII. ON THE USE OF AN INTERMEDIATE CATE- 
GORY OF JUDGMENT (“ EQUAL” OR 
“ DOUBTFUL ”) | 


In this article we shall try to prove, by objective and experi- 
mental means, that with all comparative work involving the 
process of discrimination or the perception of relation (1) an 
intermediate category of judgment (such as “doubtful” or 
“equal ’’) is indispensable for the most reliable and useful results ; 
(2) “doubtful” is preferable to “ equal” for this category. 

The use and value of an intermediate response (in addition to 
the truly comparative judgments like heavier and lighter) has 
been much debated. Either “doubtful” (d) or “equal” (e), 
and often both, was used by the earlier psychometrists and by 
most of their successors; but Jastrow and others proposed using 
only the two comparative responses, of which one would always 
be “right” and the other “ wrong” (provided the two stimuli 
are not equal). This is no place for an exhaustive history or 
analysis of the two methods’; but we may note some advantages 
claimed for the purely comparative procedure confined to the 
opposed responses heavier and lighter (the c-method) : 

(a) It simplifies manipulation and analysis of results; the d 
and e cases which were formerly troublesome are thereby wholly 
abolished (24, 286) ; 

(b) It obviates d which is no real judgment at all, being a 
mere evasion or refusal by the observer, and not on a parity with 
true judgments like H and L’; 

(c) It precludes e which necessitates and issues from a kind 

*See Titchener (24, 285), for a convenient summary of this topic’s early 
ate “Evasive answers such as ‘equal,’ ‘don’t know,’ or ‘no dif- 
ference,’ permit the observer to avoid forming a judgment in just those cases 
where it is most important to discover whether or not a correct judgment 
can be formed” (6, 28); “ When the difference is slight one must overcome 
some mental inertia before he can make up his mind, and if allowed to shirk, 
it is natural for one to lapse into a state of mild aboulia”; whereas by forcing 


O to choose between two alternatives we abolish the tendency to vacillate and 
keep him in a judicial attitude (p. 32). 


98 ELMER CULLER 


of mental standard, which in turn is bound to vary from time 
to time and with different observers.° 
The validity of these claims will be considered later. 

Opposed to the c-method were considerations of this kind: 

(a) If we compel O to “guess”’ when not sure, the cases 
which he would otherwise call d or e will now be assigned to 
H or L at random; but the law of chance-distribution (das Gesetz 
der Wahrscheinlichkeit) holds only with large numbers, whence 
a great many observations are needed if this procedure is to be 
permissible (Merkel: 18, 586). It having been amply shown by 
Pierce and Jastrow (20) and by Brown (6) that O does not 
“guess”? at random, this claim has no longer any force; even 
when professing to be wholly unsure of his judgment, O is more 
likely, apart from constant tendencies, to be “right” than 
“ wrong.” 

(b) Suppose we have only positive D (stimulus-differences ) ; 
in case O fails to perceive the increase (+ D) in a given trial 
he will incline to respond wrongly, “lighter” (18, 586). We are 
not quite sure of Merkel’s meaning here; but anyhow, when we 
use the modern scientific procedure for systematic work (sym- 
metrical distribution of D on each side of the standard, S) and 
measure the limen from Xi, as above advocated (Article V), any 
possibility of this kind is minimal if indeed operative at all. 

(c) With small D where discrimination is difficult O will in- 
cline to observe with increased attention, in case d or e be denied 
him; and in consequence of this change of attitude will give pro- 
portionately too many “ rights” (18, 586). Merkel tries to show 
this from Higier’s results (14, 105). He calculates the value of h 
with Fechner’s fundamental table for each D, both positive and 
negative, and finds that a D of —1 mm (S being 100 mm) 
gives much higher precision (h) in discrimination than a D of 
+ 1mm; this fact of itself, of course, merely proves the pres- 

*Brown (6, 32): “The quality of sameness rarely or never occurs pure. 
It is necessary to decide in each instance how near alike the two things are 
and then decide whether that amounts to equality. In other words, one must 
maintain a mental standard of equality. As one becomes more or less scrupu- 


lous this standard is liable to vary ; impressions that at one time seemed slightly 
different now pass for the same.” 


SPUDIES- IN PSYCHOLOGY 99 


ence and operation of a constant error. But the mean of these 
two h for +1 per cent and —1 per cent is larger than of the 
two h for +2 per cent and —2 per cent and the rest of the 
higher D; he thereupon infers that ‘‘ bei der kleinsten Zulage ”’ 
O was observing with “ verstarkter Aufmerksamkeit’’; ‘ mog- 
licherweise wurde bei kleinen Reizen die Aufmerksamkeit tber- 
haupt etwas hoher angespannt als bei grossen”’ (p. 105). This 
conclusion is by no means warranted; all that Higier’s data reveal 
is the operation of a constant tendency which naturally appears 
most noticeably with the smallest D; just as a displacement of .5 
inch will alter the proportion of “ rights’”’ and “ wrongs”? much 
more when we compare small D of one inch than large D of ten 
inches. Nothing can bé inferred from these data therefore ex- 
cept the presence of a constant tendency which appears more 
clearly with small D (+1 per cent) than with large D (+2 to 
a per cent). 

(d) A recurrent objection, finally, states that the simplified 
c-method straitjackets the observer and does violence to the com- 
parative situation; O is not permitted to respond naturally but 
instead is brought under compulsion (Zwang) which distorts his 
natural mode of judging (cf. 24, 289 and 19, 14). 

It is clear that previous discussion has been largely a priori, 
subjective or irrelevant; and inasmuch as the proponents of, the 
e-method fail to accept the alleged introspective evidence against 
their procedure,’ no agreement has yet been reached. Each in- 
vestigator seems to follow his own preference in the matter; or 


b] 


if he wishes to use a particular method of statistical analysis 
(such as Urban’s which, in its standard form, necessitates an 
intermediate category), he adopts the procedure it prescribes. 
This chaotic situation is regrettable; we therefore propose here 


*Brown (6, 32): “The results of these experiments should be sufficient 
answer to . . . objections on the ground that the observer must not be 
forced or constrained out of the natural channels of expression. As a matter of 
fact no constraint is involved in the exclusion of these expressions (‘ equal’ or 
‘don’t know’) in the case of observers who have had practice in attending to 
small differences. In the present case the observer gave this introspection in 
the middle of the minimal difference series: ‘The weights never seem exactly 
the same. There is always a difference . In the face of experience, a 
priori objections in this matter are out of place.” 


100 ELMER CULLER 


to present some objective and quantitative evidence in favor of 
the i-method (with intermediate category, d or e), which in our 
opinion proves it unquestionably superior to the other for general 
comparative purposes.®° The argument will cover three heads. 
(1) The i-method invariably has a higher degree of precision 
(h) or a smaller deviation for the psychometric function than 
does the c-method; it thus gives a more reliable and accurate 
measure of the discriminative capacity to be tested. We shall 
try to prove this with evidence from three independent sources. 
(a) From Brown himself. Let us compare all the experiments 
of Brown, four in number, by the c-method (including the vari- 
ous forms of instruction: “ indicate which weight is the heavier ” 
and “is the second heavy or light, in comparison with the first? ”’ 
neither of which admits d or e) with two cases by the i-method 
where “‘ same” was allowed (in one of which was the question: 
Is the second the same or heavier?; in the other: Are the two 
same or different?’). We here have materials for comparing 
those trials where O is forced to decide in terms of H or L 
and those where he may resort to “same” or “no difference.” 


’ 


‘ 


°In this connection the reader may consult an article by George (13). He 
found that “doubtful” tends to lessen with practice whereas we found the 
reverse in our thermal study: at the close of practice “equal” had been 
wholly displaced by “doubtful.” In our work O was instructed to announce 
“whether the second stimulus is warmer or cooler, that is, of higher or 
lower temperature, than the first.” When they appear equal or indiscriminable, 
then “doubtful” is the true and only proper answer to the question. Our 
“doubtful” thus includes his “doubtful” and “equal” both; much of his 
attack on the “doubtful” response is thereby reft of its force. George 
invariably announced in advance that, say, “the second stimulus will always 
be greater than or equal to the first” and thereby directly suggested the use 
of “equal” where we should employ “doubtful.” He concludes that doubtful 
judgments must “either be ruled out or discarded” (p. 11) and Boring (27, 444) 
insists that “the instructions and experimental setting must assure a practically 
complete elimination of doubtful judgments.” In the present article we try 
to show that the doubtful category is highly useful even though we exclude 
all D-judgments from our final computations. 

7In the former, O was apprised in advance that the second weight would 
never be less than the first, whence L was not an appropriate response. As 
we should expect, there were times when the second, despite this information, 
seemed lighter and was so reported; but, we are told (p. 30), these cases 
gradually ceased as the O tended to assimilate them to the “same” category. 
As a matter of technique, this procedure looks a bit curious but need not 
delay us here. In the second of these cases, we are told (p. 44), “the question 
was put, ‘Are they the same (or nearly the same)?’ and the judgment was 
again in oral terms ‘same’ but if they did not appear the same nothing was 
said.” 


STUDIES IN PSYCHOLOGY 101 


To make the comparison easy and equitable we shall confine our 
survey to those D which appear in each of the six sets; the time- 
space order being the same in all cases (comparison-stimulus, J, 
on the left and second), conditions are strictly comparable except 
for slight variance of instruction and small discrepancies in the 
total number and range of D employed. | 


GROUP I 
Percentage of “heavier” (py,) ; J heavier, to left of S and second; 
S= 100 gm. 
J > Ze Aree OF Su un LO sy kee ete Le 
1. (Which heavier? 19a +23a).... 66 81 89 94 99 99 100 100 
Eee oamer or heavierl ii. i ore es 50 69 86) 0 910.097)", 98 1007 100 
GROUP II 
Percentage of p,;,; J lighter but estimated heavier, to left of S and second; 
S=100 gm. 
LESS SB OY 1.6 1.4 |e 1.0 8 6 A 2 
3. (Which heavier? min. 
Clik: eee se Ot wh Wan 5] 54 55 56 56 56 58 61 
GROUP III 
Percentage of “lighter” (p,;); J lighter, to left of S and second; 
S=100 gm. 
J<S by 2 + 6 SLO crt 2 A141 
4. (Which heavier? second less, 
TOTOT Ac Ais Gwe ool bela! ZA 4§) 64. 68 8404931), 96, 100 
5. (Is second H or L? second less, 
QUALI eu Malt hss nie nee eal shh died is 3 35 49 60 79 88 9% 98 100 
6. (Same or different? same)....... ALI GON ITSO 3ie 9G). 99 LOO 00 


How are these figures obtained? Row 1: it is unfortunate for 
our purposes that Brown’s successive percentages reveal large 
practice-effects ; as appears when we consider the following series 
(pp. 14-15), which are identical in procedure being all listed as 
“greater, left.” Three groups will serve for comparison: la to 
5a, 17a + 19a, 23a (the last being separated from the next pre- 
ceding series of the same kind, 19a, by some 30,000 trials; see 
p. 53) ; the precision and limen ® for each of the three is: 


h limen 
la towSa .210 2.27 gm 
17a + 19a 249 1.92 
23a .371 1.29 
*The limen is assumed to extend from the point where p,;;=.50 to 


.6745 
pH— 79; in other words, it equals the p.e. of the distribution ( 
h 





V 


102 ELMER CULLER 


The precision (h) keeps on rising from early to later series, 
notably from second to third; this betokens a correlative improve- 
ment in sensitivity, wherefore reliable figures are not easy 
to secure for comparative purposes ; but inasmuch as all the other 
observations here used were taken after 19a and before 23a, it 
seemed reasonable to assume that upon combining these two we 
should have about the same stage of practice represented in this 
method as in the others. Hence the figures given are the mean 
percentages for 19a and 23a. The figures of row 2 are copied 
from: Table IV, p. ol; those ‘ot 3 trom Dable ul Isr. \ Zea 
fitting our psychometric curve to the figures of 3 we of course 
bore in mind that the several D (.2 to 1.6 gm) were just 10 per 
cent of the D (2 to 16 gm) used in all the other series. The 
figures in 4 and 5 come from Table VII, p. 42; in 4 we have the 
percentage of “second less’’ as shown by a manual movement 
in accord with the instruction “indicate which weight is the 
heavier ”’; in 5 we have the proportion of “ second less’ as stated 
orally in reply to the question, “ Is the second heavy or light (in 
comparison with the first)?’ The figures in 6 finally are de- 
rived as follows: we form a cumulative curve from the “ same” 
distribution (p. 42) by adding successively the number of 
‘““sames ”’ in each of 200 trials, beginning at the right end (5, 6, 
20, 40, and so on) and thereby get in order the sums 5, 11, 31, 
71 and so on; the final sum, that is the total area of the ‘‘ same” 
distribution, proves to be 1043. Dividing the sum at —2, at —4, 
and so on by 1043 we find the percentages in row 6, which reduce 
the “same” distribution to an ogive for comparison with the 
other ogival curves.® Altogether we have two modes of report 
(oral and motor) and two sets of D (-++ and —) to compare 
with the series where ‘ was admitted. 


’ 


“same * 
We now fit to these percentages the Urban psychometric func- 


* The “same” distribution is unique in that it rises to a maximum and then 
recedes to zero; whereas all the others rise to a maximum (100 per cent) and 
then remain there. What we have really done here is to get the value of h 
(or ¢) for the distribution of “same” judgments in a form which will make 
its precision (deviation) roughly comparable with that of the other curves. 


STUDIES ANS PSYCHOLOGY 103 
} 





tion ® (y) and get the value of h (= ) with its p.e. (see pre- 


aV2 


ceding Article VI of this series). h (or @) is the only real 
measure of discriminative sensitivity and has the same meaning 
in every case; whereas “‘limen”’ is an arbitrary term which is 
variously defined in the two methods (c and 1); we accordingly 
confine ourselves to the basal concept, h. 


h p.e.n of trials 
Mah ek pS 4 hie w/e Vad ood, od aad VR aio 288 .0137 100 
Peesameor Neavier P's eek cei hos eee .303 .0068 450 
3. Minimal differences............. . 186 .0028 1000 
AE MCCONG HESS) IMOLOL GG. ose wk ase ceria .292 .0098 200 
BR SECON Lens) OFalie. Ses. 's be sateee .291 .0098 200 
PA Et Ee Neti 2S cine © ek fale . 382 .0129 200 


The larger h is, the steeper is the psychometric curve and the 
smaller the p.e. of its distribution (the limen). We see at once 
that both cases of the i-method (3 and 6) show /ugher precision 
than do any of the other four; row 6 (.382) indeed exceeds the 
nearest c-value (.292) by about .090 which is 5% times its own 
p.e. (.0162). The higher precision of the i-method appears the 
more sharply in that the two c-values with negative D (4 and 5) 
are almost identical’? with each other and with the c-value for 
positive D (row 1); while all are substantially less than either 
i-value."? 

We feel justified in concluding therefore that the two i-methods 
(same or heavier? same or different?) are more precise than any 
of the c-methods used; and while the differences in h are not 
large enough in every case to be valid by the usual criteria of 
significance (for the reason presumably that n is too small), yet 
the fact that both i-values are larger than any of the other four 


* Brown seems to think (p. 53) that these two limens differ widely and 
then proceeds to draw rather far-reaching inferences about the general unre- 
liability of the “threshold.” On the contrary, the two methods agree almost 
perfectly in precision and consequently in differential limen. 

™ The figure for minimal differences (row 3) is much lower than any other 
and not so reliable; for the reason that the percentage curve has a kind of 
plateau in the middle and thus approximates the psychometric ogive but poorly. 
We cannot say which part of this curve most nearly follows its “true” 
course; but in any event the figure for h is at best approximative. 


104 ELMER CULLER 


lends weight to the presumption that their differences are genuine. 
This being true, the i-methods prove to be the more precise and 
accurate mode of measuring differential responsiveness to weight- 
stimulation. 

(b) To avoid the objection that Brown’s experiments with the 
two methods (i and c) differed in other ways, however slight, 
as well and in consequence are not strictly comparable, let us 
consider the following data from Higier (14, 232 ff). These 
two sets of figures, on his formal statement, issue from identical 
conditions except that in one case the intermediate judgment (d) 
was admitted, in the other excluded. Those with d, it should be 
noted, were taken after those without d; he fails to state whether 
practice-improvement was provided for, but the figures show a 
little evidence of betterment from this source. 


Percentage of judgments (longer or shorter) ; time-space factors constant ; 


= 100 mm.; n= 480 
Dp — —4 —3 —2-—1 0 1 Zz 3 4 5 
ic-method, longer 24°03 05 GAD i222" B20 74865" 70; eles 
Z.9-method, longer: 00%), 01 °)03; 06.7): 124,13), 43. 259 7670 Be Bene 
3:/4-method, shorter.) 96." 91587, 276 9) 61) 41 O18 1S OS Os ee 


These figures are from Table XIX, p. 277; the numbers there 
given are here reduced to percentages of 480. He tabulates the 
responses in the old way as “right” and “ wrong,” “longer ” 
being right for a +D, “ shorter ” for a —D; but the values above 
are easily derived from his table. 

Upon fitting the psychometric function to these three sets of 
figures, we have: 


h p.€.n 
Lte-meth dod i ge aD LRRD meerer eg Rae ce rect .0049 
2. d-methad jlonger aiken APA eye dane eae. Lt . 308 .0067 
S.-i-method.t shorter oc Ue oan Sea EN eels une Leugie .290 .0063 


The differences with their p.e. are: 
(1 —2) = .081 + .0083 
(1— 3) = .063 = .0080 
These differences are clearly significant, being eight to ten 
times their own p.e. Inasmuch as the experiments were made 
with identical conditions for the express purpose of comparing 
the two methods, we have to attribute a good deal of importance 
to these results. 


STUDIES IN PSYCHOLOGY 105 


(c) There remains the sole possibility that Higier failed to 
make due account of practice-improvement. To be reassured in 
this matter and to gain additional evidence, we proceeded to or- 
ganize a brief experiment on lifted weights with rigorous condi- 
tions, the writer being observer. Actual experimentation was 
preceded with some hours of preliminary practice, during which 
O was in every case apprised of the actual relation between the 
stimuli; this was done with the purpose of defining and fixing 
the criteria for H and L. Five. weights were used (194, 197, 
200, 203, 206 gm.), with a rotating table to obviate the space- 
error. Time was marked by a clock beating seconds; each weight 
was lifted about one second with an interval of some four seconds 
between the members of a pair. In case of doubt, O “ guessed ”’ 
whether the second was H or L and then reported H-doubtful or 
L-doubtful; these cases were then tabulated in two ways: they 
were duly classified as H or L (c-method) and again as doubtful 
(i-method). By so doing we are enabled to use precisely the 
same data for our comparison; whenever any factor, like fatigue 
or practice, acts in any wise upon the one method, it affects the 
other as well; conditions are really identical as they can not be 
when observations by the two procedures are made at different 
times. Our data are therefore comparable down to the last 
detail, differing only in respect of method (the matter under 
investigation). The whole number of trials was 900 gained in 
six periods of 150 each. By using the variable S recommended 
above (Article V), we got nine D from —12 to +12, as follows: 


D (in grams) —12 -9 -6 —3 0 3 6 9 12 
Relative no. of trials 1 2 3 4 5 4 3 2 1 
Whole no. of trials 36 72 108 144 180 144 = 108 72 36 
1. c-method, per cent 

Meavier?l cit x. Uses 17 19 34 38 49 56 63 69 81 
2. i-method, per cent 

Heavier... 580.20, os 08 08 12 12 23 28 33 56 69 
3. i-method, per cent 

Ontetia as fecsta cite a 64 61 40 33 20 19 08 14 08 


Laying the most probable ® (y) curve through these figures, 
we get 


h p.@.n 
MME CCEVICT TONE 0.4 5h Lah Late eae es Ca tea ree Tw clubcs on oe .153 .0071 
RITORUOCL Fa 0 os chit sere Pee a he oak rine ee a eis .174 .0082 


(ESI 7 Ripe Desig PSE ae ergo Neda hain aii AS —.180 .0085 


106 ELMER’ CULLER 


As above noted, the observations were taken in six periods of 
150 each; if we compute h at the close of each period, we have: 


c-method i-method (H) i-method (L) 
First period iat ares § eee atone .142 .229 —.146 


Firstictwory aise eee eo .101 .149 —.126 
Firstxthrée tae ie then ete ee .170 —,129 
First (fourivi ceca dahon ok .138 .167 — 156 
Pirstonvec ojos vy aeeurs tae Gon ees .161 .180 —.166 
First "six "(ag apove) Vayu anee 153 .174 —.180 


While the figures fluctuate somewhat, notably in the first few 
days (owing to limited number of trials), and while h tends in 
all three to rise with practice, the relation is unmistakable: by the 
c-method h is invariably smaller than with 1 (heavier) or i 
(lighter) ; and so far as we can see there is no indication what- 
ever in these figures that h in the first column will ever overtake 
h in the other two. Seeing no reason to continue, we therefore 
stopped observing at the close of the sixth period. The evidence 
from Brown and Higier is thus confirmed by our own experi- 
ment, designed and conducted with the express purpose of examin- 
ing this matter. 

In the face of such evidence we consider it proved beyond 
reasonable doubt that the use of an intermediate category of 
response insures greater precision and accuracy in measuring the 
differential responsiveness of the organism to a given mode of 
stimulation. This fact is directly opposed to the claim that the 
use of doubtful encourages O to shirk his task; but the evidence 
appears to us conclusive. 

A little analysis will serve to show the theoretical plausibility 
of this conclusion. Consider Fig. 1. The comparative stimuli 
run from J_, to J+4, S being the standard. The ordinate in a 
given case shows the percentage of “ heavier’ (ina and b) and of 
“lighter”? (inc andd). Leta be the ® (y) curve for “ heavier ”’ 
and d for “lighter” by the i-method; for convenience they are 
drawn symmetrical, though their precision in practice is rarely 
the same. Let b and c be the corresponding curves by the 
c-method; these are of necessity symmetrical, their precision be- 
ing always identical. If no constant tendencies of any kind 
operate, both pairs of curves will intersect at S; with curves b 


STUDIES IN PSYCHOLOGY 107 


and c, H and L are equal at this point each being 50 per cent. 
It is clear that the dotted curves (c-method) rise more slowly, 
with lower precision and larger deviation than do a and d 
(i-method). The d will be most numerous in the region of S, 
while few will appear at the extremes, Ji, and J4; hence a 





Fig. . 


and b start near together at the top (with either method, c or i, 
we have about the same percentage of H at J,) but diverge 
greatly at S where the large number of d depresses the a-curve 
much below b; around J—, again the two curves are closely 
apposed. Hence if O reports heavier only when he is “ sure”’ 
(that is, only when he finds those criteria which he has previously 
come to associate with a greater weight), we get a more precise 
measure of discrimination than when he is forced to “ guess”’; 
even though when guessing he is more likely to guess right than 
wrong. If it were a matter of getting the highest possible per- 
centage of “rights” (as in a true-false examination), then we 
might well advise O always to guess when unsure; but when.as- 
here we are investigating his responsiveness to varying degrees 


108 ELMER CULLER 


of stimulation, we get a more precise index of sensitivity when 
he judges only those D which meet the differential criteria he has 
established. 

(II) A second disadvantage of the c-method is that the two 
psychometric functions (for H and L), being purely symmetrical, 
are compromises or hybrids which accurately represent neither 
of the two alternative modes of discrimination. Is there any a 
priori reason why we should be equally sensitive to warm and to 
cool? or why our capacity for distinguishing an increase and a 
decrease of weight should be precisely the same? Surely not; 
and yet with but two modes of response the precision (and limen) 
for warmer and cooler as for H and L is of necessity identical. 
Suppose for example that O is twice as sensitive to an increase 
of weight as to a decrease; in other words, the H-limen is but 
one-half the L-limen. Using the c-method we should expect, 
with no constant tendencies operative, to get 50 per cent H and 
50 per cent L when S is compared with a J of equal magnitude 
(100 with 100 gm). Now compare 100 with 102; the curve of 
percentages will rise sharply because O is highly sensitive to 
weight-increases; but when 100 is compared with 98 the curve 
will fall more slowly, O being relatively irresponsive to weight- 
decreases. In other words the right half of the curve will rise 
with one rate, the left half will recede with a wholly different 
one; the two halves of the curve, instead of being symmetrical, 
belong to unlike psychometric functions; when we try to fit a 
smooth curve to such results we get a kind of hybrid function, 
whose precision lies somewhere between those of the two com- 
ponent halves. As soon as we admit the intermediate category d, 
this difficulty vanishes; the H-curve will then have high pre- 
cision throughout, the L-curve likewise low; the two being inde- 
pendent, neither is compromised by the other. The d form a 
kind of neutral ground, such that the comparative judgments 
H and L can each trace its own course unprejudiced by the char- 
acter of the other. 

(IIl) The d-method, in our opinion, is more scientific and 
more exacting ; it trains O to apply himself faithfully and induces 





STUDIES IN PSYCHOLOGY 109 


a larger measure of scientific caution; its responses are more 
precise because they proceed from a more scrupulous attitude. 

These propositions are indeed the reverse of what proponents 
of the c-method claim: that the use of d promotes evasion and 
inertia whereas the comparative method keeps O from idle vacil- 
lation and from shirking his task (6, 28 and 32). We feel that 
any such characterization of the d-category is without founda- 
tion. The scientist who ‘“‘ suspends judgment ’”’ because he fails 
to find sufficient evidence for concluding one way or the other 
cannot justly be accused of evasion, vacillation or inertia; he is 
likely to be more scrupulous and true in his work than the 
observer who is always ready with a “snap” judgment. The 
latter may well guess right oftener than wrong; but he also 
guesses wrong much oftener than does the other—a fact which, 
though obvious, seems to be overlooked. To put the matter 
simply: suppose a gestalt with any of the three characters a, b, 
or c come, by course of training, to eventuate always in the 
overt response Warmer, and one with the features m, n, or 0 
come to entail the opposed reply Cooler. In a given comparison, 
however, for some reason (lapse of “attention’’) the configura- 
- tion fails to reveal any of these accustomed “earmarks”; how 
then shall O reply? Surely the scientific thing to do is to “ sus-. 
pend judgment” and report “ doubtful’’; that is precisely what 
we await from the seasoned man of science as opposed to the 
facile judgments of the untrained mind. Are not the same pro- 
cedure and “ spirit ” of scientific caution equally useful and praise- 
worthy in psychometric service? If so, nothing is more fitted to 
destroy them than the habit of guessing. In our own experience 
with lifted weights, when forced to report H or L, we came to 
do so easily, with a shrug ; forced to decide even when the criteria 
upon which we had come to depend were missing, we came to 
take the guess lightly, even flippantly ; not as a last resort but as 
a commonplace. We are accordingly convinced that the guess 
is a much more fertile soil of perfunctory and heedless perform- 
ance than is “ doubtful,” and that it is likely to compromise any 
form of scientific study or test. 


110 ELMER CULLER 


In addition to being more scientific, the intermediate method 
is more exacting; it stimulates O to apply himself diligently and 
thus leads to uniform and efficient performance. When resorting 
to d, O fails to meet the primary task his instructions impose. 
He is required to report whether the second stimulus is H or L; 
his first duty then is so to clarify and extend his concept of H 
that a positive D, when applied, will evoke some of the character- 
istic features of this concept and thereby yield the correct re- 
sponse (H). Where this fails to occur, where the two stimuli 
condition a gestalt too vaguely or sketchily configured to entail 
one of the two comparative responses which he is primarily in- 
structed to give, he is reduced to reporting d and thereby makes 
known that he is not equal in this trial to the task assigned. This 
is bound to be true if he makes the task of discrimination serious 
at all. Here is the chief psychological merit of d: being a dis- 
tinctive mode of reply, d brings home unmistakably O’s failure 
to meet the task imposed, and thereby insistently stimulates him 
to sustained attention and better mastery of his criteria. In the 
c-method, per contra, there is nothing distinctive about the guess- 
response; one L sounds the same as another; there is no repeated 
reminder that one’s criteria are imperfect nor the same obvious 
incentive to revise and improve them; one may keep on guessing 
indefinitely and still meet the demands of the situation; improve- 
ment is thereby delayed and uncertain. We believe, for example, 
that Brown’s observer found the i-series “more exacting ” 
(p. 32) for one reason because the c-method had not constrained 
her properly to master and define her criteria. We saw (p. 101, 
above) that precision continued to increase after series 19a, 
which was already preceded by some 35,000 observations 
covering about five months; indeed the improvement seems to 
have continued well to the close of the whole set of 75,000 judg- 
ments. Practice-effects could hardly have persisted so long had 
the method been efficient. In our thermal study (7), improve- 
ment demonstrably ceased after some 7,500 observations within 
a period of 3-4 weeks; these figures look high and yet are only 
10 to 20 per cent of Brown’s. Thermal discrimination, 





STUDIES IN PSYCHOLOGY 111 


beset as it is with a multitude of confusing somesthetic impres- 
sions, is certainly no less complex and difficult than weight- 
discrimination; so that the proportionably slow improvement of 
Brown’s observer amply confirms, we believe, our conclusions on 
the perfunctory character of the guess-method. | 

So much for the evidence in favor of an intermediate category ; 
what of the objections raised above (p. 97)? The first, that it 
simplifies analysis, need not be taken seriously nowadays. The 
difficulties with d and e are obsolete; instead of apportioning 
them to H and L in some way or other, we simply neglect. them ; 
that is what they are for. They provide a neutral ground which 
permits each of the two comparative curves (H and L) to run 
its course unmodified by the other. 

Secondly, is d an evasion or refusal by the observer? Far 
from it; if O is adequately trained for his duties at all, it is just 
as true a judgment as H or L, though differing in character 
from either. As above noted, d signifies absence of the stated 
criteria for H and L. In the preliminary trials of an experiment 
we isolate a group of criteria and then apply them as uniformly 
as we can: certain features in the whole impression touch off H, 
certain others L, while those complexes in which neither (or 
rarely both) appear are called d. It may well be that in these 
d-patterns are imbedded factors which may, and later do, come to 
serve as additional criteria of difference; as O improves with 
practice some configurations, formerly d, now eventuate in H or 
L; but so long ‘as these factors remain obscure and undefined, 
the patterns in which they appear have no sure and uniform nexus 
with either of the two appropriate responses. Hence failure of 
given criteria to appear in a gestalt leads to d even as their pres- 
ence entails H or L. 

Thirdly, does an intermediate category demand some new kind 
of mental standard? None but the standards for H and L which 
any mode of discrimination presupposes. But will not the pre- 
cision of the d-judgment vary from time to time and with dif- 
ferent observers? It certainly will; even as does the precision 
of H, L and every other form of organic response. The per- 


112 ELMER CULLER 


centage of d== 100 — (H + L); its frequency can change only 
as do theirs. So long as the standards for H and L remain con- 
stant, so will that of d; if we use those two how can we object 
to d which has a fixed relation to them? The frequency of d is 
fixed wholly and alone by our criteria for H and L; when the 
latter are complete and clear, the d will be few; otherwise numer- 
ous. Variation is just as true of the c-method as of the other. In 
either case O must find and stabilize his criteria as well as he can, 
but of course they will not be invariable. When O is dull and 
distracted, we may expect more “doubtfuls”’ than when he is 
fresh and attentive ; but would anyone claim that O will “ guess ”’ 
equally well in these two conditions? We may indeed force O 
to give one of two alternatives in every case, but we cannot 
thereby force him to decide with equal precision every time. 

We submit then that the objections to an intermediate category 
are obsolete, irrelevant or common to all forms of organic 
function. 

Our second general question remains: which of the two modes 
of response is preferable for the intermediate category—equal or 
doubtful? ‘The answer in turn depends upon another question: 
is either equal or doubtful an indispensable category, without 
which O cannot do justice to the psychological situation in which 
he is placed? Having agreed upon the use of an intermediate 
category, we must now adopt one that is adequate to O’s every 
need. 

In one part of our thermal study ‘“ equal’’ was imposed as 
the intermediate category between Warmer and Cooler, whereas 
in the method of constant stimuli “‘ doubtful ”’ was used through- 
out. We thus have materials for comparing the two. As for 
the former, the observers agree that not all ‘“ equals” are alike. 
One O reports at one time that she is “ not doubtful about ‘ equal ’ 
judgments ; they are as certain as the others ’’; she finds however 
that two impressions may differ in thermal quality, and yet she 
cannot be sure which is warmer. These do not really fit any of 
the three categories, but she calls them equal; doubtful would 
clearly be a more appropriate designation. Her repeated request 


STUDIES IN PSYCHOLOGY 113 


at the close of a series that, say, “the first two ‘equals’ be 
changed to ‘ warmer,’”’ shows clearly also that two impressions 
which at the time appeared equal did so no longer after other 
‘“equals’’ had been experienced. Another O finds: “ Some 
‘equal’ judgments are not very good ones. One ‘equal’ may 
seem better than the others—the recognition of equality is more 
certain. Some are not different enough to be called different 
but are not so good ‘ equals’ as others.”’ Later he says: “ Equals 
more uniform to-day; no small differences between them.”’ 

From the above it is clear that if “equal ’’ be admitted as one 
category, “doubtful’’ must also be used to accommodate the 
truly uncertain cases; for analytical purposes however the two 
can hardly be separated and are in fact usually combined; hence 
why use “equal” at all? The contention that “equal’’ may be 
just as certain as “warmer” or “cooler’’ may be true but is 
irrelevant ; as we have shown in Article VII of the present series, 
the question for O in the process of comparison and the percep- 
tion of relations is simply: Of these two sensory impressions, 
is the second warmer or cooler than the other? Or, in other 
words, of these two stimuli is the second of higher or lower tem- 
perature than the first? Or, once more, does the gestalt condi- 
tioned by these two stimuli have the characteristics which attend 
an increase or a decrease in temperature (from first to second) ? 
When the two appear “equal” (indiscriminable) then ‘“ doubt- 
ful” is the true and only answer to these questions. The writer 
in his own observing therefore uses nothing but “ doubtful ”’ 
throughout ; including thereunder the cases which reveal no ap- 
parent difference as well as those where the direction of differ- 
ence is uncertain. 

To sum up: we have shown by evidence from three independent 
sources that the use of an intermediate category of judgment 
invariably yields a psychometric function of higher precision (h) 
and smaller deviation (0) than does the opposed procedure; it 
thereby gives a more reliable and precise measure of the dif- 
ferential capacities of the organism. We have shown, in the 
second place, that the c-method accurately represents neither of 


114 ELMER CULLER 


the two alternative modes of discrimination (H and L) as does 
the i-method, but instead it gives a compromise curve fixed in 
varying degree by the criteria for H and for L. In the third 
place, we note that the d-method follows recognized scientific pro- 
cedure and undertake to explain the proportionably slow improve- 
ment of Brown’s observer as due to the perfunctory attitude 
which the guess-procedure encourages. ‘The objections to an 
intermediate category we find to be obsolete, irrelevant or ap- 
plicable in equal measure to every form of discriminative pro- 
cedure. Finally, we note that “doubtful” is preferable to 
‘equal’ for this intermediate type of response. 

In face of this evidence, we believe the superiority of the 
d-method has been established beyond reasonable doubt. 


STUDIES IN PSYCHOLOGY 115 


IX. ON ADOPTING THE PROBABLE ERROR OF THE 
PSYCHOMETRIC FUNCTION (URBAN) AS 
THE “LIMEN ” 


We here propose to set forth a few advantages of using the 
probable error (0.6745 o) of the Urban psychometric function 
as the index or measure of discriminative capacity in lieu of the 
conventional “limen,’ which extends either from the objective 
standard to the median [the crude (Urban) limen] or preferably 
from the subjective standard, Xi, to the median [the “ true” 
limen, as used in our thermal study (7) ].? 

The probable error of the ® (y) curve (hereafter called P) is 
in our view a more useful and reliable measure of discrimination 
than is the traditional limen (L) for at least four reasons: 

(1) P has notably greater reliability than has the crude L, or 
median. The p.e. (L) is shown in Article VII to be 





84535 o 1.253 p.e. 
dis. dis. 
pe S - ; 
Md 
Vn Vn 
.6745 p.e. 
dis. 
SUC) Diedyn ee 
P 
V2n 


Dividing second by first we have .381; in other words P is less 
than 2/5 as variable, or more than 214 times as precise, as the 
median or Urban L. In both of course we postulate a normal 
frequency surface as does the whole Urban procedure. With so 
large a degree of difference P is undeniably superior in reliability.” 


*Thomson (22) would debar the “doubtful” or “equal” response and then 
adopt the “interquartile range of the point of subjective equality,” extending 
from 75 per cent heavier to 75 per cent lighter, as a measure of sensitivity. This 
proposal is defective in two ways: (a) by excluding “doubtful” he impairs 
the quality and precision of O’s judgments (see VIII of this series); (b) he 
assumes the lighter and heavier limens to be equal, for which no experimental 
or theoretical justification exists. 

?We have no method of finding the p.e. of the “true” L; the ordinary laws 
for the propagation of error fail to apply, since the factors which determine 
it are not independently variable; but we incline to believe that the true L 
varies less, or in any case no more, than does the Urban L 


116 ELMER CULLER 


(2) By adopting P we escape certain difficulties into which the 
use of “ doubtful’ (d) may occasionally lead. This intermediate 
category, as we have learned (VIII), serves to increase precision 
and thereby lower both the mean limen and its variability; but 
in case the observer has not adequately defined and stabilized his 
criteria, the following anomaly may from time to time appear. 
A decline in the proportion of d in the region of the subjective 
standard Xi has two opposed results: it lowers the precision (h) 
of the whole curve, thereby raising the limen and also appropin- 
quates the median to Xi, thereby lowering the limen. For ex- 
ample, if O gave no d at all, the two comparative curves (heavier 
and lighter) would coincide at their 50 per cent points and both 
L reduce to zero. A reduction in d therefore tends both to raise 
and to lower L; of the two factors, the latter as a rule predom- 
inates. Two cases of independent origin will serve to clarify the 
matter. 

(a) In our study of thermal discrimination, method B, 2 (con- 
stant stimulus-differences; simultaneous exposure of one hand 
to standard and of other to comparison; adaptation to 32°), we 
worked the same temperature (32°) twice, once at the very 
opening of practice and again after some months when the study 
was virtually done. In the first series O’s procedure was not 
yet stabilized, wherefore the two disagree widely in the propor- 
tion of d; the percentages are shown in columns I and II. 


Stimulus- 
differences I II 
eon .00 
.20 2 
i Be" .46 00 
10 65 17 
05:2 78 14 
00 MY he, 28 
—.05 75 32 
—.10 .62 .44 
—,15 33 .03 
—.20 .00 .19 
—.25 .00 
Warmer : 8.88 5.90 


Colder: 


STUDIES IN PSYCHOLOGY 117 


The precision (h) in II is notably lower than in I, but the 
limen is smaller too. The situation is anomalous; when h is high, 
L should in all logic be low. The reason is not far to seek; the 
large proportion of din the middle range of I enlarges both h and 
L, while the fewness of din II reduces both L andh. This type 
of situation is of course unusual, indeed almost unique in our 
data; and merely shows that O in series I had not yet “ settled 
down ”’ to a definitive procedure. In passing we may note how 
clearly these figures confirm our proof (in VIII) of the value of 
the “ doubtful ” response in enhancing precision of judgment.* 

(b) Another example may be drawn from Fernberger’s study 
on the “stimulus-error’’ (9). His observers compared weights 
under three forms of instruction: pressure (A), kinesthesis (B), 
stimulus (C); the judgment in each case being greater (g), less 
(1) or equal. From observer B the following figures were 
obtained : the first three columns are taken from the table (p. 71) ; 
4 and 5 give the true limens, each being inversely proportional 
to h; 6 and 7 contain the values of P. 


Interval 
hi hz (= Lt Ly) Li Ly Pi Pe 
ase os eiit .108 2.45 | Bae | 1.24 4.30 4.42 
11S ates aby .109 3.76 1.85 1.91 4.26 4.38 
Chae “AM 54 HES: 3.91 1.95 1.96 4.26 4.30 


It appears that C has the highest mean precision and A the 
least; in spite of which C has the largest mean limen and A by 
far the smallest. Again we find that in each successive curve A, 
B, C (Chart II, p. 69) B increased the proportion of d thereby 
forcing the two medians (p, = p,==.50) apart, even while, in 
consequence of the freer use of d, she was raising her precision, 
that is, learning to differentiate smaller S-D. With the use of P 
as our discriminative index, no such anomalies can arise; as the 
percentage of d falls, h will likewise drop and P correspondingly 
enlarge, as in logic it should. 


*'When the frequency of d at the subjective standard of reference Xi, is 
below 50 per cent, it is clear that L will be less than P; with d >.50 it will 
exceed P, and when d=.50 the two will coincide. So here, in I where d goes 
up to .78, P is larger than L; in II where d stops at .44, P is less. 


118 ELMER ‘CULLER 


(3) A third value of the method is that it promotes a degree 
of “scientific caution”? (Article VIII, 3) which the Urban pro- 
cedure rather tends to inhibit. If O makes earnest with the 
discriminative process at all, he is sure to improve as the criteria 
come better in hand. Most good observers we believe tend to 
run ahead of their criteria and begin guessing when they should 
report d; the P-method reveals this procedure by raising the 
limen and so encourages O to wait for his criteria instead. We 
have presented (VIII) the value of the d-category in promoting 
scrupulosity; P goes a step further by promoting the use of d; 
it thereby trains O to depend on his criteria and in so doing to 
clarify and improve them. If we wish therefore a precise index 
proceeding from a scrupulous attitude, this revision of the ® (7) 
seems desirable. 

(4) The method finally is simple and convenient, P being 
easily and quickly derived from h: 

6745 4769 


P= D.€. 4, wf et LN mene fe Oa 
pp Ug: 


Its own variability in turn is exactly known: 
.6745 P 
\/2n 


While the deviation of the crude L is also known, 


p.e.(P)= 





‘ .84535 P 
p.e.(L)= p.e. (Md)= ———_-__, 
Vn 
that for the true L, a much more important figure, is still un- 
determined. 

It may be of use to compare the true limen (L) with P when 
both are derived from the same data; we therefore present the 
following table (cf. 7, chap. VI), in which are shown both 
P and L for warmer and cooler by methods A,1 and A,2 (adapta- 
tion to temperature of standard in each case) : 


STUDIES IN PSYCHOLOGY 


Metuop A, 1 (SuccessivE PRESENTATION ) 
CBF UA 2NT A 1G 20 Fen 24 ow dO! 51) BOS e320 ian Oa 


Ly 076. .064 .048 .067 .059 039 .081 .062 . 041. .038 
p.e. 013 013 «.010 =.012,—s 010s .006—s—«#w040s«w008-—s—«é“éjtOHOGCSCté=é‘“é#OONG 
Le —.088 —.056 —.061 —.076 —.056 —.042 —.075 —.055 —.038 —.033 
p.e. OLDF OU Lee WU ka Old Ck 007 acount WOU Dt = 0U0in ents 
Pw 08 08001) 0/940). 080e. 7 099 64 000) 155.5) '.060% 0960) .0o6 
p.e. 004 .005 .004 .004 .004 .002 012 003 .002 8.002 
Pe —.076 —.076 —.095 —.095 —.090 —.066 —.171 —.060 —.051 —.045 
p.e. POU Sar O41 UO) er OOS O05 7 005. "ULL a OUd 1 ey hue 
MetHop A,2 (SIMULTANEOUS PRESENTATION ) 
Lw SPA sey in Hue Oi NAOe 7 ere Uitacrrl hc ROMY 1h Is Reso thats hg Do 
D.€. SOLS UR UL eer Uden Lou LON AZOy) OLS Odo 
Le —.109 —.094 —.069 —.080 —.087 —.067 —.062 —.074 —.066 
p.e. LG VT RUCU Mie OU LOM ALU Th) OL NOLON) 012.0 > Ole QOL e 
Pw OA 104 LOB i 178 T2500) O84 142 io 094. O70 
p.e. 007.007," "006° 012.0057" .006" 008" '.005°"°.003 
Pe —.092 —.102 —.099 —.132 —.132 —.087 —.096 —.104 —.082 
p.e. 0067050072) 0060012 Fr 005) 0007 8) D05:); 7.00617) 004 


WEIGHTED ADJUSTMENT EQUATIONS 


(1) Values from 16°-24° (y=a-+bx; x=0 at 24°). 
(2) Values from 32°-40° (y=a-+ bx; x==0 at 32°). 


MetHop A,1 
(1) 16°-24° a b a b 
. Lw .0392° —.0035° Pw .0625° —.0041° 
Le —.0419 0043 Pe —.0684 0045 
Lw—Le 0811 —.0078 Pw—Pec 1309 —.0086 
(2) 32°-40° 
Lw 0409 .0053 Pw 0540 0057 
Le —.0383 —.0042 Pe —.0484 —.0053 
Lw—Le .0792 0095 Pw—Pe 1024 0110 
MertuHop A,2 
(1) 16°-24° 
Lw .0677° —.0023° Pw .0876° —.0069° 
Ie —.0689 .0022 Pe —.0902 .0064 
Lw—Le .1366 0045 Pw—Pe 1778 .0133 
(2) 32°-40° 
Lw 0573 .0034 Pw .0686 .0081 
Le —.0685 .0005 Pe —.0849 —.0019 
Lw—Le 1258 .0029 Pw—Pe 1535 .0100 


In forming the normal equations for the fitted line 
usual method of least squares, each value (L or P) is 
its p.e.’. 


(y=a-+ bx) by the 
weighted inversely to 


The conclusions in our thermal study based on the limens (L) 
are, on the whole, confirmed by the P. (1) Practicé-improvement 


again is found to cease at 20° (first series). 


(2) The P are 


120 ELMER CULLER 


larger in absolute value than the L; this of itself has little moment, 
inasmuch as any index of discrimination has but relative signifi- 
cance. Here it proves merely that no stimulus-difference, what- 
ever its magnitude, evoked as many as 50 per cent doubtfuls; 
in other words, the mode of the d-distribution, in the mean, was 
less than 50 per cent. (3) In the principal method (A,1) the 
Weber ratios are about the same, those for P running 10-15 per 
cent higher (.0086 vs. .0078 and .0110 vs. .0095). This may 
be ascribed largely if not wholly to the greater absolute magnitude 
of P; if each P be k times the corresponding L, it is clear that 
the Weber ratio (1.e., the slope, b, of the fitted line y= 
ast bx)! tor P) «wilbvalso. berkwtimes: athe teator bee Gets 
appears that an increase in the absolute limen carries a correlative 
but smaller increase in the Weber ratio or rate of rise in successive 
limens. When the minimal value of the threshold is high, its 
slope is also steeper. (4) The ratios for P in method A,2 depart 
widely from those of L and thereby confirm our previous con- 
clusion (7, ch. VI): every important value of A,2 being but one- 
third to one-eighth as reliable as the correlative figure of A,l, 
the disparity in the Weber constants by the two methods may 
be due largely, or even wholly, to the high variability of A,2. 
Whereas with L the Weber ratio for A,2 is much smaller than 
for A,1, the reverse is true with P; in consequence the mean of 
the two ratios in A,2 is nearly the same as for the correlative 
values of A,l, and thus gives added proof that the figures of A,l 
are reliable. 

To sum up: we have aimed to show the superiority of the 
probable error of the psychometric function ® (y) over the con- 
ventional L as an index of discriminative sensitivity. Combined 
with Xi, the subjective point of reference, it provides everything 
the traditional method yields; and in addition it is far more 
reliable, it obviates the inconsistencies which may otherwise ap- 
pear, it promotes a scrupulous attitude in O, while its magnitude 
and deviation can both be easily and exactly found. We com- 
ment it therefore to the use and criticism of psychometric 
workers. 


STUDIES IN PSYCHOLOGY 121 


Note on the comparative variability of the probable error 
and the quartile deviation in a normal surface. 5; 


We have just examined the advantage of using the prob- 
able error (P) or quartile deviation (Q) of the ® (y) as the 
measure of sensitivity. Inasmuch as the two are always identical 
in a normal surface it would seem to be irrelevant which term 
we use; when we come to apply the usual formulae of variability 
however we get widely divergent results: 


67457 o Pav ee 
p.e.(P )== (p.e.dis. pears — 


\/2n Vn 





.5306 o 
Vn 
O we see is 1.65 times as variable as P whence the latter is 2.72 
(== 1.65") times as reliable as Q. 

We now have the anomalous result: of two values which are 
always identical in a normal curve one is much more reliable than 
the other. Even though they always coincide it becomes a 
matter of grave import which name we adopt when it comes to 
finding how reliable the value is. The relation as commonly 
stated cannot be strictly true; in 1,000 samples, if each were 
normally distributed, we should have 1,000 values for P and Q; 
the two being identical in magnitude, their variation would also 
have to be the same. That the difficulty is not merely personal 
or factitious was confirmed by two skilled statisticians, to whom 
the matter was mentioned; and inasmuch as the question is not 
considered in the common statistical treatises, the matter may be 
worth a brief note. 

Take a normal surface where P and Q coincide. Now deduct 
from the lower half of the area an infinitesimal amount (smaller 
than any assignable quantity ) and add it to the upper half. While 
P and Q will each of necessity be affected, Q will change in 
magnitude 1.65 times as much as P; at the instant of departure 
from normality, in other words, Q is 1.65 times as variable as P. 
In anormal surfaces P and Q have as many relations as there 
are differing modes of distribution; but as the frequencies ap- 





p.e.(Q)= 


122 ELMER CULLER 


proach normality by whatever route, p.e.(P) and p.e.(Q) approxi- . 


mate more and more nearly the limiting relation 3217/5306; and 
while this figure is commonly given as their relation in a normal 
curve, it is really true only when a curve approaches to or departs 
from normality. We must then have recourse to a fundamental 
concept of differential calculus, the limit, if we are to clarify what 
in its common form of statement appears absurd. 

The true measure of deviation for our purposes is clearly 
p.e.(P) instead of p.e.(Q). h being the ultimate index of sensi- 
tivity by the method here proposed, it alone fixes the variability 
as well as the magnitude of the “limen,”’ P. It follows that 


just as 


4769 
P == .6745 o=— , 
h 





SO 
3217 .2275 


p.e.(P)= p.e. (.6745 «) = : 
Vn hy)/n 








which is the value we used above. 


a EE 


STUDIESTIN: PSYCHOLOGY, 123 


X. THE STIMULUS-ERROR 


In a preceding article (VII) we tried to show that the ordi- 
nary comparative judgment (heavier, warmer) is really an 
attempt to estimate the relation between two stimuli from the 
subjective indices which they evoke when presented together ; that 
O, when properly prepared for his task, reports “ warmer ’’ be- 
cause he finds in the present configuration those criteria which 
have in former trials gone with a transition from lower to higher 
temperature. By so doing we may invite the accusation of 
espousing the so-called “ stimulus-error ’’; we here propose there- 
fore to scrutinize this “error’’ and enquire into its nature and 
effects.. The argument will cover four topics: 


1. What is the term meant to designate ? 

2. Is it a useful or apt designation for the purpose? 
3. In what characteristic way, if any, does it operate? 
4. Critical conclusions. 


1. What Does the Term Mean? What Is It Used to 
Designate ? 


To reduce the question to elemental form, consider an ob- 
server who with stated control successively lifts two weights; he 
thereby receives two complex somesthetic impressions which as 
a rule differ perceptibly in certain ways; the whole configuration 
evoked by application of the stimulators eventuates in a dif- 
ferential response (heavier). In this perception of change will 
be certain features or parts (Gestaltteile) which continue to 
appear in successive trials and can thus be traced from one to 
the next,’ say T,,/T., T;, 5; the TI being true criteria of weight 
(pressure, tendinous and muscular qualities, variously shaded, 
localized and combined), while S is a spurious criterion, irrelevant 
but confusing, like temperature (as the Weber illusion, whereby 


* Boring (5) reviews the history of this concept in a paper whicn may be 
accepted as representative and about which our comment will center. 


124 ELMER CULLER 


a cold object appears heavier than a warm one). All of these, 
alone or variously combined, may condition a given response. 
Likewise a comparison of temperatures will evoke a variety of 
patterns, in which may be found coolness now at fingertip, now 
between the fingers, now in skin-creases on back of hand 
and the like. These may all be called true criteria of cool; but 
the concomitant pricking, tingling, lightness, smoothness, snug- 
ness are secondary. The true indices commonly appear on a 
ground of irrelevant features which complicate the total impres- 
sion and often become equally or even more prominent or 
“figural”’; and which differ from true criteria in that they 

(a) may appear only with certain degrees of stimulation; thus 
at 48°, where pain becomes insistent, discrimination changes 
markedly because thermal criteria are now being overshadowed 
or replaced by pain; | 

(b) are unlike the true criteria; thus cold water, because of 
its constrictive action on the dermal musculature, seems denser 
than warm; but this tactile quality is no true criterion for a 
thermal limen because it clearly does not resemble, or belong with, 
warm and cool; 

(c) often vary independently of the stimulus; thus tingles 
and pricks appear at high and low temperatures both. In our 
records (7) was also noted several times the astonishing dif- 
ference in tactual quality of two jars whose temperatures were 
almost identical. | 

Given a situation of this kind: we gather from Boring’s discus-_ 
sion that an observer escapes the stimulus-error whenever his 
response is determined by one of these true criteria T alone 
(pressure on finger-tip, coolness on back of midfinger) ; but that — 
O runs foul of the error in case his response (heavier ) i 

(a) Is determined indeed by a single T but not by the same 
one each time, so that he shifts about from trial to trial, his— 
report being conditioned now by T,, next by T., then by T;, and 
so on. His criteria then are genuine but vary from trial to trial 
(ep aad endisy ay iy , 

(b) Is determined by S in whole or part; thus, in default of 





STUDIES IN PSYCHOLOGY 125 


thermal differentia, O may report “ warmer ” because his fingers 
sting (5, 463). 

(c) Is determined by several T concomitantly (T, + T;) 
instead of only one. This seems a possible, though by no means 
certain, implication of Fernberger’s instruction; for if O fails 
to judge by pressure alone or by kinesthesis alone he is pre- 
sumed to have the stimulus-attitude (9). 

(d) Is determined by some combination of T and S, so that 
any change in the whole configuration, whether relevant or not, 
may touch off the response (4, 451). 

(e) Is determined neither by T nor S directly but rather by 
the associations which they evoke; thus O’s response might be 
affected by his visual representation of the weight’s size, color, 
material, shape (5, 463). 

(f{) Is determined, finally, by no definite criterion of any sort, 
whether T or S, but issues at random in consequence of chance 
habits (4, 447). 

We are by no means sure that all the above meanings are 
really sponsored by proponents of the term; but in any event 
this mode of listing may serve to clarify the question and to 
uncover the relation of the several possible meanings. 


2. Is the Term an Apt or Useful Designation? 


The use of a single criterion (T,,) throughout, which to Boring 
seems the test of good procedure, we heartily approve; but we 
do not therefore reject (a) and (c) as invalid. If in one trial 
coolness be noted only on the midfinger-tip and in another only 
by the line of immersion, are we not justified in reporting cooler 
both times even though the criteria be not identical? and if pres- 
sure on finger-tip and kinesthesis in forearm together induce the 
report heavier when neither alone would have evoked it, that 
judgment is surely permissible. If T, and T, are both valid 
criteria, how can T, plus T, or the series T,, T., T;, —, be 
other than sound and legitimate? 

Type (e) furthermore is wholly acceptable in case the associa- 
tions derive only from T and not from S. When comparing 


126 ELMER CULLER 


sound-intensities, for example, O may image the height of fall 
in each trial; but in case the visual representation is conditioned 
wholly by T-factors and not at all by S, what is “ erroneous ” 
about so doing? Some may seek to avoid this procedure in the 
belief that it complicates the judging process; but we see nothing 
wrong or unsound about it. 

The remaining three, in which the report is affected by irrele- 
vant and specious factors, are of course erroneous. If O reports 
cooler on the basis of painful or tactile impressions, he is not 
doing what he is asked to do, he is not giving a thermal judg- 
ment at all. The complete absence of defined criteria (f), finally, 
can not occur under genuine experimental conditions; to attempt 
psychometric work without established criteria would be like pro- 
fessing to weigh without a unit of weight. 

In three of the cases, therefore, neither part of the compound 
term “ stimulus-error ’’ seems to be relevant; the remaining three 
are indeed “errors” but seem to have no special relation to the 
“stimulus.””” 


3. In What Characteristic Way, If Any, Does It Function? 
What Are Its Demonstrable Effects? 


Friedlander mentions three, of which only the last here con- 
cerns us: 

(a) Verlagerung an den Aufmerksamkeitsort (11, 196) ; 
objectified sense-impressions are referred to the region whither 
attention is directed. 

(b) Verbreitung of the tactual sense-impression throughout 
the interior of the object as visually perceived or imaged, in such 
wise that the “ density’ of the. sensory distribution varies in- 
versely to the volume of the visual object (p. 197). 

(c) Apparent change in differential sensitivity (limen), about 

? Boring and others appear to use the terms stimulus and object as though 
synonymous, which in our view is an unfortunate identification of meanings. 
When I see a tree, the stimulus is a complicated pattern of light-waves 
impinging upon and activating the retinal receptors; but the object (tree) 
which I see is constituted by my own perceptual reaction. The stimulus is a 


form of energy, the object perceived is the organism’s response to that stimulus. 
The stimulus exists apart from the perceiver, the object does not. 











SLUDIES WWI ES VOHOLOGY 127'8 


the direction and degree of which he professes to be still unsure 
mCp.(287 ):. 

Of these three, quantitative findings, for which we are indebted 
to Friedlander, Fernberger and Reid, are available only for the 
third. (1) Friedlander had but one observer who was able to 
achieve and maintain the “ stimulus-attitude,’ with the result 
that his data are confined to that individual. He employed two 
attitudes or Einstellungen: the object- or G-attitude (Gegen- 
standseinstellung ), wherein the observer with eyes open is directed 
to compare the heaviness of the weights (Schwere der Gewichte) ; 
and the A-attitude (Abstraktionseinstellung), wherein observer 
with closed eyes is directed to attend to and compare the sense- 
impressions (primarily Druckempfindungen in the hand). He 
offers two sets of figures, for standards of 500 and 1200 gm 
respectively; but inasmuch as O completely failed, on Fried- 
lander’s formal statement, properly to differentiate the two atti- 
tudes in the latter case, the figures for 1200 gm. are without 
value for us. The other set (S==500 gm), when treated by 
the Urban process, yields these values of h:* 


G A 
(ATS ae gd ge ges i deb Be ei be A el a —.0188 —.0168 
RAV IEL Es Heh t 3. Pip ean S99h ) wade Are AE Ole epee ale .0186 .0129 
4769 h 
The p.e. of h being ————, we have these values for the dif- 
Vn 
ferences (hg—h,) with their p.e.: 
RT ae EV neo Meche ee vit Uield rire eia tou —.0020 *+,00188 
LE 8 2T eNAUR AR feet AA. ATO ee le tee IN DRE ROR EC ar .0057 +.00167 


The latter difference, being 3.4 times its p.e., may be taken as 
fairly reliable; the other of course is not. 

These figures being all derived in a single time-space order, 
we cannot find the true limen nor is it needful to do so; but the 
higher precision of G logically necessitates a lower threshold, as 
Friedlander also finds by his mode of reducing the data. Fried- 
lander finds the lower limen of G “ tiberraschend” (p. 191) for 

*In order to make the values of h more nearly comparable we have included 


enly those stimulus-differences which were used in both series (G and A), 
extending from 420 to 590, inclusive, by 20-gm intervals. S500 gm, n= 82. 


128 ELMER CULLER 


the reason that O had trouble in maintaining the G-einstellung * 


and so believed that his performance was better, more uniform 
and satisfactory, in the A-series. For an explanation of the 
fact Friedlander resorts to the concept of “ sensation-density,”’ that 
the sense-impression is spread throughout the volume of the object 
as visually represented. “Durch die bei der Objektivierung 
stattfindende Ausbreitung uber das Volumen des Gegenstandes 
wird die Dichte der Empfindung vermindert, und wenn diese 
Abnahme der Dichte wie eine durch Reizschwachung hervor- 
gerufene wirkte, so ware eine Verfeinerung der Unterschieds- 
empfindlichkeit bei der Objektivierung zu erwarten”’ (p. 200). 
This is apparently what happens, even though “ subjective con- 
ditions ’ in the G-attitude were “ weit ungunstiger’”’ than in A. 
Friedlander thinks the result may also be due to “ grossere 
Anspannung der Aufmerksamkeit ”’ induced by the very difficulty 
of G-Einstellung; his explanations are clearly tentative. 

(2) In Fernberger’s study lifted weights were compared with 
three forms of instruction: pressure (P), kinesthesis (K), 
stimulus-attitude (S), the judgment in each case being greater 
(g), less (1) or equal. Of the three observers, P had had “a 
great deal of practice,’ B “some little practice,” H was “ totally 
unpracticed.”’ The following table gives the precision (h) for 
each observer by each method: 


h(1) h(g) 

r LRA, Mee Eee Me DIOR eT: Nites eRe OE Ay ta ly 102 .103 
RE ON ETA bate Tie et en ae se ee 131 108 

SRAM e BELA take rte re sri Caps bigti a aly 131 117 

B | URNS AI Same ir AD IPE VR ev 28 ah? 1! 8 a pe vey 108 
K 112 109 

Se teen a ant UW De le ae CL ea ae eae one 112 111 

H j SAE RMN Ue MeN ath 82-9 PX Nee RAD A eye 095 097 
[cope pe Napier, Morty acme OR WIR eC EE Md a 093 097 

SPR ana Att ED Oa ed oboe oh.” FANS Way finan AL 118 112 


The stimulus-attitude we see gives the highest mean precision 
in every case; so far the results conform with Friedlander’s. 
This finding, in our opinion, is the quantitative solution of Fern- 
berger’s problem; neither he nor Boring, however, seems to think 
it worthy of special mention (p. 71 f., and 5, 465). 

(3) Reid (21) followed Fernberger in using lifted weights 


el ee 


one 


ole 


STUDIES IN PSYCHOLOGY 129 


and the three types of instruction (pressure, kinesthesis, stimulus- 
attitude ) with some refinements and extensions: more observers, 
more trials with each O, and at every session a report from O 
on his actual criteria during that series. He finds that no single 
O was able to follow each of the three instructions; they all 
exceeded or contaminated one or more of them (p. 73). Change 
of verbal instruction therefore does not of necessity induce a 
correlative change of attitude. An instruction further may be so 
difficult that O is unable to obey and perforce allows it to be 
contaminated. As for quantitative data, Reid gives the value 
of h for each instruction (P, K, S) for both judgments greater 
and less (42 values in all). Comparing h, with the correspond- 
ing hp and hx for the seven observers, we find h, larger in 21 
out of 28 cases and smaller in 7. 

The stimulus-attitude therefore yields higher precision, finer 
differentiation: with Friedlander in 2 out of 2 cases, with Fern- 
berger in 10 out of 12 (the other two being equal), with Reid 
in 21 out of 28, the remaining 7 being smaller. The likelihood 
of this occurring by chance, if we may assume that the figures 
for P, K and S are truly independent (as they are if the three 
forms of instruction do not overlap and are rigidly observed; 
that is, if they are what they purport to be), is 1 in some 
18 millions*; but of course neither of the two conditions 
is really met. Friedlander notes that, while the Druckempfind- 
ungen fade and recede under the G-einstellung, they still have a 
demonstrable influence upon discrimination and are by no means 
unregarded (11, 135 and 142) ; while Reid finds that no single O 
was able to keep every instruction pure (21, 73). 

Be that as it may, the stimulus-attitude, within the conditions 
imposed by these three investigators, unmistakably excels in pre- 
cision of result; it is clearly the method to use when we wish to 
test the differential capacities of the organism. As for explain- 

* By chance, h in one method is just as likely to be larger as smaller than in 
another. Of the 42 cases cited, hs is larger in 33, smaller in 7, equal in 2; the 


likelihood, in forty pairs of numbers drawn at random, that the first will exceed 
40! 


Bato 





the second (or vice versa) 33 times is 


130 ELMER CULLER 


ing this fact, we see just two possibilities: (a) The S-method 
may well be the most familiar. It is commonly said to be the 
‘“natural”’ attitude in the judgments of everyday life. If this 
be true, an O, when using his wonted mode of discrimination, 
might well show higher precision than when adopting a relatively 
new and unfamiliar one (judging by pressure or kinesthesis 
alone). No attempt was made, so far as we can see, to bring 
any O to his limit of practice in all three methods before under- 
taking comparative tests; Fernberger says they were given “ suf- 
ficient preliminary practice so that the hand movements became 
automatic’ (9, 67), while Reid states (21, 60) that “every O 
performed a practice-series of about 500 double lifts, which ex- 
tended over a period of two weeks.” Clearly if a subject who 
uses the right hand normally for writing were given some pre- 
liminary practice in manipulating the pencil with the left, we 
should not forthwith expect him to write as well with left hand as 
with right. Unless O be equally trained in all modes of discrimi- 
nation, therefore, comparative figures prove little or nothing. 
Friedline (12, 415) claims indeed that “ practice-effects,” with 
the limen of dual discrimination, occur only with the “ object- 
attitude ’’ and not with the others; but Reid’s data show improve- 
ment with practice in all three. If we compute the mean value 
of h in the first 250 trials and in the last 250 of both time-orders 
and all observers (except M and S who failed to follow instruc- 
tions), and find the ratio of each pair, we have: 


Heavier Lighter 
EE PUTT ee LAM ME ed gp Nee hy taut MNO ABA Gu oh MeN ape 1:21 1.20 
Pie ee Ee EG 1 on he ea We eg Oe ei te ee 1.12 1.05 
1 GRAN Weg RANTS REO Rai NTO ON eA 1.10 1.09 


The precision of the final series of 250 is greater than of the 
first by the ratios here shown; improvement thus appears with 
all three instructiorf$ but is twice as large for S as for the others. 
While not of major consequence then, practice can hardly be 
disregarded; and the precise import of Reid’s and Fernberger’s 
figures becomes hard to appraise. 

(b) A more general explanation remains. Friedlander’s ob- 
server had long training in comparing sensory impressions but 





STUDIES IN PSYCHOLOGY 131 


found it hard, as we saw, to maintain the stimulus-attitude. 
Whereas practice and subjective conditions seem all to have 
favored the former, the G-Einstellung none-the-less showed higher 
differential sensitivity than did the A. The only apparent reason 
seems to be that discrimination is improved by using a number of 
criteria (Ti, Te, Ts, —), whether singly or collectively; if we 
have say three marks by which to distinguish two objects, we 
should expect discrimination to be more reliable and precise than 
when we have but one. The stimulus-attitude, by making use of 
more criteria, would thereby achieve a finer degree of differentia- 
tion. The same factor, we may presume, is likewise operative in 
Fernberger’s and Reid’s results. 

The material of the present section in our opinion warrants the 
conclusion that the stimulus-attitude promotes discriminative eff- 
ciency and precision in the organism. 


4. Critical Conclusions 


We have tried to set down a few apparent meanings of the 
concept “ stimulus-error’”’ as found in current usage, and to see 
in what distinctive way its presence is revealed. In formulating 
a conclusion, our first problem is to analyze the psychological 
situation to which the term is applied. If we ask O once to judge 
‘the intensity of pressure sensations in the fingertips or die Druck- 
empfindungen in der Hand zu vergleichen, and then ask him to 
judge the Schwere der Gewichte or the weights themselves, the 
two directions seem to be incommensurable; the second is hardly 
a psychological instruction at all of the same order as the first. 
To orient ourselves we must then put the stimulus-attitude into 
psyghological terms and view it in relation to other modes of 
judging. For this end Friedlander’s careful analysis may be 
helpful, who finds that two conditions are at once necessary and 
sufficient for objectifying the pressure and kinesthetic sensations 
produced by a resting or lifted weight: (1) die Richtung der 
Aufmerksamkeit auf den visuell wahrgenommenen oder vor- 
gestellten Gegenstand; (2) the condition that “ bereits eine ge- 
haufte Zahl gleichartiger Wahrnehmungen vorhergegangen sein 


132 ELMER CULLER 


muss, bei denen die Aufmerksamkeit dieselbe Richtung auf den 
Gegenstand hatte”? (11, 193). The objectification of pressure 
and kinesthetic sensations, accordingly, is a product of experi- 
ence, “die sich aus vielfaltig wiederholten, bei gegenstandlich 
gerichteter Aufmerksamkeit vollzogenen, gleichartigen Wahr- 
nehmungen eines bestimmten Zusammenhanges zwischen visuellen 
und taktilen Sinnesinhalten bildet’”’ (p. 201). ATI sense-impres- 
sions, he concludes, can thus be objectified. 

Now we commit the stimulus-error, says Boring (5, 451) “if 
we base our psychological reports upon objects rather than upon 
the mental material itself, orif . . . we make judgments of the 
stimulus and not judgments of sensation.’”’ This antithetic char- 
acterization we feel to be neither sound in theory nor useful in 
practice. If the stimulus-attitude consists in attending to the 
object as visually wahrgenommen or vorgestellt, is the visual 
V orstellung any less “ mental”’ than the sensation to which it is 
opposed? It being clear, furthermore, that every comparative 
judgment, whatever name it be given (judgment of object or of 
mental material), can issue only from some kind of “ mental ” 
factors or criteria, whether well or ill defined, variable or constant, 
the antithesis gives no real clue to the psychological relation of 
the several methods which are being contrasted. 

The matter in our view reduces to this: upon lifting two 
weights, we commonly image them in connection with the sensory 
criteria they provide (pressure, kinesthesis). This visual repre- 
sentation may affect the comparative process by supplying new 
differentia of its own, which are either absent or unnoted in the 
more immediate (sensory) criteria; somewhat analogous in effect 
though not in mechanism to the negative after-image, wherein 
one may observe features which one failed to remark in the posi- 
tive impression.” A kind of conditioning process may sometimes 
occur : 


* Within the ordinary conditions of psychometric work, one might question 
whether the visual representation brings any additional criteria to the com- 
parative process, inasmuch as the stimulators are purposely made indistin- 
guishable except by weight. But even here there may well be unconscious 
effects by these weight-differences upon the visual representation which O 
himself could not specify and which still may influence or aid his perception 
of difference. 


STUDIES IN PSYCHOLOGY 133 


) 


originally the response “ heavier’ is evoked by a given pressure 
change (T)) which is attended by a visual representation of the 
object; at first the latter may well be quite incidental and have 
nothing to do with the perception of difference; but in time it 
comes also to evoke the heavier response; whereas the pressure- 
factor, while always present and in a sense basal, may well become 
less obtrusive and clear. The visual Vorstellung, even though 
in the beginning wholly indifferent, may thus become a real 
adjuvant of the pressure and kinesthetic criteria of differentia- 
tion, so that in its absence the others fail to function as well as 
with its aid. This gradual conditioning process may well be 
responsible also for the more extensive practice-improvement in 
the stimulus-attitude. 

As criteria for comparison therefore we may accept nothing 
but variations of pressure in the fingertips (Tp) ; or of kinesthetic 
impressions from the wrist (Tx); or finally we may accept any 
variation in the total impression, including Tp and Tx as well as 
any that may be provided by the visual representation (Ty).° 
When we are told about judging “objects” or “stimuli” we 

presume the third procedure is implied: judging from the total 
impression or pattern; so that A is reported heavier than B 
because of some relevant change in the whole configuration 
whether due to the direct and immediate action of present stimuli 
(“sensory”) or to the revival of residual effects from earlier 
stimuli (“imaginal”). Using more criteria, the stimulus- 
attitude is both more complex and more precise. Being more 
complex, it is more beset with incidental variations and more 
liable to spurious criteria; many irrelevant changes go on which 
must be kept clear of the genuine changes due to the stimulus 
proper ; but having isolated and clarified our criteria, we also have 
a more efficient instrument of differentiation than any single 
criterion can provide. These different modes of discrimination 
may well lead to unlike results, as noted above; but we thereby 

* Somewhat as in the calculus, we may study how x varies when all other 
variables (y, z, ...) are treated as constant; then find how y varies when 


xX, z,... are held constant, and so on; finally we may treat them all as varying 
concomitantly. 


134 ELMER CULLER 


‘ 


see no reason for calling one of them an “insidious error,’ a 
‘very real scientific devil” and similar epithets (5, 462, and 4, 
449). To us they appear to be simply different modes of com- 
parison, all equally valid in theory and all on the same plane 
methodologically, differing only in complexity (number and range 
of criteria). Certainly one may not use them all indiscriminately. 
Each has a function and value which none of the others may 
usurp; like any tool, each must be used in the way its character 
demands. But when used with skill and understanding, the 
stimulus-attitude is the most refined psychometric tool we have 
for measuring the functional capacities of the organism; and as 
such we believe deserves respect.’ 

The stimulus-attitude, we are told, “‘ means indefiniteness and 
instability of criterion’ and thereby necessitates equivocal corre- 
lation of stimulus with response (4, 447, and 5, 465). This may 
indeed be true if we take it up hastily and heedlessly; but the 
same may then be said of any psychological method. Being a 
refined and complex instrument, the stimulus-attitude needs 
greater care and skill for its proper use. We may briefly sketch 
how criteria should be isolated and controlled in lifting weights. 

To acquaint O with the elemental phenomenon of change from 
heavy to equal to light and reverse, we give him a number of 
preliminary series in which he is at all times apprised of the 
actual relation between the stimuli (whether second is heavier 
or lighter than first). Little can here be done by verbal instruc- 
tion; all we can do is to put O into a situation where heavy and 
light are juxtaposed and then let the criteria emerge and take on 
relief to which in future those terms (H and L) will be applied. 
In this way the crude criteria of everyday life are clarified and 
dissociated from specious and incidental material. This is spe- 
cially needful in the somesthetic senses where a stimulator (metal 
weight) affects so many receptors at the same time and thus 
tends to evoke all manner of confusing configurations. Upon 

“We incline to Friedlander’s conclusion that A- and G-einstellung differ 
only in direction of attention; this makes the distinction all the more one of 
degree. When judging by pressure or kinesthesis alone (A-einstellung) the 


writer visualizes the fingers or wrist to which the pressure-patterns are re- 
ferred, while in the stimulus-attitude he visualizes the weight itself. 


SPU DIBS ING ES RCHOLOGY 135 


lifting again and again pairs of weights whose relations are known 
to him, O gets a variety of sensory patterns in successive trials ; 
some of the factors (Gestaltteile) are casual and incidental (owing 
to temporary physiological changes, variations in mode of seizing, 
raising and depositing weight, height and rate of lift, and so on), 
while others are stable appearing every time. With each positive 
increment, O reports “ heavier ’’; each pattern, though differing 
in some way from those which have preceded, issues in the same 
overt response; and so the stable features come to eventuate more 
readily and surely in the report “ heavier ”’ than do the occasional 
variations which now appear and now do not. O’s task in the 
training series is to isolate these invariable concomitants of change 
in weight until they stand in clear relief and to fix them so well 
that future judgments will be consistently determined by them 
alone. Under such tuition O is prepared really to function in 
discriminative work because he has gained a relatively clear and 
stable concept of ‘‘ heavier’ and “lighter.” Any form of dis- 
crimination then consists in making a differential report based 
upon the organic or subjective criteria which appear within the 
configuration evoked by two stimuli when applied under stated 
conditions to a given receptive surface. The totality of these 
indices or criteria makes up O’s concept of H and L at a given 
time ; they are achieved by means of preliminary training wherein 
the stable features of discriminative patterns come out with 
increasing precision and permanence and are thereby cleared of 
casual and irrelevant adjuncts. 

By this schema where does the stimulus-error come in? In 
Article VII we defended the view that all differential judgments 
are ultimately estimates of stimulus-relations; but of course they 
can only rest upon “subjective” or “intraorganic”’ criteria. 
Whatever we claim to be judging we are always judging by 
means of “ mental’’ criteria and nothing else; and as we have 
just shown the stimulus-attitude yields to none in scrupulous 
attention to their formation and fixation.* 


§ Equivocal results on the limen of dual impression arise (5, 465) not because 
O adopts the stimulus-attitude, but because he fails to define his criteria. 


136 ELMER CULLER 


Summary. We here try to set down various meanings of the 
term “ stimulus-error,” to consider its fitness for these meanings, 
and to find in what characteristic way its operation is revealed. 
We try to define the stimulus-attitude in psychological terms and 
to show that certain attributions, as indefiniteness and instability 
of criterion, are wholly unjustified. We seek to prove that it 
involves no scientific “error” of any kind; but that, on the 
contrary, it is, for certain purposes, our most refined psycho- 
metric tool. 


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3. Bortnc, E. G. The Number of Observations on Which a Limen May Be 
Based. Amer. J. of Psychol., 1916, 27, 315 

4. Bortnc, E. G. Control of Attitude in Psychophysical Experiments. 
Psychol. Review, 1920, 27, 440. 

5. Bortnc, E. G. The Stimulus-Error. Amer. J. of Psychol., 1921, 32, 459. 

6. Brown, WARNER. The Judgment of Difference, etc. Univ. Calif. Publ. 
in Psychol., 1910, 1, No. 1. 

7. CULLER, ELMER. Thermal Discrimination and Weber’s Law, with a 
Theory on the Nature and Function of Sensory Adaptation. Arch. of 
Psychol, 1926, No. 81. 

8. aspera G. T. Elemente der Psychophysik. Bd. I, 3te Aufl., Leipzig, 

9. FERNBERGER, S. W. Experimental Study of the “Stimulus Error.” Jour. 
Exper. Psychol., 1921, 4, 63 

10. FisHer, ARNE. Mathematical Theory of Probabilities. Second ed, New 
York, 1922. 

11. ROL ae H. Wahrnehmung der Schwere. Zt. f. Psychol., 1919, 83, 

. Abt., 129. 

12. FrrepLINE, C. L. psa acs of Cutaneous Patterns Below the Two- — 
Point Limen. Amer. J. of Psychol., 1918, 29, 400. 

13. erie S. S. The Effect of Instruction, etc. Amer. J. of Psychol., 1917, 
AWE 

14. Hicter, H. Experimentelle Priifung der psychophysischen Methoden im — 
Bereiche des Raumsinnes der Netzhaut. Phil. Stud., 1892, 7, 232. 

15. Howett, W. H. Textbook of Human Physiology. Eighth ed., Phila- — 
delphia, 1922. 

16. K6uter, W. Die physischen Gestalten in Ruhe und im stationaren Zu- 
stand. Braunschweig, 1920. 

17. Martin, L. J., and Mutter, G. E. Zur Analyse der Unterschiedsempfind- 
lichkeit. Leipzig, 1899. 

18. MerKeEL, J. Theoretische und experimentelle Begriindung der Fehler- 
methoden. Phil. Stud., 1892, 7, 558; 8, 97 

19. Mtxrer, G. E. Gesichtspunkte und Tatsachen der psychophysischen 
Methodik. Wiesbaden, 1904 

20. Pierce, C. S., and Jastrow, J. On Small Differences of Sensation. 
Mem. Nat. Acad. Sci., 1885, 3 (part 1), p. 75. 

21. Rem, A. C. Effect of Varied Instruction on Perception of Lifted Weights. 
Amer. J. of Psychol., 1924, 35, 53. 

22. TuHomson, G. F. A New Point of View in the Interpretation of Threshold | 
Measurements in Psychophysics. Psychol. Rev., 1920, 27, 300. 





STUDIES IN PSYCHOLOGY 137 


r&y: en ue H. Accuracy of the ® (vy) Process. Brit. J. of Psychol., 

24. TircHeneER, E. B. Experimental Psychology: Quantitative, Instructor’s 
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25. Ursan, F. M. Die psychophysischen Massmethoden als Grundlagen 
empirischer Messungen. Arch. f. d. ges. Psychol., 1909, 15, 261; 16, 168. 

26. WarrEN, H. C. Human Psychology. Boston, 1919. 

27. WasHBURN, M. F. Uber den Einfluss der Gesichtsassoziationen auf die 
Raumwahrnehmungen der Haut. Phil. Stud., 11. 

28. WirtH, W. Psychophysik. Leipzig, 1912. 


ALLPORT’S EXPERIMENTS IN. “~ SOCIAL 
BACTOEPATIO NG: 


By E. G. WILLIAMSON 


Allport describes the social group as “ any aggregate consisting 
of two or more persons who are assembled to perform some task, 
to deliberate upon some proposal or topic of interest, or to share 
some affective experience of common appeal.’ In the “ face-to- 
face’ variety of such a group the members “react” to one 
another. In the “ co-acting”’ variety the individuals are primarily 
occupied with some common “ stimulus ”’ beyond themselves ; and 
there the “ response ’’ of the members to a common task or com- 
mon experience is augmented by the sight and sound of others 
doing the same thing. Such an influence of the group upon its 
individual members is termed social facilitation.” In order to 
investigate the influence of this factor upon the members of a co- 
acting group and to compare the results with those of solitary 
workers, Allport had recourse to experiment. By keeping con- 
stant under both conditions such external details as furnishings, 
light, air and the seating of the subjects, the only remaining 
variables were, as he assumes, “ rivalry ’”’ and the “ facilitating ”’ 
presence of others. These two factors produced “a distinct in- 
crease in the quantity and quality of the work of the individual.” 
But rivalry was minimized or eliminated entirely, as he supposes, 
first by a constant amount of time given to each task and secondly 
by eliminating the comparison of achievements, with the under- 
standing that the trials were in no way competitive. The sub- 
jects were instructed, however, to work at a maximal speed 
consistent with accuracy, and they were informed, moreover, 
that all were engaged upon the same task. This elimination of 
rivalry was designed to leave “social facilitation’ as the single 


*F,. H. Arxport, Social Psychology, 1924, 260. 


* Same, Influence of the Group Upon Association and Thought, J. Exper. 
Psychol., 1920, 3, 159-182. 
138 


Oe = 


—_— 





STUDIES IN PSYCHOLOGY 139 


variable factor producing an increase in the work of the indi- 
vidual while a member of a co-acting group. 

So much for Allport; now we consider certain points in 
criticism. In the first place, it is not evident that the expedients 
named would really eliminate the factor of rivalry. A constant 
time for each trial may have prevented a race to finish first; but 
it is not clear that it would rule out competition in accuracy, in 
thoroughness, or in quantity of work. What was to prevent 
either the solitary or the grouped subject from competing against 
time or against a standard of accuracy whether set by himself 
or by the experimenter or implied in the setting of the task? 
This incentive or whip would be every bit as “social” as any 
rivalrous “ desire to win.” It is a social factor, moreover, which 
might appear quite differently in the isolated (A) and the grouped 
(T) work. A numerical difference appearing in the A and T 
performances might well be due to this factor as much as to 
“social facilitation.”’ Allport ignores the fact that rivalry may 
functionate in a solitary individual as well as in a group-member. 
‘“Introspections’”’ of the subjects, meager though they were,* 
suggest that the expedients did not as a matter of fact entirely 
eliminate rivalry. 

In the second place, it was assumed that the only instruction 
which determined the performance of the subject was the verbal 
command of the experimenter. “‘ Situation-instruction’’ and 
“ self-instruction ’’ were overlooked. As every descriptive psy- 
chologist knows, experience is determined from all these sources. 
The subject may instruct himself directly against the command 
of the experimenter, or the situational setting may nullify either.* 

The third criticism has to do with the subjects. Information 
upon them is scanty. They were upper classmen and graduate 

* Allport obviously understands “introspection” to include every sort of 
comment, reflection, speculation, whim or suggestion which occurs to the 
worker to report upon his work, his states, his opinions, the situation at large 
or the general run of events. 

*FERNBERGER, S. W., Effect of Attitude of Subject Upon the Measure of 
Sensibility, Amer. J. Psychol., 1914, 25, 542; Georce, S. S., Attitude in Rela- 
tion to Psychological Judgment, /bid., 1917, 28, 1-37; Bortne, E. G., 


Stimulus-Error, [bid., 1921, 32, 449-471; Brentitey, M., The Field of Psy- 
chology, 1924, 390, and Sup. pp. 1-15. 


140 E. G. WILLIAMSON 


students in psychology, twenty-six in number, although not more 
than fifteen were used in any one experiment. ‘They were ar- 
ranged in groups of three or five when working together. There 
is no indication that they were chosen with the purpose of elimi- 
nating those habituated by past experience to performance in 
groups. There was, furthermore, apparently no effort made to 
secure a fair sampling of the multifarious reactions of different 
individuals to social situations. Such factors might or might not 
influence the results; but it is better technique to control than 
to ignore them. 

Now we turn to the numerical results from which Allport drew 
his inferences. In the Journal article, quantitative comparisons 
in terms of work done are made for “ free chain association ”’ 
and “‘ thought process ” (Tables II-X) with isolated and grouped 
workers (Experiments 1-4 and 6).° In Exper. 4 the average 
number of associations for the average subject is the same (27) ; 
in Exper. 6 the difference is negligible (8.0 + 1.7 and 8.8 = 1.9); 
in Exper. 2 the average excess for the grouped worker is 3.3 
associations (with mean variations more than twice the dif- 
ferences), and in Exper. 3 about the same excess (but with m.v.’s 
of 21.0 and 20.1). Thus in only two of the four experiments 
does the associative output show a distinct difference favoring 
the work in the group, and there the high variability suggests 
that the small difference is without significance. Surely an in- 
secure factual basis for the concept of social facilitation! But 
the case is still worse. A natural basis of comparison of the work 
of a given subject would be the total output (number of associa- 
tions), provided the number of trials was the same in groups 
and in isolation. But Allport ignores the fact that most of his 
workers were subjected to more trials in the group than when 
alone. 

In his Table II will be found a comparison of the number of 
trials for each subject working T and A at successive free asso- 
ciations. As reported the experiments are open to the criticism 


*J. Exper. Psychol., 1920, 3, 164-178. 





STUDIES IN PSYCHOLOGY 141 


that the numerical differences in the results T and A may be 
due to the difference in number of trials together and in isolation, 
instead of—as alleged—to “social facilitation.” Let us com- 
pare the performance of the individual subjects on the basis of 
the average number of associations per trial, T and A. Our 
Table I is constructed from Allport’s data on page 164 to show 
the results of such a comparison. 


TABLE I 


FrEE CHAIN ASSOCIATION 
Aver. No. Assoc. M.V. from 


Subj. No. Trials No. Assoc. - per Trial Aver. of Aver. 
Awd 7; eae Avian le AAS T, 
haa | a ke py ee Be 5611-583 AS 3.0 9 8 — 
Bee, ate 11 P10 62.7 63.4 SPU On Sap Ay /: > 
Re ae 5 6 67.8 78.7 13,50.413.1 We ne — 
Be Wee 5 Litml0 54.3 54.4 48 5.4 4 8 a 
Beas. 6 6 44.2 483 43 Oo pA OT We F p 
a our 10 56.8 55.1 4.3 3.4 oa ue — 
5 aa L47ee 1S b7iotvSa.2 4.1°'°3.8 DLN — 
Beh esto. I3cvh15 56.8 61.2 43 4.0 9 6 — 
2 eh Seely. i K yueenie Y- 68.4 71.2 et All Bt, 0 1.3 nL 
Te ot 14 «16 69.9 72.4 49 4.5 3 Jl — 
(Na ae Zvi 3 65.0 73.0 ne OURS OF NAN, ap 
Pee ey ae y 14 «15 67.4 67.5 48 44 4 vs — 
ee ee 14 16 40.1 46.5 28 29 24 17 ir 
if be th og bre 76.9 80.9 8.0 10.7 eee 9 
eg So aH0 61.4 65.7 12.065 GSincLO — 
Average. 114 13.5 60.3 63.6 5.2 4.6 GaN 


The left half of the Table is Allport’s; the right half is our 
own computation. In the final (right) column, ‘+’ indicates 
performance favorable to the group, and “—”’ favorable to isola- 
tion. Where Allport found a difference of 3.3 (63.6-60.3) in 
favor of T, the difference is really 0.6 (5.2-4.6) in favor of 
isolation ; though, to be sure, the m.v.’s indicate that this difference 
is not more significant than Allport’s. But as the groups stand 
they are contrary to his interpretation. Since he counted noses, 
it is worth noting also that 8 solitary subjects had a higher aver- 
age yield of associations, against 7 who stood ahead in the group. 
Allport might have observed, in inspecting his Table II, (1) that 
9 of the subjects who reported more associations when working 
in the group actually had more trials when grouped, and (2) that 
if 11.4 A-trials produced 60.3 associations, the 13.5 T-trials 


142 E. G. WILLIAMSON 


might have been expected (without “social facilitation’’) to 
produce above 70 associations—not (as reported) 63.6. 

We have treated in a similar way Allport’s quantitative results 
from his Exper. 3, 4, and 6 (figures are wanting for Exper. 5). 
All four experiments are summarized in our Table II. In all of 


TABLE TI 


SUMMARY OF EXPERIMENTS 2-4, 6 


iv No. Subj. with 
from Aver. No. Subj. Greater (or 


Aver. No. Aver. No. of Aver. with Equal) No. 
Experi- Trials Assoc. No. Assoc. Excess Assoc. Trials for 
ment per Subj. per Trial per Trial Favorableto: A.andT. 
Asani. Anal. Aeltuke Fata ea Be A. T. Equal 
AAS ORC RS AN We YO5e 7175 5 ed 4 10/78 
NPA Son oe), 21.02 20.35 5.28 4.35 6 8 2S ee 
en ie bn We 3687313 1.76 1.91 Teel LOG ser 
PAM te 8 LER sy ns Aes 0.89 0.62 0.79 0.27 7 ah J ycOGae 


them the average number of associations® for the average trial 
was greater in isolation than in the group; and, again, 25 sub- 
jects exceeded in this condition, where only 21 subjects turned 
out more associations (on the average per trial) when grouped. 
This evidence certainly does not appear to sustain our author’s 
inferences upon “ social facilitation.”’ 

Additional experiments (reported in the Social Psychology, 
pp. 274-278), directed toward the estimation of the degree of 
pleasantness and unpleasantness and of light and heavy weights, 
are thought by the author to “ establish” the fact of “ shunning 
extremes and expressing more moderate estimates when in the 
presence of other judges.” Wanting individual records, measures 
of variability, adequate reports of the subjects, and the precise 
experimental conditions, it is impossible to decide whether this 
wide induction upon “ social conformity ”’ is really supported by 
the evidence at hand.’ 


* The unit-association (the basis of A’s results) is, as everyone knows, a 
highly variable and uncertain factor. Whether it is sufficiently fixed to be 
indicative in this connection we doubt. 

“It is not clear how one continuous scale of affective degrees could be used 
for both pleasantness and unpleasantness. Furthermore, we are not told 
whether the notable absorption of odors by clothing, the admixture of smell- 
stimulus and body-odor, and the more intensive air currents of the group were 
properly taken into account. 








STUDI Er INR SY GCHOLOGY 143 


We have one further point in criticism to offer. Were All- 
port’s deductions from the figures justified, we might still com- 
plain at his conception of “social response’ and the use which 
he makes of it in this context. One may of course arbitrarily 
assume sociality among physically associated individuals who 
stand or sit within sight and hearing of each other, and one may 
further assume that the sociality rests upon, and is inherent in, 
the perceptions and movements incident to such a physical con- 
junction. One would then be inclined to deny—as Allport seems 
to deny—sociality to the solitary person and always and only 
to find it in the group. But such assumptions would over- 
look, at the very least, two important conditions of socializa- 
tion. In the first place, a person is as obviously socialized by 
the sight of a personal gift, a coat thrown into the gutter, or a 
jimmied pantry window, as he is by the jostling throng or the 
call of a street-peddler; and, secondly, a personal relation con- 
sidered in memory or imagination, that is to say without physical 
presence, is quite as social a relation as propinquity could possibly 
be. Social significances and references can enter, then, into 
(1) the perception of lifeless objects and into (2) absent per- 
sons as really as by way of the sight and sound of a physical 
associate. And if they can so “enter ’’, then why not conceivably 
“ facilitate’ or “inhibit”? performance? It seems to be only a 
determination to adhere to the naive conception of sociality as 
depending upon, the immediate give-and-take of congregated 
animals, upon stimulus-and-response, in the behavioristic phrase, 
that leads to the problem of facilitation as outlined by our author. 
In experiments of our own, where we have sought in vain for a 
general facilitating effect of sociality, it has appeared that 
sociality can never be imposed by, or assumed from, “ presence ”’ 
or “absence,” but that it must be authenticated by the socialized 
person himself. 


QUALITATIVE RESEMBLANCE AMONG ODORS 


By Maptson BENTLEY 


However they may have fallen short of a definitive classifica- 
tion of odors, the experimental studies since Henning have at 
least made it clear that the investigations must now be carried 
on with a refined technique, in large numbers, and with carefully 
and specially trained observers. The vast number of exciting 
substances, the varied appeal to the receptors, olfactory and non- 
olfactory, and the complex qualitative relationships among the 
odors themselves combine to make the task exceedingly difficult. 
Henning’s preliminary observations and his proposal of a classifi- 
catory scheme have at once aroused new interest and suggested 
new modes of attack upon an ancient psychological problem.* 

Our own small contribution lies in the direction of additional 
controls and safeguards and in the proposal of slight methodical 
changes. We have taken fifty odorous substances (thirty-three 
of them chemically definable) and we have tried to determine the 
qualitative relationships of these fifty to three standards, chosen 
somewhat arbitrarily to stand near the spicy, fragrant and ethereal 
“corners” of Henning’s figure. Our standards were S = nut- 
meg, I == heliotrope and E=lemon oil. The E was, unfortu- 
nately, a complex and undetermined substance.” Everyone who 
has worked with the problem knows the difficulties of discovering 
satisfactory representatives of these landmarks upon the proposed 
smell-figure. With care the three standard odors were, however, 
kept sensible constant through the experiments. The exact place 
which they may occupy in Henning’s system is of no particular 
consequence to our own problem. 

*H. Henning, Das Geruch, 2nd ed., 1924; F. L. Dimmick, Amer. J. Psychol., 
1922, 33, 423-425; M. K. Macdonald, ibid., 1922, 33, 535-553. 

* The standards and the unknowns were chosen without the writer’s sugges- 
tion that he might observe them “without knowledge.” The arrangements — 


were made by Miss L. M. Hatfield, who served as experimenter throughout the 
research with objectivity, carefulness and high intelligence. 


144 





SLUDIES EN PSYCHOLOGY 145 


Care in presenting the substances, in respiration, and in the 
confusion of smells with other qualities has been much dwelt 
upon in recent studies ; although the standardization of these mat- 
ters has not gone very far. A long series of preliminary experi- 
ments directed us toward the control of olfactory intensities 
(concentration and distance of the exciting substance) and 
toward the elimination of disturbing circumstances. Our vapor 
current was dirhinic. E carefully governed the time of exposure 
by means of a silent metronome. Rate, order, interval, and other 
sources of variable error were provided for. O sat near an 
elevator shaft toward which a small motor-fan, run at moderate 
speed, was directed; but he sat just outside the main current of 
air. By leaning slightly forward he could bring his face into 
the current and so improve ventilation. E’s manipulation of 
the small black, glass-stoppered containers went on within the 
air current between O and the shaft. The procedure was strictly 
without knowledge, save when the writer observed, and then 
O’s information only included the general setting and not the 
number, order or names of the stimuli. Excitation of the blind- 
folded observer was usually restricted to one inhalation, which 
was taken under the following general instruction. 


“Make yourself as comfortable as possible and try to maintain an attitude 
of affective indifference throughout the experiment. Before each stimulus is 
presented I shall say ‘Ready,’ and at the word ‘Now’ I shall present the 
stimulus. I want you to inhale deeply but steadily, being careful not to sniff, 
and then to exhale rather suddenly. Attend carefully to the olfactory quality, 
and to that alone. Report if you notice any temporal change in the quality. 
Be careful to base your comparisons upon quality, and not on pungency, affec- 
tiveness or any verbalizations which might be attached to the stimulus.” 

We laid great stress upon comfort, bodily relaxation, complete 
divorce of O from the setting and the manipulations, absolute 
quiet and absence of chatter with FE, strict training of E in a 
monotonous and nonsuggestive set of signals, prompt exhalation 
of the breath, and a set for olfactory quality only. It is now 
apparent that contaminations from successive excitations easily 
damage olfactory results. Our sudden exhalation and the im- 
mediate removal of the vaporous air by currents greatly reduced 
the difficulty and at the same time notably prevented intensive 


reduction under exhaustion. 


146 MADISON BENTLEY 


Our chief method employed three successive odors, the. first 
and second of which represented the “standards.” The special 
instruction here, given at the beginning of each series of ten, 
was as follows: 


“T am going to give you three olfactory qualities in the order one, two, 
three. Report whether three is more like one or two, and give the degree of 
resemblance in terms of ‘small,’ ‘medium’ and ‘great.’ If it is like neither, 
report ‘unrelated.’ Give also the degree of your assurance in terms of ‘low,’ 
‘moderate’ and ‘high.’ ” 

The main inspection concerned the three qualities, with the 
Aufgabe to report relative likeness. The interpretation of the 
reports, especially the discovery of faulty and changing criteria, 


was aided by the commentaries of O. Albeit, the better the 


TABLE I 

List oF Oporous SUBSTANCES 
1. n-Caproic Acid 26. Essence of Sassafras * 
2. n-Heptoic Acid 27. Di-n-butyl Amine 
3. n-Butyl Alcohol 28. Vanillin 
4. Phenyl Ethyl Alcohol 29. Coumarin 
5. Chloral Hydrate 30. Geraniol 
6. Menthol 31. Benzyl Chloride 
7. Quinoline 32. Ethyl Hexahydrobenzoate 
8. Dimethyl Aniline 33. Oil of Cloves * 
9. n-Butyl Acetate 34. p-Toluene Sulfonylchloride 
10. Diethyl Diethyl-malonate 35. Essence of Peppermint * 


11. Ethyl n-Valerate 36. n-Ethyl Acetanilide 
12. Ethyl Cinnamate 37. Iodine * 

13. Methyl Salicylate 38. Listerine * 

14. Anethole 39. Fish Oil * 

15. Anisol 40. Strong Cheese * 
16. o-Bromotoluene 41. Citral 

17. p-Cymene 42. Mutton Tallow * 


18. p-Dichlorobenzene 

19. Essence of Wintergreen * 
20. n-Propyl Bromide 

21. Acetophenone 


. Nitrobenzene * 

. Oil of Mace * 

. Caryophyllorum * 

. Syrup of Sarsaparilla * 


22. Phenol 47. Oil of Juniper * 
23. Eugenol 48. Sulphuric Ether * 
24. Camphor 49. Oil of Terebinth * 
25. Pinene 50. Naphthalene * 


* Chemically undetermined. 


arrangements of E and the more reliable the O, the fewer the 
comments! All reports of “low assurance” were later repeated. 
At the end of each series O made an estimate of its reliability. 
Where this estimate was low and where other comments gave 
evidence of unfavorable conditions for observation, the entire 





STUDIES IN PSYCHOLOGY 147 


series was repeated at another time. Three series of 10 reports 
each filled the observation-hour. Each of the fifty unknowns 
was presented at least once with each possible combination of 
two }of) the - standards’; F\—— fragrant, | == ethereal) and 
S== spicy. These combinations were FE, ES and SF, given in 
the two temporal orders. 

The experiment was carried through with three junior students 
who had had, at the least, the general laboratory training. The 
main difficulty with such Os is the confusion of the object-smell 
with the olfactory quality (Gegebenheitsgeruch). Despite our 
caveats and despite the want of visual and other outside knowl- 
edge, the commentaries make it evident that (1) substances were 
at times ‘“‘ recognized”’ and then compared as objects and (2) 
extraneous qualities (pressure, pain, coldness, and the like) were 
used as criteria. The results accord fairly well with like results 
of other observers. Where a comparison with Henning (H), 
Dimmick (D) and Macdonald (M) is possible, we have set it 
down for whatever it may be worth. (Subscripts in the D-results 
indicate the number of placements.) Our Os agreed fairly well 
upon unknowns 8, 10, 14, 16, 19, 23, 28, 33, 41 and 44. The 
origin of some discrepancies appears in the commentaries; but 
other disagreements stand unexplained. 


No. 6. Menthol. H(LS), D(SiwEs;), M(near the center of the FESR 
face of the prism). All of our Os placed this on the SE side. 

No.14. Anethole. H(S), M(S standard). Our Os placed this most 
often at S, but they also found a primary relationship with F and a slight 
resemblance to E. 

No. 15. Anisol. H and M(S). Our Os found it unrelated. 

No. 24. Camphor. H(R), D(RwSsE:). Our Os placed this on the 
SF side, weighted slightly on F. 

No. 25. Pinene. H(R), M(R and near the center of the FESR face). 
Our reports are contradictory. Each O placed it at least once near each 
of the three corners, but also “no relation” was reported. 

No. 26. Essence of Sassafras. H(SR), D(SwEsF.,). This seems to 
be a triplex odor. It was placed eight times near S, six near FE, and eight 
times near F. 

No. 28. Vapillin. H(FS), D(E), M(F). All Os placed this on the 
FS side, nearer F. 

No. 29. Coumarin. H(FS), D(FiwE:S:R:). Placements near F, near 
E, and near S. 

No. 30. Geraniol. H(FE), M(ES near the middle). R, a simplex 
F-odor; W and J, resemblance to all three standards. 

No. 33. Oil of Cloves. H(FS), D(SwEsFs). All Os; nearer S than 
any other corner, though small resemblance to F and E. 


148 MADISON BENTLEY 


No. 35. Essence of Peppermint. D(SiReEsF:). Resemblance as re- 
ported by our Os is greatest toward S, with relationship also to E and S. 
Ag: ut Citral. H(E), M(E standard). Our Os; resemblance to S, 
E and F. 
No. 47. Oil of Juniper. H(R), D(RuE.S;3). R, a triplex odor; W, 
consistently near E, and J at S. 
No. 48. Sulphuric Ether. H places most ethers at E. Our Os placed 
Sulphuric Ether most often at E; but W also with F; R reported it a simplex 
E, and J as wholly unrelated. 


An entire set was also carried out, under the method of “three 
stimuli,” with the writer serving as observer. The greatest care 
was taken to derive the report immediately from the olfactory 
qualities. Frequently the standards themselves were not recog- 
nized and verbalized because of the formal- and self-instruction 
‘ to take each quality as simply “this ”’ and so to set the relative 
degrees of relationship. The results for observer B are tabulated 
in Table II. In the vertical columns are recorded the placing 
of the fifty unknowns with respect to FE, ES and SF. Capital 
letters in the table stand for high relationship, small letters 
for low, coefficients for the number of times reported, and U 
for “ unrelated.”’ 

Only two unknowns (25, 49) appear as related only to the 
ethereal standard; one (No. 36) to the S-standard only, and 
none only to F. Twelve (in Class IV) stood related to E and S 
only, and three others showed only a trace of F-ness. Only four 
(Nos. 9, 19, 29, 39 in Class V) excluded the S-relationship en- 
tirely. The largest single class (VII) contains 16 odors which 
display a general relationship to E, F and S; and 6 (Class 
VIII) stand almost entirely unrelated to all three. The remoter 
relation to F, for our whole series, is shown in the total entries ; 
F— 54, S=87, E=90. Nevertheless, our Os (as well as 
Dimmick and Macdonald) noticed the small qualitative distance 
separating F and E. Where our relationships were equivocal we 
followed the set with a second lot (two-stimuli set) in which a 
given unknown was compared (for close, remote, or no relation) 
with one standard at a time. These results are put down in the 
three narrow columns, under the headings “ E,” “S” and “F.” 
'They confirm very nicely the relationships of the unknowns and 





Class I 


STUDIES IN PSYCHOLOGY 
Table I 


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150 MADISON BENTLEY 


substantiate the less-tried method of comparing two qualitative- 
relations (three-stimuli method) .* 

It is impossible to say, as it has been in other investigations, 
how many of the unknowns were single qualities. It is impos- 
sible, e.g., to say whether geramiol (No. 30) resembles E and S 
as orange resembles a given red and a given yellow or as a tonal 
fusion resembles (by way of its several components) two neigh- 
boring tones. Before the olfactory qualities can be ordered, 
more knowledge of the simple items of olfactory experience must 
be acquired. Besides smell compounds, we have to contend with 
the interjection of warmth, cold, taste, pressure, tickle and pain. 
The writer was astonished to find what a large contribution to 
“smell”. is made by the simple pressures of inhalation. He 
discovered that when a weak inhalation (without the intent to 
“smell in’’ a substance) cancelled these pressures, a single odor- 
ous quality was totally unlocalized. Regarded as a moment in 
experience, it was no more in-the-nose than it was in-the-hand 
or in-the-outside-air. This result has since been strikingly con- 
firmed by Skramlik,* who found that the accessory qualities 
(which he severally disposes of in the nasal cavity) supplied the 
localization. He gives a long list (p. 104) of chemical sub- 
stances which are without accessory effect and which he finds 
to be unlocalizable. Both our experiments and Skramlik’s suggest 
that this lack of reference to the sense organ in “ 
may be of first-rate importance in setting qualitative relations. 

Our small experiment suggests that the hope of discovering 
order and arrangement among the olfactory qualities will be 
remote until the simple qualities are directly compared without 
admixture of non-olfactory elements. The task of the observer 


pure smells ”’ 


* After our experiments were completed (1924) appeared Findley’s use of 
the three-stimulus method (Amer. J. Psychol., 1924, 35, 436-445). In his case 
the unknown was presented between the two standards where, in our experi- 
ments, it was given after them. Only one standard (E = ethereal) and none 
of comparison-stimuli were common to the two investigations. Findley’s Os 
gave but little consistency in their degrees of relationship, and he concludes 
that “it is thus impossible to verify Henning’s qualitative theory with any 
great degree of precision ” (445). 

“E. v. Skramlik, Ueber die Lokalization der Empfindungen bei den niederen 
Sinnen. Zsch. f. Sinnesphysiol., 1925, 56, 69-140. 


———— ee 


STUDIES IN PSYCHOLOGY 151 


should be further simplified; his instructions should be more 
specific and constant, and the criteria used in his comparison 
should be standardized with greater care. With adequately 
trained observers the direct comparison of similarity-differences 
is feasible, and it promises, under rigid control, to advance our 
knowledge of the olfactory system. 










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